POLITICAL ETHOS
Contribution to a theory of reputation in the analysis of political discourses

INTRODUCTION

Several studies in the domain of political and language sciences support the argument that achieving political backing implies an art of staging: a political leader's self-image proves central to the development of a consensus regarding his figure and to citizens' support for the value universe defined by said figure. In other words, the political discourse's persuasive effectiveness is largely linked to the politician's reputation[1].

Mediatization of the political body, growing dominance of the *ethos* and the *pathos* over the *logos*, discursive management of voice and corporal flows, construction of the political show[2], are all syntagms and statements reflecting the decisive interweaving of politics and mass media in the public sphere. Against that background, we think theoretical developments on the concept of *ethos* could prove particularly fruitful for studies on contemporary political discourse. Thus, the general goal of this article is to outline the development of the concept of *ethos* throughout history, from Classical rhetoric to the present, stressing recent trends in discourse analysis in the French-speaking world. We hope for this paper to elicit conclusions in favor of a theoretical framework for the analysis of the political *ethos*.

ETHOS: FROM RHETORIC TO DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Ethos in Classical rhetoric

In his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle argues that the ultimate goal of rhetoric is "to see what is possibly persuasive in every given case" (2005:17), and posits a rationale adapted to common sense: propositions need not be true, but credible (2005:95). The idea is to say what the public believes to be possible, even if it is scientifically impossible, rather than saying what is really possible, if that possibility is rejected collectively by common opinion.

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[1] The convergence of political science's concern with leadership and language sciences' concern with the *ethos* could find a productive avenue of research in the Machiavellian concept of "reputation", even if said research is but a first approximation. In that line, see H. Adverse (2009).

[2] See, *inter alia*, Verón (1987, 1999); Charaudeau (2006); Courtine (2006); Edelman (1996); Debray (2005).

According to Aristotle's treatise, the art of rhetoric comprises three main operations: *inventio, dispositio* and *elocutio*. Within the *inventio*, the realm of invention or discovery, there are in turn two general proof avenues: technical proofs (*entechnoi pisteis*) and extra-technical proofs (*atechnoi pisteis*). The former refer to the proofs composed methodically by the speaker, while the latter are those which do not depend on the speaker's skill: witnesses, confessions, or documents, for instance. In his enumeration of technical proofs, Aristotle identifies (2005:44) three types:

> "Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself".

These three types have been labeled *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*, respectively. The *ethos* is covered in Book I, dealing mostly with the creation of arguments, inasmuch rhetoric hinges on the orator's skill, on his adaptation to the audience and his genre adaptation. The *ethos* refers to those attributes *shown* by the orator in his speeches, regardless of his sincerity, that make him credible for the audience. According to Aristotle, personal character is the strongest element in terms of proof, and its effectiveness is eminently discursive:

> "Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak" (2005:44ff).

Likewise, Aristotle identifies the causes informing the speaker's credibility, that is, the set of attributes legitimizing him. At the beginning of Book II, he writes:

> There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the only possible cases" (2005:45ff).

In this tradition, the *ethos* refers to the technical proof through which the orator is able to appear credible and attempt to forge a relation of trust with his audience. *Good sense*, *good moral character* and *goodwill* are three positions the speaker assumes before his intended audience, and from which he addresses that audience: follow me, believe me, or love me. The key, however, is that in all cases this refers to discursive proofs or *positions*, produced within the speeches rather than in preexisting representations.

In contrast, in the Roman tradition, the *ethos* can be characterized by its mostly pre-existing or pre-discursive nature. *Vir bonus dicendi peritus*: such is Cicero's definition of a good speaker. If the concept of *ethos* is understood by Aristotle as a discursive category, and, as such, defined as technical proof, both Cicero and Quintilian, who argued that only a good man can speak well (Amossy 2000:63), consider the orator's public image a prior argument, more important than those stemming from the speech itself[3]. Oratory *tejné* is thus subordinated to one's virtue as a citizen: he who is evil cannot be a good speaker, just as he who has a good reputation cannot be a bad speaker. Oratory skill is, therefore, the *necessary* expression of a virtuous life.

Neo-rhetoric: cross-discipline dialogues

The doctrinary corpus of Classical Rhetoric, based on the Greek and Roman traditions, gave way to what Gérard Gennete called "Rhetoric Restrained", that is, rhetoric limited to the resources of elocutionary exornation. If the post-Quintilian period of Roman rhetoric is known for the consolidation of its theoretical structure, thanks to the contributions of the so-called lesser Roman rhetoricians, the most important aspect of the rhetorical system in the Middle Ages is "the consolidation of textual construction in its deep structure and its aspects of surface structure, as well as the approximation of Rhetoric to Poetics" (Albaladejo 1989:32). This consolidation was followed by a gradual reduction of rhetoric into a discipline dealing with tropes, a position buttressed in the 16th century with the interest shown by humanists in the direct learning of eloquence in speeches, and definitely established in the 17th century, with French Classicism. This marks the beginning of Rhetoric focused exclusively on the area of verbal ornamentation, as a mere theory of *elocutio* (Albaladejo 1989:35-7).

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[3] According to Amossy (2000:62), the argumentative dominance of the prior *ethos* was posited in the Greek tradition by Isocrates (436-338 BC). The Athenian, contemporary to Aristotle, asks in *Antidosis*: "Who can indeed ignore that the speech of a man with a good reputation inspires more trust than that of a man without prestige, and that the proofs of truthfulness stemming from a speaker's conduct carry more weight than those stemming from his speech?"

From the 15th century to the second half of the 20th century, "Rhetoric Restrained" was the consolidated rhetorical position, the dominant representation of rhetoric. Starting in the 1950's, three new trends emerge in studies of Rhetoric, collectively labeled "Neo-Rhetoric" by Pozuelo Yvancos: Rhetoric of argumentation, Rhetoric with a structuralist base, and general Rhetoric of a textual nature.

(1) The *New Rhetoric*

The theory of argumentation developed by Chaïm Perelman, even though it fails to explicitly revisit the category of *ethos*, announces the main ideas analyzed by contemporary trends of discourse analysis in the French-speaking world[4]. In *The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation*, written with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, argumentation is defined as the set of "discursive techniques allowing us to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent" (1989:34). Now, discursive effectiveness in achieving said adherence depends largely on the fit between the self-image presented by the speaker and what the audience expects of him. Given that all speeches are aimed at an audience, Perelman proposes:

> The only general advice a theory of argumentation can provide in this case is for the speaker to adapt to his audience (1997:34).

The speaker must shape his image based on a series of positive values and beliefs he ascribes to his audience, and, at the same time, this *ethos* model depends on what the addresser considers a *legitimate* addresser for his addressees:

> Each (social) medium could be characterized by its dominant opinions, for its unchallenged convictions, for the premises it accepts automatically: these conceptions are part of its culture, and any speaker who wishes to persuade a particular audience has no choice but to adapt to it. Each audience's own culture is also revealed in the speeches directed at it (1989:57).

Moreover, Perelman argues:

> In argumentation, the key is not to know what the speaker considers true or convincing, but to know the opinion to those to whom the argumentation is addressed (1997:63).

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[4] Amossy proposes an analysis of the links between post-Perelman rhetoric and discourse linguistics, in the article "Nouvelle Rhétorique et linguistique du discours", in Koren & Amossy (2002).

The *doxa*, the *own culture* surrounding the speaker's search for legitimacy, is a necessary condition for the interaction and, thus, inherent to the construction of an effective world in terms of *ethos*. The discursive construction of the speaker's persona is affected both by discursive and social factors. The image he projects, his public figure, works as the dominant contextual element to determine the audience's attribution of meaning to his speech, and, therefore, as its source of persuasive power. In its contextual function, the speaker's public image conditions the words' persuasive effectiveness: "The speaker must indeed inspire confidence: otherwise, the speech is not worthy of credit" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1989:489). Just as in the case of arguments, this *fiducia*'s success depends on a set of collective representations necessary to the exchange: What is honesty? What is justice? What is seriousness? But also, what must *surround* someone worthy of being honest? What would make a person serious? What does it mean to be just? The relevance of the solidarity between speaker and audience —"a contact of spirits between speaker and audience", as Perelman said in *The Realm of Rhetoric* (1997:31-2)— is such that it works as the feature that defines the boundaries of the argumentative and the demonstrative realms[5]:

> Indeed, the goal of argumentation is not like the goal of demonstration, that is, to prove the truth of the conclusion based on the truth of the premises, but to transfer to the conclusions the *adherence* to the premises (1997:43).

The ability to transfer to the conclusions the adherence to the premises built in the image of the audience largely hinges on the *ethos*' illocutionary effectiveness, that is, in that image's performative strength in deploying a visible universe in which the audience finds itself *surrounded* by what the speaker says and shows of his self. In that sense, the capacity for argumentative transference would be proportional to the speaker's success in positioning himself as guarantor of the world he develops argumentatively in terms of *ethos*. The speaker's image has little relevance when we deal with formal deductions crafted with a univocal language; it becomes paramount instead when the use of rhetoric turns discourse and context ambiguous, and ends become important.

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[5] When asked about the difference between argumentation and a formally-correct demonstration, Perelman said (1997:29): "First, the fact that in a demonstration the signs used must be free of any ambiguity, unlike what happens in argumentation, which takes place in a natural language, in which ambiguity is not excluded beforehand. Second, in that the right demonstration is a demonstration adjusted to rules which are made explicit in formalized systems. Also, and this is a point we shall stress, in that the status of axioms, of the principles used as starting points, differ in demonstrations and in argumentations".

(2) A rhetoric of connotation

Even if we accept that Perelman's rhetoric broadly suggests some current study areas in the realm of discourse analysis, the revival of an *inventive* rhetoric related to language theories was not an exclusive product of his work. Rather, it owes much to the works of Roland Barthes. The *tejné rhetoriké* of old is, according to Barthes (1982:12), a meta-language which can be thought as a machine to produce discourse. Just as *elocutio* and *dispositio*, *inventio* is for Barthes a relevant operation within the rhetorical mechanism. Following Aristotle's reflections, Barthes places the speaker's attributes (*ethos*) within the realm of *inventio*. However, he offers a definition of them that manages to update the Aristotelian theory from a *connotative* perspective:

> Pour Aristote, il y a trois 'airs', dont l'ensemble constitue l'autorité personnelle de l'orateur: 1. *prhonèsis*: c'est la qualité de celui qui délibère bien, qui pèse bien le *pour* et le *contre*: c'est une sagesse objective, un bon sens affiché ; 2. *arétè*: c'est l'affiche d'une franchise qui ne craint pas ses consèquences et s'exprime á l'aide de propos directs, empreints d'une loyauté théâtrale; 3. *eunoia*: il s'agit de ne pas choquer, de ne pas provoquer, d'être sympathique (et peut-être même: *sympa*), d'entrer dans une complicité complaisante á l'égard de l'auditoire. En somme pendant qu'il parle et déroule le protocole des preuves logiques, l'orateur doit également dire sans cesse: suivez-moi (*phronèsis*), estimez-moi (*arétè*) et aimez-moi (*eunoia*) (Barthes 1997:143).

The attributes the speaker proposes about his own self are not, to Barthes, an image constructed in the speech exclusively in the realm of denotation, of what is said, but built mostly in the realm of connotation, of what is shown. *These are his airs*: the features of character the speaker *shows* before the audience, independently of his sincerity, to achieve a favorable impression: "The speaker enunciates information and *simultaneously* says: *I am this man, not that*" (Barthes 1997:143)[6]. As a two-pronged process, the *ethos* implies two orders, the imaginary and the discursive: the former, because it works in the psychological-emotive dimension of rhetoric, even if it is a projected psychology, that is, reflecting not what is truly in one's mind, but what one believes is in the mind of the other; the latter, because the attributes shaping the image the speaker offers to his audience, *what he wants to be before the other*, are created through discourse, and through what it *shows* rather than through what it enunciates.

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[6] In his essay about the photogenic qualities of electoral candidates, in *Mythologies*, Barthes stated that the photograph of a candidate "tends to spirit away 'politics' (that is to say a body of problems and solutions) to the advantage of a 'manner of being', a socio-moral status. A candidate's effigy, his corporal-visual image, makes explicit an ideology for us to read" (2005:165ff). This refers, in sum, to proposing a moral character rather than a platform: to *showing*, rather than informing.

(3) Microsociology: interaction rituals

Erving Goffman has studied the way we present our selves and interaction rites through the analysis of dialogues from early works, such as *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959), to *Forms of Talk,* published in 1981. According to the author, saying that interlocutors interact implies assuming that the self image constructed in and by the speech affects the mutual influence they have on each other. This presentation of self depends on social roles and situational data, and, inasmuch as it is inherent to any social exchange and is subject to socio-cultural regulation, it goes clearly beyond the speaking and acting subject's intentionality.

Restricted to conversational interactions, the construction a self image is a concern pervading all of Goffman's work. Concepts like *performance*, *routine*, *face*, and *figuration* are sociological categories whose relevance is a response, to a certain degree, to that concern. *Performance*, for instance, is "all the activity of a given person, in a given occasion, aimed at influencing some of the participants in a given way" (in Amossy 2008:12). This activity is set within a *part* or *routine,* that is, pre-established action patterns that the speaker applies during a *performance*, and that he can present or use in other occasions. These routines are the pre-established behavior patterns used by a chairman in a meeting with his employees, a judge in court, a nurse in his communication with his patient, a father during a family meal, or a politician during a public speech.

The category of *face*, developed later, combines these concepts with the process of presenting one's self, taking into account the prior data that define and overdetermine it. Defined as the positive social value a person effectively defends through the action line the rest of the participants suppose that person has adopted throughout a particular contact, the *face* shows the tension between the gradual crystallization of a *doxic* image and the vindication or redefinition of that image in the current interaction situation. The essential aspect here is what Goffman labels *face-work* or *figuration*, to wit: everything a person does to keep his actions from humiliating anyone, even himself (in Amossy 2008:13).

Microsociological studies on interaction rituals bring Goffman closer to some issues prevalent in contemporary discursive studies on the notion of *ethos*. *Performance* as an attempt to achieve the other's adherence to one's own narrative program; the inclusion of every speaker in pre-established behavior patterns which would seem to reflect the recurrence of certain enunciation scenes associated to specific practices and genres (the business

meeting, the trial, the family meal, the political speech); the relevance of prior information in a situation of enunciation; and the negotiation, in terms of *ethos*, that takes place in every discourse between the image of a speaker in the audience's *doxa* and the image he tries to *show* in his communication.

Thanks to these "conceptual proximities", Goffman's microsociology is a fruitful area in the most general framework of conventions and social identities. This is why his work is considered by authors such as Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni and Ruth Amossy. The former, for instance, takes the principle of *face-saving* to show how language is affected by structural facts and conventional forms, and which could be the links to develop between strictly-linguistic phenomena and interaction situations, whereas Amossy places Goffman's among the most important contributions to the understanding of *ethos*, even in more routine and personal verbal exchanges.

CURRENT TRENDS OF FRENCH DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: NEW CONTRIBUTIONS TO A THEORY OF *ETHOS*

Both pragmatics and discourse analysis were late adopters of the concept of *ethos*. Michel Le Guern's initial observations in "L'ethos dans la rhétorique française de l'âge classique" in *Stratégies discursives* (1978) were revisited by Oswald Ducrot in his outline of a polyphonic theory of enunciation in the 1980's, and by Dominique Maingueneau in many of his works, from *Géneses du discours* (1984) to recent collaborations in books such as *Imagens de si no discurso. A construção do ethos* (2008) and *Ethos discursivo* (2008).

Ducrot's semantic pragmatics is concerned with the discursive locution instance, choosing as its subject "that which, according to the utterance, speech does" (1986:178). The goal is to challenge the idea of unicity in the speaking subject, which, according to the author, is dominant in the last two centuries of language studies. To that effect, he approaches the issue of the subject of enunciation just as it appears within the meaning of the utterance. According to the linguist, "the speaker that, through his utterances, communicates that his enunciation is this or that, could not represent that enunciation as something independent of the utterance characterizing it" (1986:192). It is into that framework that Ducrot brings the Classical concept of *ethos*, with the purpose of illustrating his distinction between locutors L and λ, that is, between the *speaking subject* (locutor L) and the locutor as *being in the world* (locutor λ, element of experience):

> Resorting to my terminology, I shall say that *ethos* is attributed to L, the locutor as such: as the source of the enunciation, he finds himself clad in some characteristics that, as a counter-blow, make said enunciation

acceptable or unacceptable. What the speaker can say of himself as object of enunciation, refers instead to λ, the being in the world, which is not relevant for the part of rhetoric I refer to (1986:205).

Thus, enunciation in Ducrot becomes central to the creation of a self-image, given that the locutor's speech modalities afford a better knowledge of him than that provided by what he may say about himself. In this sense, there is a significant difference when it comes to seducing the audience and capturing its adherence, between the self-image shown by a speaker who appears to be the owner of his words and to have power of decision over the information he provides, and the self-image of a speaker whose words seem to surprise him, due to the situation he has positioned himself in.

Giving a favorable image of oneself —in Ducrot's view— does not depend on what the speaker says about himself, but rather in the way he exercises his speaking activity. It refers to the way in which the speaking subject represents his own enunciation. That is the reason why he argues: "This is not about boastful claims [the speaker] can make about himself within his discourse, statements that in fact risk alienating the audience, but of the appearance granted to him by the rhythm, the warmth or the severity of intonation, the choice of words, or the arguments" (1986:205).

Dominique Maingueneau, in turn, understand *ethos* not as a means of persuasion or argumentation, but as a constituent dimension of all enunciation instances. The *ethos*, in his view, cannot be separated from the enunciation instance. Thus, in *Analyser des textes de la communication*, he writes:

> Cette prise en compte de l'éthos permet à nouveau de prende ses distances à l'égard d'une conception du discours selon laquelle les « contenus » des énoncés seraient indépendants de la scène d'énonciation qui les prend en charge. En fait, *on ne peut dissocier l'organisation des contenus et la légitimation de la scène de parole* (1998:81).

When he states that the *ethos* enables the association of the organization of contents and the legitimization of the speech scene, Maingueneau is stressing the fact that enunciation takes places in an *instituted* space, defined by the discursive genre, and also in the *constructive* dimension of that discourse, which is *staged* and creates its own enunciation space. The *ethos* would act then as a summoning of sorts, by which the addressee is summoned to a place, integrated into the enunciation instance implied by the discourse. This *enunciation scene*, to use the exact term, enables the deployment by the enunciator of *corporality* and *character*, which are

independent of the speaker's body. It is a double figure for the enunciator[7], to which the *tone*[8] present in any text is linked (Maingueneau 1984:100). Thus, in en *Nouvelles tendances en Analyse du discours*, Maingueneau writes:

> Le ton est nécessairement associé à un *caractère* et une *corporalité*. Le « caractère » correspond à ce faisceau de traits « psychologiques » que le lecteur-auditeur attribue spontanément à la figure de l'énonciateur d'après sa manière de dire. [..] On devra en dire autant de la « corporalité », qui renvoie à une représentation du corps de l'énonciateur de la formation discursive (1987:32-33)[9].

As figure and body of the enunciator, that embodied enunciator acts as *guarantor*, source of legitimacy that certifies what is said:

> Le garant, dont le lecteur doit construire la figure à partir d'indices textuels de divers ordres, se voit ainsi affecter un **caractère** et une **corporalité**, dont le degré de précision varie selon les textes (1998 :80).

It is interesting to adopt a perspective covering not only the verbal dimension, but also the set of physical and psychical determinations ascribed to the *guarantor* by the *doxa*. Thus, the *guarantor*'s corporality and character stem from a vast image of collective representations, which imply identification of and with a vague tradition of stereotypes associated to certain behaviors.

The *guarantor*'s figure implies an *ethos world*, a world which subsumes a number of stereotypical situations associated to behaviors, to which the *guarantor* summons the audience, and to which he provides it with access (cfr. Maingueneau 2002:55-67; 2008). The *ethos* goes back indeed to the figure of that *guarantor*, who, through his words, clothes himself with an identity tailored to the world he attempts to create in his utterance. Through the guarantee the enunciator himself offers about the *ethos* world he deploys, and to which he invites the audience to adhere, the addressee is brought into the enunciation scene recreated by the speech. This enunciation instance, according to

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[7] According to Amossy (2000:4-5), these two elements are derived from social representations of certain types of character, in the psychological sense of the term, and from a "way of inhabiting the social space" linked to positions and apparel styles.

[8] Maingueneau adopts the concept of *tone*, which he prefers to *voice*, as the former syncretically covers both oral and written communication.

[9] Maingueneau's first reflections on the *ethos* are marked by the relation between that concept and the discursive formation in which the enunciator is set. After a few steps in that direction, however, Maingueneau chooses to abandon the notion of discursive formation —whose plasticity, due in fact to its double origin (Foucault and Pêcheux), has generally resulted in operational uselessness (cfr. "Unidades tópicas e não-tópicas" (in 2008a) and the entry on "Discursive formation" (in Charaudeau & Maingueneau 2005)— and to articulate *ethos* and the concept of *enunciation scene* instead. In "Unidades tópicas e não-tópicas", Maingueneau (2008a:16) goes as far as saying that when he took over the "Discursive formation" entry in the *Dictionnaire D'Analyse du Discours*, which he co-directed with Patrick Charaudeau, he replaced *discursive formation* with *positioning*, due to his incapacity to ascribe a precise status to the term.

Maingueneau (1993; 1996; 2002), can be analyzed in three scenes: *overarching scene*, *generic scene* and *scenography*[10]. The *overarching scene* provides the discourse with its pragmatic status, it sets it within a type: advertising, philosophical, political, etc. The *generic scene*, in turn, refers to the contract related to a discursive genre or subgenre. Within the political type, for instance: the speech given from a lectern, a press conference, an address to the nation broadcasted live. As regards *scenography*, it does not stem from the genre, but is constructed by the text itself: a political leader's discourse can be enunciated through the image of a common man or a prophetical woman. Scenography is not a stage, a set of props, as if the speech flowed from within an already-constructed space, independent of the speech. Scenography is what enunciation gradually installs as its own speech device. The speech *shows* its scenography and its *ethos*, but also says they are legitimate[11].

Scenography achieves legitimacy based on three terms: the figure of the enunciator (the guarantor of the enunciation) and the correlative figure of the addressee, a chronography (a moment in time) and a topography (a place), from which the speech is *purported* to flow. These cannot be dissociated: the determination of the identity of the co-participants in the enunciation goes hand in hand with the definition of a set of places and certain times that create the conditions through which the speech attempts to justify its right to be uttered[12].

The *ethos*' rhetorical effectiveness stems from the fact that it somehow overarches the enunciation without being an explicit part of the utterance (Maingueneau 1996:78). This *overarching*, which Maingueneau himself chooses to define as *enunciation device*, is simultaneously deployed in what is *shown* and what is *said*, mobilizing everything that contributes to issue an

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[10] This assumes that the subject is not set in discourse only through shifters (*embrayage*) or traces of subjectivity in language (modal words, deictics, *subjectivème*s or idiologemes), but also through the activation of discursive types and genres in which the locutor takes a definite position from the beginning, and through the deployment of a familiar scenario, which gradually gives shape to the relation with the addressee.

[11] According to Maingueneau (1996:80), the concept of *scenography* offers a two-fold advantage over the concept of *scene*: it adds to the theater dimension of scene the suffix *–graphy*, that is, writing. In that sense, the suffix *graphy* enables understanding scenography both as a frame and as a process. From the moment it is uttered, the word is transported by a certain *ethos* which, in fact, is progressively validated through its own enunciation.

[12] The triple dimension of scenography is associated to *discursive deixis*, which, according to Maingueneau (1987), has the same function as enunciation deixis, but in a different level, namely, that of the universe of meaning created by a discursive formation in its enunciation. For that reason, discursive deixis is linked to foundational deixis, from which it obtains a large share of its legitimacy: "La deixis discursive n'est que le premier volet de la scénographie d'une formation discursive, qui en comprend un second, la deixis fondatrice. Par là il faut entendre la ou les situations d'énonciation antérieures dont la deixis actuelle se donne pour la répétition et dont elle tire une bonne part de sa légitimité. On distinguera aini la **locution fondatrice,** la **chronographie** et la **topographie fondatrices**. Une formation discursive, en effet, ne peut énoncer de manière valide que si, en un sens, elle peut inscrire son propos dans les traces d'une autre deixis, dont elle institue ou « capte » la légende à son profit (Maingueneau 1987:29).

image of the speaker. His tone of voice, his eloquence, his choice of words and arguments, his body language, his gaze, his posture are all *ethos sign*s.

From the perspective of the label of *ethos signs*, Maingueneau's concept of *ethos* revisits the distinction between *shown ethos* and *spoken ethos*, suggested by Roland Barthes and Oswald Ducrot, among others, to put forward an *effective ethos*, in which both dimensions converge with the pre-discursive *ethos*.

The *ethos* proof is effectively constructed through discourse, even if there are preexisting data: it is not an image of the locutor existing outside the enunciation instance. In this sense, it is a dimension of the speech's illocutionary strength. Regardless of the frontal presentation or the definition a speaker can provide of himself, the *ethos* does not move in the foreground, but laterally, and implies a sensitive experience of the speech, which triggers the addressee's emotional nature, in a dynamic interaction (Maingueneau 2002:2). This is an interactive process of influence on the other person, which cannot be interpreted outside a precise communication situation, which is in turn integrated in a given socio-historical context.

The enunciator —according to Maingueneau (2008c)— does not act as a stable source which "expresses" itself in a given fashion. Rather, it is seen in a fundamentally interactive framework, in a discursive institution set within a certain cultural configuration, and implies legitimate enunciation roles, places and times, a material support and a means of circulation for the utterance. In this sense, neither does the enunciation situation work as a "pre-established framework":

> La situation à l'intérieur de laquelle s'énonce l'oeuvre n'est pas un cadre préétabli et fixe : elle se trouve aussi bien en aval de l'oeuvre qu'en amont puisqu'elle doit être validée par l'énoncé même qu'elle permet de déployer. Ce que dit le texte présuppose une scène de parole déterminée qu'il lui faut valider à travers son énonciation (Maingueneau 1993:122).

A speech's persuasive effectiveness (or its *incorporation* effectiveness) stems from the fact that it leads the reader-listener to identify with the mobilization of a body featuring historically-specified values. It is not an utterance aimed at being contemplated. Rather, it is enunciation extended towards a co-enunciator or addressee that requires mobilization to physically adhere to a given universe of meaning.

CURRENT STATUS OF *ETHOS*

Besides the argument's persuasiveness, besides the program at stake, Maingueneau's concept of *ethos* enables us to reflect on the general process by which the subjects *adhere* to a common *ethos* world. That said, it should be noted that the correct operation of the communicational exchange depends as well on the representations of the enunciator's figure the public builds even before he speaks. In this sense, the concept of *ethos* we are concerned with resorts to the epistemological contributions of the Greek and Roman traditions: while Aristotle's definition implies an *eminently* discursive self-image; the Roman tradition implies a central concern with the self-image existing before the enunciation situation[13]. The image crafted by the speaker structures itself on pre-existing elements, such as authority, institutional position, "good or bad reputation", status, etc. According Amossy's definition, pre-discursive or prior *ethos* is built mainly on the speaker's social position and on the *doxa* surrounding that position or that speaker:

> We shall then use the label prior ethos or image, as opposed to the speaking ethos, which is exclusively discursive, to refer o the image of the speaker the audience can construct before he begins his speech. This representation, necessarily schematic, is modulated in different ways by the speech. The prior ethos is built on the basis of the role played by the speaker in the social space (his institutional functions, his status and his power), but also based on the collective representation of the stereotype surrounding him. It is prior to the beginning of the speech, and it partially conditions that beginning. At the same time, it leaves tangible traces in the speech, which can be pointed out both in linguistic markers as in the enunciation situation which is at the foundation of the exchange (2000:7).

The *ethos* differs from the speaker's *real* attributes, both as regards discursive figures and prior or pre-discursive figures. The enunciator's

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[13] According to Maingueneau (2008a:60), the distinction between prior or pre-discursive and discursive *ethos* could be challenged. He argues that, while it is true that any discourse takes place along time (a man who spoke at the beginning of a meeting and who later speaks again has already acquired a certain reputation which he can confirm or not with his speaking sequence), it would seem more reasonable to think that the pre-discursive/discursive dichotomy must take into account the various discursive genres, that is to say, that it is not absolutely relevant. In more general terms, we could even question the status of what is pre-discursive: What is it about? A temporal, ontological, or phenomenological event? At which point in time is there an instance which is prior to the speech? If we are dealing, as it seems, with a matter of temporal linearity, the pre-discursive as a conceptual discrimination would not be valid outside a strictly rhetorical epistemology, that is, in a strategy of the subject of enunciation. Within a theory of discourses, we understand that the status of the pre-discursive would not go beyond the crystallization of prior discourses, and, thus, a pre-discursive *ethos* would be no more than the semantic-pragmatic sedimentation of a prior discursive *ethos*, which would determine of the current *ethos* construction. The conceptual distinction posits an operational discontinuity which can hardly find any footing in discursive practices. It would appear that the major epistemological issue as regards the *ethos* is the notion of time: How do we think in the present of the enunciation based on the proposition stating that the speech presupposes the scene to which it resorts to be enunciated, which it must simultaneously validate with its own enunciation?

discursive dynamics is set within a reversible two-fold structure: the speech has a social dimension and a linguistic dimension, both deeply linked to each other[14]. The conceptual distinction between *prior ethos* and *discursive ethos* aims at stressing that the effective *ethos* is conditioned not only by the construction of a self-image in the enunciation situation (*spoken ethos* and *shown ethos*), but also by the institutional authority and the social conceptions the enunciator is set in and on which he depends. The set of representations that give shape to the pre-discursive *ethos* involve the speaker's status and the question about his legitimacy[15], and feeds on the stereotypes of the temporal context, necessarily structuring itself on cultural models.

The *ethos* is a constituent of the verbal exchange and largely determines the speaker's capacity to have an effect on his addressees (Amossy 2008:137). Its discursive construction is part of a mirror-like relation. The speaker constructs his self-image based on the image he creates of his audience, that is, on the representations of a trustworthy and competent speaker he believes the audience to share (Amossy 2008:124). The position of a speaker in a given field and the legitimacy for expression provided by that position (in his field of expertise or in different one) is combined with his *ethos*' participation in a given socio-historical universe. The exchange's effectiveness depends on the speaker's authority and on the identification processes related to shared representations and the population's cultural models.

The pre-discursive *ethos* can be confirmed or modified in every enunciation situation. Within a generic scene, the speaker builds a self-image which is in tune with and talks to the distribution of pre-existing roles, based on the audience's shared conceptions. In enunciation, legitimacy stems both from the external status of the enunciator and the modalities of the symbolic exchange he participates in, on the one hand, and from his discursive production, on the other. For that reason, attention must be paid to the image linked to the locutor or the category he is part of, at the exact time of enunciation; it is necessary to have access to a stock of images from a given society or, at the very least, to know the public image of a given political or media figure. It is important to consider the image constructed by the audience of the speaker's social, ethnical and national category; the single dominant

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[14] The discursive institution —according to Maingueneau (1987:39)— shows two faces: one social and one linked to language. He states that it is thanks to the category of discursive practice that we can designate the essential reversibility of the two faces of discourse. In fact, there is a relation of complementarity, rather than one of exclusivity, between both factors, as they work simultaneously and implying each other to buttress the effectiveness of discursive identification.

[15] The concept of *ethos* as used in discourse analysis, according to Maingueneau (1984, 1987), crosses field sociology, favoring "the close link between a discourse and an institution". No language act can be separated from an institution, which the act itself presupposes in its very realization.

image at the time of the argumentative exchange; the possibility for different, clashing images of a single speaker to exist, depending on the chosen audience.

THE ENUNCIATION PARADOX

The construction of an *ethos* world, within the communicative exchange, rests on validated enunciation scenes, already established in collective memory, either as a negative example or as a valued model. The distinction between discursive and pre-discursive instances reveals the *ethos* paradox at the level of the construction of self-image in relation with the planes of the audience's conceptions and the institutional position. The same paradox can be seen at the scenography level: the validated scene is *simultaneously without and within* the discourse that creates it. It is *without* inasmuch as it is pre-existing, and *within* inasmuch as it too is a product of discourse, which configures it based on its own universe (Maingueneau 1996:83)[16].

The *ethos* becomes a highly-versatile articulator: it challenges any separation between text and body, between the represented world and the enunciation representing it. The paradox in every *ethos* world is that the guarantor of enunciation must provide legitimacy to his way of speaking by means of his utterance itself (Maingueneau 1993:143). Scenography, with the *ethos* of the participant, implies a circular process: from the moment it is uttered, the word is transported by a certain *air* which is gradually validated through the enunciation itself. We face what we could call an *enunciation loop*: the guarantor, through what he says, through the world he deploys, needs to tacitly justify the scenography he performs and in which he is set. According to Maingueneau:

> La scénographie implique ainsi un processus *en boucle paradoxale*. Dès son émergence, la parole suppose une certaine situation d'énonciation, laquelle, en fait, se valide progressivement à travers cette énonciation-même. La scénographie est ainsi *à la fois ce dont vient le discours et ce qu'engendre ce discours* ; elle légitime un énoncé qui, en retour, doit la légitimer, doit établir que cette scénographie dont vient la parole est précisément *la* scénographie requise pour énoncer comme il convient, selon le cas, la politique, la philosophie, la science, ou pour promouvoir telle marchandise (1998:71).

Thus, scenography is both condition and product of the enunciation situation, both within and without the enunciation situation. Every speech, through its very deployment, attempts to convince creating the enunciation

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[16] We interpret "validated scenes" —according to Maingueneau's proposal (1996:83)— as archetypical representation made popular by iconography.

scene that gives it legitimacy (Maingueneau 1987; 1993; 1998). In other words, an act of enunciation takes place because some production conditions hold true, but, at the same time, said act *performatively* summons the conditions that validate it. It is largely due to its own enunciation that the discursive act labels itself relevant. What is at stake is the two-fold nature of subjectivity in enunciation: the subject of enunciation, inasmuch as he is enunciated, is simultaneously subject and object of the speech. If, on the one hand, this instance subjects the enunciator to its rules, on the other it provides legitimacy, based on the authority institutionally ascribed to that enunciation place.

THE SUBJECTIVE INSTANCE: FROM STRATEGY TO INCORPORATION

The two-fold nature of subjectivity in enunciation opposes in itself any rhetorical conception of discourse, in the sense that, for discourse analysis, the *ethos* does not imply attitudes, procedures or strategies. It could be said that it is not possible to define any external aspect between subjects and their discourses. Under no circumnstances are contents independent of the enunciation scene that adopts them.

The operational consideration of the concept of ethos assumes, for discourse analysis, a "double displacement": first, it is necessary to discard all conceptions related to psychology or will, according to which the enunciator would determine his choice based on the effects he wants to create in his audience; second, it is necessary to reject the image of a discourse that mobilizes ideas thanks to various procedures or strategies. It is important to understand that the effectiveness of the *ethos* does not rest on procedural aspects; rather, it is about a corporal implication which Maingueneau (2008c) calls *incorporation*, understood as the way in which the addressee relates to the speech's *ethos*. This process takes place in three inseparable registers: first, the enunciation of the text provides the guarantor with corporality; second, the co-enunciator assimilates a set of schemes inhabiting his own body in relation to the world; and last, these initial registers enable the establishment of an imaginary community which comprise all who adhere to the same discourse.

Incorporation, as a category, clarifies the *incarnate* conception of *ethos* Maingueneau works with: the notion does not imply merely a verbal dimension, but also a set of physical and psychical determinations linked to the *guarantor* by stereotypical collective representations. The audience identifies in the speech the enunciator's corporal discipline, which rests on a vague set of social representations. In Maingueneau's words:

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> A positioning does not imply just a definition of a enunciation situation and a certain relation to language: we must also bear in mind the body's clothing, a physical adherence to a certain universe of meaning. The 'ideas' are presented through a way of *saying* which is also a way of *being*, associated to representations and standards of body discipline (2008a:53).

In Maingueneau's proposal, the notion of *ethos* enables the articulation of body and discourse. The subjective instance visible in the speech works like a *tone* which cannot be separated from a historically-specified enunciating body. The universe of the speech becomes real in the staging of a speech which must manifest its truth through its enunciation, which can only produce an event and persuade, if it enables *incorporation*, that is, if it manages to capture the addressee's imagination and provide him with an identity through a scene of valorized speech. Attracted by the *ethos* tone, the addressee is not only capable of understanding the contents, but is also *physically* affected, and participates in the represented world guaranteed by the enunciator.

CONCLUSION

The historical development of the concept of *ethos* enables us to outline some future research lines, aimed at producing a theory of self-image or reputation in political discourse. First, it reveals a connection between *ethos* and collective conceptions; that is, between reputation and public opinion, which seems relevant to analyze the construction of political identities in a time in which the approach to the political is more individualized (Rosanvallon, 2007). Second, it allows us to articulate design strategies for public image based on prior reputation or *ethos*, which becomes central in societies with a great influence of mass media, due to the media's role as a public archive. Third, it offers theoretical tools to create a multi-modal or multi-sensorial study of the political realm, articulating words, voices and bodies, in a time in which the political *ethos* is first and foremost a political image. Last, it puts forward a dominance of subjective proofs that goes against a rational view of politics, which enables studies integrating a non-functionalist conception of discourse research with a subjective conception (i.e., *ethos* and *pathos*) of political identification processes. The *ethos* is thus ultimately linked to the construction of identities, as the consideration of a self-image's effectiveness is not independent from identifications *embodied* in the proposed and assumed *ethos* world.

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