

# Workshop on Welfare

July 12 – 13, 2023 – Saarland University

## Wednesday, July 12

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[\*The Ground of the Moral Value of Welfare: Personal or Impersonal?\*](#)
- 12:30 – 13:15 Adriano Mannino (LMU Munich & UC Berkeley)  
[\*Infinity, Transitivity, & the Measure of Welfare\*](#)
- Lunchbreak*
- 14:15 – 15:00 Rhys Southan (University of Oxford)  
[\*Explaining and Defending the Axiological Basis for the No-Difference View\*](#)
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[\*From Deduction to Rejection: A Novel Approach to Non-Aggregative Theories in Welfarist Axiology\*](#)
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July 12, 11:15 – 12:00

Jonas Harney (Saarland University)

***The Ground of the Moral Value of Welfare: Personal or Impersonal?***

What grounds the moral value of welfare? Some people believe that welfare has moral value because it is good, or has value, for individuals (cf. Holtug 2004, Holtug and Adler 2019). We can call this Personal Ground. Others have claimed that welfare has value because it is good, period, or has simply value (cf. Parfit 1984). This is Impersonal Ground. The two views have been advocated in the context of population ethics; also, value theorists debate whether final value is personal or impersonal (for example, Regan 2004, Rosati 2008, Kraut 2011, Hurka 2021). In this talk, I will examine the two positions and argue for Personal Ground: Welfare has moral value because it has personal value.

In a first step, I provide an argument for Personal Ground. Intuitively, we morally value welfare for the sake of the individuals whose welfare it is. If Impersonal Ground were correct, I argue, we would morally value free-floating value and, thus, it would not be true that we morally value welfare for the sake of the individuals whose welfare it is. Therefore, we have good reason to accept Personal Ground.

Second, I consider a reductionist strategy which proponents of Impersonal Ground may provide. They may argue that we can understand personal value as impersonal value which is possessed by an individual. However, reductionism about personal value is not able to account for what is peculiar about Personal Ground. It cannot account for the moral severity of conflict cases in which we can provide welfare only to one of two persons. On Impersonal Ground, such a case is not morally important, because the individuals drop out of the picture. While proponents of the reductionist strategy have some room to manoeuvre here, I show that they cannot fully explain what is peculiar about such cases.

Third, I consider what is known as the Container Objection against Impersonal Ground. I distinguish it from a similar, yet different, objection: the Replaceability Objection, which is not directed against Impersonal Ground itself but aims against the implication of certain moral theories that it is morally neutral to replace one individual with another as long as the individual realizes the same amount of welfare. According to the Container Objection, by contrast, Impersonal Ground treats individuals as container of what is morally important, because the individuals do not figure in the explanation why welfare has moral value. Since this is in conflict with the individuals being of primary moral concern, as I argue, we should reject Impersonal Ground.

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July 12, 12:30 – 13:15

Adriano Mannino (LMU Munich & UC Berkeley)

### ***Infinity, Transitivity, & the Measure of Welfare***

Extensively measurable quantities – such as mass or length – are fully additive in their parts. The attractive idea that there is such a thing as a sum of welfare, or a sum of the value of welfare, requires that welfare and its value be extensively measurable (cf. Nebel, forthcoming).<sup>1</sup>

In this paper, I argue that one of the leading arguments feeding into the case for the extensive measurability of welfare – the so-called Aggregation Argument – is faced with a serious infinitarian problem. The argument proceeds from plausible principles of anonymity, transitivity, and Pareto, and aims to establish that “the numbers count” (pace Taurek 1977). Most recently, it has been advocated by Gustafsson 2021. If the numbers did not count, the project of establishing the extensive measurability of welfare and its value would be doomed from the start. Hence the argument’s importance for theorists attracted to the idea that welfare can be summed. Here is a sketch of the argument, applied to the choice context of effecting the survival of the equally good lives of A, B, and C:

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| (1) A survives $\sim$ B survives                    | (via anonymity := identity permutation invariance) |
| (2) B survives $<$ B & C survive                    | (via Pareto)                                       |
| (3) $(x \sim y) \wedge (y < z) \rightarrow (x < z)$ | (IP-transitivity)                                  |
| (4) A survives $<$ B & C survives                   | (numbers count)                                    |

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<sup>1</sup> Extensive structures can be characterized in terms of the following necessary and sufficient properties: completeness and transitivity of the relation on the respective set of objects (e.g., masses), weak associativity of the concatenation operation for members of the set, monotonicity, and an Archimedean property (cf. Krantz et al. 1971).

The survival of A is equally as good as the survival of B; the survival of B & C is better than the survival of B; IP-transitivity holds for the respective relation; and therefore, the survival of B & C is better than the survival of A, viz., the numbers count. The argument is valid, and none of its premises are easy to deny. Premises (1) and (2) are important welfare axiological desiderata, and the denial of premise (3) generates a preference cycle that can be money-pumped, which invites the charge of irrationality.

However, there is an infinite version of the argument that should, I argue,<sup>2</sup> induce significant doubt about the argument's soundness. The integers used below denote individuals whose lives are each equally good:

- (1) 1, 2, 3, ... survive  $\sim$  -1, -2, -3, ... survive (via anonymity)
- (2) -1, -2, -3, ... survive  $<$  0, -1, -2, -3, ... survive (via Pareto)
- (3)  $(x \sim y) \wedge (y < z) \rightarrow (x < z)$  (IP-transitivity)
- (4) 1, 2, 3, ... survive  $<$  0, -1, -2, -3, ... survive

Unfortunately, (4) is now false: If we affirm (1), we can hardly uphold (4). The set {1, 2, 3, ...} can be generated via an identity permutation/bijection from {0, -1, -2, -3, ...}: pair 1 with 0, 2 with -1, 3 with -2, etc. Anonymity thus entails that the survival of either set of individuals is equally good, such that we could have started with 1, 2, 3, ...  $\sim$  0, -1, -2, -3, ... as our first premise. If we find ourselves attracted to the welfare axiological desiderata of anonymity and Pareto, we might now consider giving up transitivity (as Kagan 2015 has done in infinite contexts). This should then lead us to greater open-mindedness about “rethinking the good” along intransitive lines (cf. Temkin 2012). In particular, given the central role of transitivity in the characterization of extensive structures, it should induce doubt about whether welfare and its value can be summed. If transitivity cannot generally be upheld, we should reduce our confidence in the soundness of the Aggregation Argument for the (finite) numbers counting.

However, the problem runs deeper than this. Infinite cases also lay bare a conflict between anonymity and Pareto: Anonymity entails that the survival of {0, 2, 4, 6 ...}, say, is equally as good as the survival of {0, 1, 2, 4, 6 ...}, given that the latter can be generated from the former via an identity permutation. This is inconsistent with Pareto, which entails that the survival of the latter set is better than the survival of the former set.

This conflict between anonymity and Pareto is troubling – it should further reduce our confidence in the soundness of the Aggregation Argument, given that the compatibility of two of its premises is now in doubt. I argue that authors from Vallentyne and Kagan 1997 to

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<sup>2</sup> My overall case includes various arguments to the effect that choice situations involving infinitely many individuals cannot be ignored or sidelined in axiological and moral theorizing.

Bostrom 2011 and Bader 2023 have underestimated the severity of the challenge posed by infinite ethics. In particular, Pareto principles pose a surprisingly deep challenge to the axiological summation of welfare. They play no part in the general characterization of extensively measurable quantities (cf. footnote 1), which is especially evident in infinite cases: An infinite set of 1kg masses remains unchanged in its total weight if we add to it a further 1kg mass; no Pareto analog holds for masses. I conclude that if Pareto holds for personal welfare and its value (including in infinite cases), this casts serious doubt on the idea that welfare can be summed.

### References

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July 12, 14:15 – 15:00

Rhys Southan (University of Oxford)

### ***Explaining and Defending the Axiological Basis for the No-Difference View***

In *Reasons and Persons*, Parfit introduces the No-Difference View as his preferred solution to the Non-Identity Problem. He doesn't clearly define the view, but we can construct an implied definition from his discussion of it.

**No-Difference View (NDV):** In "same number cases"—that is, cases in which the same number of people will exist no matter which action we choose—the value of the outcome makes a moral difference, but the identities of those who receive the value doesn't make a moral difference, nor does whether the value will be better or worse for the beneficiaries rather than just "non-comparatively" (or "intrinsically") good or bad for them.

Parfit didn't clearly spell out the NDV's axiological basis. In this talk, I will explain what I believe this axiological basis is and what its implications are—including what distinguishes it from Totalism—and argue we should accept this view. I leave open whether we should also accept the deontic NDV.

### *What the Axiological Basis for the No-Difference View Is*

**Axiological Basis for the No-Difference View (ABNDV):** When we evaluate world A, the values of possible worlds other than A are irrelevant to our evaluation of A.

In other words, unknown counterfactual alternatives to intrinsic goods or bads do not affect the value of those goods or bads. Better or worse nearby possible worlds we are unaware of do not affect the value of this world. Comparative value matters instrumentally. “Better” tends to refer to more intrinsic good and less intrinsic bad, and “worse” tends to refer to less intrinsic good and more intrinsic bad, yet the betterness or worseness of particular intrinsic goods or bads adds or detracts nothing from them.

### *What the ABNDV Implies, and Why it's Not Quite Totalism*

If the ABNDV is true, there is no evaluative difference between someone (“A”) having an undesirable condition that is inextricable from their existence and someone else (“B”) having that exact same condition due to a contingent mishap—so long as “B” does not know the condition was avoidable. What matters about the condition is the absolute badness it brings those who have it; the potential betterness or not of nearby possible worlds in which they lack or don't lack the condition should not change how we evaluate this world. It is not better to be “A” than to be “B” despite the fact that “B”'s condition is worse for “B” and that same condition is not worse for “A.” This explains the NDV's verdict on Medical Programmes and Depletion.

ABNDV resembles Totalism in that both are solely concerned with the intrinsic value of worlds. Like Totalism, ABNDV implies a starting/continuing symmetry: it is not more valuable to save a life than to create a new life that will contain the same amount and quality of wellbeing as the rest of the saved life would contain. However, unlike Totalism, ABNDV does not immediately imply all versions of the Repugnant Conclusion. A world of 100 lives with 1 wellbeing each does necessarily not contain the same quality of wellbeing as 1 life at 100 wellbeing might contain. However, ABNDV might imply the version of the Repugnant Conclusion which Douglas Portmore called “Short-Lived Z,” in which the Z world has a greater quality and identical quality of life as the A world, just spread amongst very many very short lives.

*Why we should accept the ABNDV*

I'll have to save this for the talk itself!

July 12, 15:30 – 16:15

Kevin Xia (University of Vienna) & Paul Sonnleitner (TU Vienna)

***From Deduction to Rejection: A Novel Approach to Non-Aggregative Theories in Welfarist Axiology***

The primary objective of this paper is to provide a deductive and non-intuitive perspective on ethics. This leads us to reject the commonly assumed notion of aggregating welfare, but raises some issues in common non-aggregative theories.

We argue that the term “good” fundamentally conveys a sense of desirability for certain qualities or characteristics, and that the term “bad” conveys a similar sense of undesirability. By broadly defining pleasure as a “consciously experienced desirable state of mind”, we demonstrate that *pleasure* is *good* by definition. Analogously, *suffering* is shown to be *bad* by definition. Therefore, we deem a welfarist axiology to be logically necessary.

By choosing such a deductive approach, our conclusions diverge from many frameworks that are based on the intuitive appeal of valuing pleasure and suffering. Most notably, we draw on the “separateness of persons” argument articulated by scholars like John Taurek and Richard Ryder to demonstrate that aggregated welfare - the sum of welfare across individuals - is not itself experienced. We argue that in order for something to be *desirable*, it has to be *experienced*. Consequently, the notion of aggregated welfare is vulnerable to the same critique as other unexperienced concepts, such as rights, freedom, and justice. This ultimately leads us to reject the aggregation of welfare.

Welfarist scholars who reject the use of aggregation as a normative principle commonly propose that actions should be geared towards the individual who is suffering the most. We critically examine this “maximum sufferer” hypothesis by questioning both its focus on *suffering* rather than *pleasure* and its emphasis on the “*maximum* sufferer” rather than the largest *difference* in the individuals’ welfare that an action can cause.

Our criticism centres around the implications of different normative principles: whilst a focus on the maximum *sufferer* might be justified based on the principle of “*avoiding* the worst state possible”, a mirror argument can be constructed that advocates for prioritising the *happiest*

individual based on a principle of “*achieving* the best possible state”. We propose a solution by arguing that the normative term “ought” has a negative focus, emphasising avoidance (suffering) rather than desirability (pleasure). Similarly, while the argument for focusing on the *maximum* sufferer might be justified by the normative principle of “avoiding the worst *state* possible”, one could also argue for causing the largest increase in welfare within an individual based on the normative principle of “maximising *the reduction* in suffering”.

However, we reject this hypothesis, by demonstrating that it can give rise to contradictory normative guidance. While we ultimately agree with the “maximum sufferer” hypothesis, we believe that these considerations are essential for a comprehensive understanding of the rejection of aggregation.

By rejecting aggregation many scholars disregard the relevance of the number of individuals involved entirely (i.e., when choosing between killing one or five people, one ought to flip a coin). We argue that by subdividing actions and excluding welfare changes we do not have a marginal impact on, the number of individuals involved naturally arises as a tie-breaker. Furthermore, we use this approach to develop a novel method of assessing and comparing the value of two different worlds.

Overall, our paper provides a more comprehensive understanding as well as a novel perspective on the rejection of aggregation and its implications for ethical decision-making. We hope that our analysis will encourage further debate and inquiry into this important area of ethical theory.

July 12, 16:45 – 18:15

Krister Bykvist (Stockholm University)

***Transformative experiences and attitude-sensitive wellbeing***

L. A. Paul has reminded us that some experiences are truly transformative. They both teach us something new and change our fundamental preferences. In short, they are both epistemically and personally transformative. Examples of transformative experiences include having a child, going to war, gaining sight or hearing, and converting to a religion. Paul argues that these experiences pose a serious challenge for traditional decision theory, a challenge that cannot be met without some radical revisions of this theory. In my talk, I want to extend this discussion and ask whether transformative experiences pose a challenge for attitude-sensitive accounts of wellbeing. I shall argue that there is indeed such a challenge, but that it can be met.



July 13, 10:00 – 10:45

Ana Patricia Melchor Organista (Autonomous Metropolitan University Mexico)

***What would an empirically based perfectionist theory of well-being look like?***

In this ongoing project, we explore the requirements and implications that an empirically grounded theory that follows the traditional principles of perfectionism would entail, and how it would hold up against the other major theories of well-being.

Perfectionist theories of WB are known for grounding what is good for us to those things that contribute to the realisation of our shared human nature. The latter concept has been heavily criticised for not giving space to the vast differences we have as human beings, members of different social groups, with different life histories, values and aspirations. The concept of human nature that we start from is minimal and empirically based, i.e., it is based on the fact that we are social mammals with an incredible degree of complexity in our relationships and dynamics with the world and each other, product of language and culture.

We need each other to survive and thrive, and we strive for similar things, such as a sense of belonging and being important to others, doing things that have meaning, and taking pleasure in our activities. How exactly we can achieve these things is open-ended and achievable in a variety of ways.

The perfectionist theories of WB are identified as objectivist theories because the evaluation of what is good for our lives does not depend solely on how we evaluate it (as pleasurable, as in a hedonistic theory (Bramble, 2016, 2018), or as the fulfilment of a desire we hold, as in a desire-fulfilment theory (Heathwood, 2018, 2021); and it also differs from the other major Objectivist theory, the Objective List theories of WB (Wolf, 2010, 2015), in that it postulates a single ultimate value for those things that can contribute to our well-being by developing or perfecting our nature, which gives this theory a parsimonious edge.

Drawing heavily on the perfectionist theory presented by Flanagan (2007), we extend the idea that the real question we ask when we talk about well-being has to do with what a good life consists in. We also explore how our subjective evaluations fit in our lives going well, primarily by examining the role that our specific values play in this good life we aspire to, drawing on the work of Valerie Tiberius (2008, 2018), but also considering the role of pleasure and pain in our lives.

The outline we propose has the advantage of being compatible with the best evolutionary explanations we have and can rule out major problems of subjectivist theories, for example, by giving us clear reasons why people do not experience well-being under oppressive

circumstances, even when they think they do. It also does justice to the resonance constraint, because our well-being has to do with our judgments about our lives, seen in a long term and situated within our communities and relationships with other people, with whom we have more in common than it might seem at first glance, so long as we share important cognitive, affective and conative properties and goals.

July 13, 11:15 – 12:00

Willem van der Deijl (Tilburg University)

***Only sentient beings are welfare subjects***

Recently, Lin (2021), Van der Deijl (2021), and Bradford (2022) observe a tension between the view that wellbeing is not merely a function of our experiences (extra-experientialism); and the view that only sentient beings are welfare subjects. This tension can be phrased in the following three statements that each appear to have significant plausibility (see Bradford 2022):

- 1) Only phenomenally conscious subjects are welfare subjects
- 2) Some welfare goods are not solely properties of phenomenally conscious states
- 3) All instantiations of welfare goods result in welfare

Interestingly, the authors draw different conclusions about this tension. Van der Deijl (2021), defending experientialism, suggests the tension is mostly an argument against claim 2: it is a good argument for the view that only experiential states can non-derivatively contribute to wellbeing. Bradford, defending extra-experientialism, suggests that it is a good argument against 1: also non-sentient beings can have welfare.<sup>3</sup>

In this contribution, I will defend claim 1 contra Bradford. I provide three arguments:

- 1) **Explosion:** A first problem with Bradford's argument is that it implausibly expands the number of welfare subjects. If we accept knowledge and achievement as welfare goods (as Bradford does), non-sentient plants, computers, and AI models should all count as welfare subjects. This is so, despite there not being anything like it to be such an object (after all, this is what defines phenomenal consciousness). This clashes starkly with considered intuitive judgments.
- 2) **Fairness:** Bradford herself suggests that the expansion of welfare subjects may, but need not result in far-reaching ethical implications. While we may have duties towards such entities in virtue of their welfare interests, they may only be able to obtain very

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<sup>3</sup> Lin resolves the tension in another way.

low levels of welfare. However, reasons of fairness typically speak in favor of prioritizing those who are only able to obtain low levels of welfare. For instance, we have special duties to those with welfare-limiting disabilities, specifically because their ability to achieve higher levels of wellbeing is limited. Consequently, if we adopt some egalitarian (or prioritarian or sufficientarian) concerns, as we plausibly should, and there are non-sentient welfare subjects, then we do have strong duties towards them. This adds to the first argument: not only are ascriptions of wellbeing to non-sentient computers, AI models, and plants counter-intuitive, they also result in implausible moral judgments.

- 3) **Parsimony:** Famously, Occam's razor dictates that we should not "*multiply entities without necessity*". Contra Bradford, experientialists provide a parsimonious theory of both welfare subjects and welfare goods. The experientialist can appeal to a single good – e.g. pleasure, or experiential valence – which explains both a wide variety of our intuitions about welfare levels, and can account for all our intuitions about welfare subjects. The extra-experientialist solution presupposes both more welfare goods – including knowledge and achievement – as well as much more welfare subjects. While both the extra-experientialist and experientialist cannot account for all people's considered judgments, we should prefer the experientialist for reasons of parsimony.

## References

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July 13, 12:30 – 13:15

Luca Stroppa (University of St. Andrews)

### *A dilemma for wellbeing pluralists*

What makes our lives go best? On Value Pluralism, many different values constitute a good life: meaningful relationships, fulfilling projects, pleasure, health and more (Fletcher 2014, Lin 2013, Nagel 1979).

One of the core tenets of pluralists is what I call “Balanced Pluralism”. It says that lives that are excellent across many dimensions are always better than lives that are average across

all dimensions. Imagine a “balanced” life that is excellent in all values: we have successful projects, fulfilling relationships, and very positive balance of pleasure over pain. The most influential pluralist arguments, such as Nozick’s experience machine (1974) and others (Kagan 2014, Mill 2002, Scanlon 2000), conclude that, if we were asked to trade many values to greatly improve a single value, we should not do it, no matter how much we would be improving that one value.

I show that Balanced Pluralism is incompatible with another widely shared principle that I call “Value Trade-off”. On Value Trade-off, small quantities of one value cannot outweigh great quantities of another value (Griffin 1986): for example, it is better to suffer pinprick pain than to sacrifice one’s life project. Since Balance Pluralism and Value Trade-offs are incompatible, pluralists should pick one: I conclude that we should keep Value Trade-Offs.

The argument for the incompatibility between Value Trade-off and Balanced Pluralism works as follows. Starting with an average life, there is a series of changes that, according to Value Tradeoff, would each produce a worse life, but according to Balance Pluralism eventually produces a better life.

For example, consider the life of Bob: it is an average life, good but not excellent with respect of many values. Bob can change each of these values just slightly for the better, at the cost of dramatically increasing his pain value. He can slightly improve his relationships by spending ten more minutes with a friend, or his lifetime project of being a good painter by adding a single brushstroke more, but each of these slight improvements cost him a night of intense torture. For Value trade-off, he should avoid these changes, and his life gets *worse and worse* than the initial life the more changes he accepts.

However, if he accepts many of these the slight improvements with respect to each value, they will pile up, and Bob’s life will be excellent in all values, except pain. For Balanced Pluralism, this final life is *better* than the initial average life. This contradicts the verdict of Value Trade-off: the two principles are incompatible.

Forced to choose between Balanced Pluralism and Value Trade-Offs, we should keep Value Trade-Offs: I defend that in no circumstance it can be better to endure prolonged, excruciating pain to promote a trivial improvement in another dimension.

In conclusion this paper highlights the incompatibility between Value Trade-off and Balance Pluralism and argues that, despite the great tradition supporting the principle for balancing, we should keep the principle for trade-offs instead.

July 13, 14:15 – 15:00

Teresa Bruno-Niño (Pennsylvania State University) & Hasko von Kriegstein (Toronto Metropolitan University)

### ***Ill-Being as Dissonance***

According to Harmonism human well-being is constituted by harmony between mind and world. Such harmony is said to have three aspects: non-accidental correspondence, positive orientation, and appropriate response. The theory posits three independent axiological principles each capturing one of these aspects.<sup>4</sup> Its ambition is to provide an account of the entries on the “objective list” of wellbeing constituents that is somewhat unifying without being overly reductive. For example, achievements are supposed to have part of their prudential value in virtue of instantiating nonaccidental correspondence, and part in virtue of instantiating positive orientation.

Like most theories of prudential value, harmonism has been developed with both eyes firmly trained on well-being rather than ill-being. But nine years ago Kagan convincingly argued that (a) ill-being should be of considerable interest to philosophers and (b) a theory of ill-being is not trivially entailed by a theory of well-being.<sup>5</sup> Sumner has since added the observation that whether a theory of well-being can be extended so as to provide a plausible account of ill-being is a criterion of adequacy for such theories that may help us adjudicate between them.<sup>6</sup> This has spurred a minor explosion of interest in ill-being; witness, for example, the 17 papers in a special issue on ill-being in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* last year.<sup>7</sup>

In this paper, we explore what harmonism can and should say about ill-being. The first step in doing this is to develop a menu of options for extending each of harmonism’s axiological principles to cover ill-being. If non-accidental correspondence between mind and world is a prudential good, what is the analogous prudential harm? Is it accidental correspondence, lack of correspondence, or something like non-accidental “anti-correspondence”? The opposite of positive orientation is presumable negative orientation, but what exactly does this mean? Here we will draw on a set of possible answers developed in recent discussions of ill-being for

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<sup>4</sup> von Kriegstein, Hasko. ‘Well-being as Harmony.’ In *Explorations in Ethics*. David Kaspar ed., Palgrave Macmillan, (2020).

<sup>5</sup> Kagan, Shelly. ‘An Introduction to Ill-Being.’ In *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, vol. 4. Mark Timmons ed., OUP (2014).

<sup>6</sup> Sumner, L.W. ‘The Worst Things in Life.’ *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 97 (2020).

<sup>7</sup> Bradford, Gwen. ‘Introduction: A Very Brief History of Ill-Being.’ *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 46 (2022): v-ix.

subjectivist theories of well-being.<sup>8</sup> As for appropriate response, focusing on ill-being exposes a puzzle regarding the gradeability of ‘fittingness’ and suggests that perhaps appropriate response is not a prudential good, but merely the absence of the prudential bad of inappropriate response.

This leads to the second step in developing a harmonistic theory of ill-being: to determine which options of extending the three principles are most promising. In doing so, we look at the implications of each principle as well as of the overall theory. The latter shows that the overall theory is well-positioned to balance some counterintuitive implications that would be difficult to avoid when extending each principle in isolation. We suggest that this speaks in favour of harmonism as a theory of prudential value when compared with its less pluralistic rivals.

July 13, 15:30 – 17:00

Ben Bradley (Syracuse University)

*The Sacrificer's Dilemma*

Recently some have argued that it is rational or prudent to bring about some outcome you no longer care about, on the grounds that your prior self underwent sacrifices to bring about that outcome. I argue that this is false.

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<sup>8</sup> For example: Dorsey, Dale. ‘Ill-Being for Subjectivists: An Ecumenical Primer.’ *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 46 (2022).