FROM *ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ* TO *RES PUBLICA*: ADAPTATION AND EVOLUTION OF CLASSICAL RHETORIC

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1. Introduction

The main purpose of this paper, based largely on the issue of our doctoral thesis, is to explore the role of *δημοκρατία* in Athens and the *res publica* of Rome in shaping rhetoric in these two city-states. Within this context, Roman rhetoric emerges as the continuity of Greek, enriching it especially thanks to the particular characteristics of the type of polity the *res publica* was, from which the former emanates. The particular importance of what retrospectively might be called "constitution" of each of these ancient democracies in both the general course of achieving the policy objectives they set themselves, and in the development of rhetorical theory and practice that followed their promotion has already been noted since antiquity (**literary sources n. 1-3**). Here I will try to highlight the elements that led on one hand to initial success but also to ultimate failure the Athenian democracy, and on the other hand to the most impressive results of the Roman *res publica*, which, however, did not prevent the final fall of this one too, in order to show their repositories to rhetoric of modern democracies. Certainly it is known that the democratic character of the Roman *res publica* is being disputed by many scholars, but it is obvious that free rhetoric dominated in this polity before it turned into militarism, and that fact allows, as I believe, to move safely to the comparison I'm interested to view. On this issue I will also make further remarks below.

2. Greek Deliberative Oratory

Although in Greek culture the political act linked to the political discourse ever since the Homeric epics (**literary source n. 4),** this phenomenon took large dimensions mainly after the Persian Wars. The democracy of Athens was certainly the vehicle that promoted further this political tactic. The same constitution, however, in combination with the Spartan one, has been projected by Herodotus as the leading

cause of the prevalence of the Greeks in their apparently unequal struggle against the Persians (490-479 BC) **(literary source n. 5).**

In any case the more democratic and liberal nature of the Athenian democracy, as opposed to conservatism and inflexibility of Sparta, led to an outward-looking foreign policy, with the ultimate objective of the union of the Greek and generally the Mediterranean world under the leadership of Athens (**literary sources 6 and 7)**.

Within this context the political power that could be offered by the Athenian *demos* raised vertically the demand for deliberative -primarily- rhetoric and hence for the other classes of it, insofar as they were relevant to the actual political activity. Especially after the reforms of Ephialtes in 462 BC, who subtracted the political powers of the Parliament of the Supreme Court (*Ἄρειος Πάγος*) and transformed the constitution to pure democracy (*ἄκρατον δημοκρατίαν*), the scope for the application of rhetoric in public life grew even more. Thus opened the way for the sophists who promised to teach with a view to profit all concerned and not only the aristocrats the art of persuasion (**literary source n. 8)**.

The ablest orator of that time was Pericles himself, the leader of the Athenian democracy, as it is evident by the orations -especially by the famous epitaph- Thucydides has quoted -of course, not without his own intervention- in his history[1]

However, it seems that the initial optimism about the effects of the substantial elimination of the Supreme Court, which at least Aeschylus did not share from the beginning (**literary source n. 9)**, had not resulted from wise calculation. Therefore after Pericles the phenomenon of populism appears in Athens, the base, the practices and the devastating consequences of which writers like Thucydides and Plato didn't leave unremarked (**literary sources n. 10 and 11**). But also Isocrates, Demosthenes and Aristotle pointed out the serious problems caused at the Athenian state by this tactic, which foreshadows its decline (**literary sources n. 12-15)**. It is, in short, the pernicious practice of *πρὸς χάριν/ἡδονὴν δημηγορεῖν* (indulging rhetoric).

That the sincere critics of the way the Athenian democracy worked were substantially right, has been demonstrated clearly by the history of this State: defeat in the Peloponnesian War and loss of political sovereignty, after a brief glimpse, until about the middle of the 4th century BC. In this period the domination of the Greeks of

[1] Th. 1.140-144· 2.35-46; 2.60-64; for his method in composing the speeches in his history see 1.22.

the North, i.e. the Macedonians, who had no democracy, led inevitably to the decline of deliberative oratory. On the other hand, the rise of Rome, which occurred rapidly, transferred the decision-making centers in Roman civic bodies: the People's Assemblies, the Senate and the magistrates –especially the consuls.

3. The Roman Backround

Forensic Orations

The way justice was awarded in Rome[2] contributed decisively to the cultivation of eloquence. Every Roman citizen could bring to a court of justice anyone else regardless of social status.[3] The judicial system, however, was based on patron-client relationship, the former delivering the speech in favor of the latter before the court or the popular assembly. The Judges, in the former case, were juries from the senatorial and/or equestrian orders under the chairmanship of the *Praetor*. The meetings took place in the *forum Romanum*, where typically a large crowd, the *corona*, watched and affected by its reactions the outcome of the cases and therefore should be taken seriously by the orator.[4] This, of course, was an absolute necessity for the trials before the people. Especially since the mid-2nd century B.C. the institution of *quaestiones perpetuae*, i.e. the permanent criminal courts met publicly, forensic oratory in Rome developed further and acquired great political power.[5]

Demonstrative Orations

Demonstrative oratory,[6] on the other hand, supported in Rome funeral speeches, the *laudationes funebres*, for men or even women of ambitious families, and some evidence-speeches of the character of important persons without specific rhetorical demands. In best case, according to Cicero, this class could be used only for

[2] Millar (1998) 41: "Around them, as was essential to both the public character of the occasion and the nature of the oratory that needed to be deployed, was a shifting crowd (*corona*) of spectators, whose reactions played a vital part in the course of the case." For a full discussion see Alexander (1990); cf. idem (2006) 236-55.
[3] David (2006) 427.
[4] Cic. *Brut.* 290; cf. Alexander (2007) 104-5.
[5] David (2006) 422 and 426-7.
[6] For a full discussion see Rees (2007).

the training of the orator, as to make him effective in the other two classes, the forensic and the deliberative.[7] Nevertheless, an eminent Roman with such an oration could demonstrate publicly his generation and its prominent members, even if it was only one such member, thereby earning the admiration and favor of the people towards him,[8] and passing the political message -especially to the youth- that virtue, which coincides with bravery (*virtus*), is something that the Romans never forget.[9]

Deliberative Orations

The *genus deliberativum* in Rome had necessarily, due to its constitution, two main application areas: the *Senatus* and the *contiones*[10] (**literary source n. 16**), a term that, depending on the context, meant "an informal public meeting called by an office holder, a speech delivered at such a meeting, or the actual crowd attending it".[11] The presentation of the differences between these two civic bodies of the *res publica* is not the subject of this treatise. What, however, challenges us here is to identify the *eloquentia popularis*, to demonstrate its real role in the *res publica* and thus the nature of this polity, which others -the majority- declared aristocratic or oligarchic, and others almost democratic.[12] In particular, rhetoric of the *contiones* will help us to understand further the role of this specific audience in the *res publica*. This audience is characterized specific not in the sense that it was popular –besides this is the main audience of both rhetorical theory and practice- but in the sense of its different role in the system of government compared to that of the Greek -eminently the Athenian- crowd, which essentially gave birth to rhetorical theory.

In this sense the Senate was also a special audience, as it was a political body with a particular function. The difference, however, is obvious: the Senate is not disputed by anyone as a state institution which was crucial to the operation of the government. On the contrary, its role has made many scholars to characterize the system of government purely aristocratic or oligarchic. Not quite the same for the *contio*: most scholars underestimate its role and consider it rather formal than substantial, reaching as far as to argue that orators before it did nothing else than

[7] Cic. *Orat.* 37.
[8] Suet. *Jul.* 6; cf. Millar (1984) 10; idem (1989) 149; idem (1998) 75; Hölkeskamp (2000) 218.
[9] Plb. 6.52.11-54. 3.
[10] David (2006) 422-6.
[11] Millar (1995) 111.
[12] For the relevant discussion see Hölkeskamp (2010) 1-11.

pretending.[13] For severe democratic process, according to this logic, not even a simple discussion can be made.

4. The Greek influence

We have to look for the beginning of the thread, as already pointed out, in Athens and not without a good reason: Cicero very clearly notes it in his *Brutus*. According to him, the *orator*, the ideal orator, first began his course in the historical process in this very town (**literary source 17**). Thus Roman rhetoric is officially presented as the continuation of Greek rhetoric. The reason vivid Greek rhetoric became in essence a simple lesson at the various Greek schools was purely political: the absence of independent political action in a state with democratic governance had led to decline the means to achieve the political objectives, namely rhetoric (**literary source 18**).

This observation is crucial for the history of rhetoric, which essentially starts from Athens and continues in Rome, where there was already a relevant backround due to the nature of the Roman constitution[14] **(literary source 19)**. The overall evolution of Roman rhetoric before and after its very fruitful contact with Greek rhetoric, from the perspective of Cicero, absolutely documents the importance of rhetoric in the operation of the *res publica,* before the latter acquired the universality, which in turn emerges as a natural consequence precisely of this operating mode of the Roman polity, as illustrated by the comment of Polybius in literary source n. 2 we saw above.

Therefore the Greek influence, made possible because of the *res publica*, is inevitable for Rome, which finds in this very influence those cultural elements that make it a particular state in conjunction with its own merits. Within these contexts, since the mid-2nd century BC the Greek embassies to Rome have given excellent examples of senatorial oratory. The speeches of these ambassadors were translated for many decades in Latin,[15] but since 81 BC, according to Valerius Maximus,[16] began to read out directly in Greek, which is historically a very important fact. At about the

[13]Morstein-Marx (2004) 241-78; according to the writer, the speakers from the *rostra*, ie the platform in the *forum* decorated with the warships' rams captured during the victory at *Antium* in 338 BC, supported the interests of the ruling class.
[14] Culpepper Stroup (2007) 23.
[15] Gel. 6.14.9.
[16] V. Max. 2.2.3.

same time, during the mid-2nd century BC, in Rome the "circle of Scipio" is created, where also involved themselves Tiberius Gracchus, Mucius Scaeola and Polybius, who was a hostage in Rome, under the influence of the Stoic philosopher Panaitios.[17] From this circle emerges Roman *humanitas* based on philosophy, rhetoric and grammar theory.[18] From now on we are talking about the beginning of the forcible entrance of Greek rhetoric in Rome with huge political implications for the very operation of the *res publica*. For Cicero, this can be explained very well by the fact of the expansion of Roman rule, which created the right conditions for the cultivation of rhetoric and great interest for it in the more dynamic part of Roman society, namely the youth of the ruling class (**literary source n. 20**), just as it happened gradually in the case of Athens after its victories in the Persian Wars and the spread of its hegemony. Of course, one must recognize at the outset that the application of rhetoric in political practice also requires common points among the polities of these two ancient cities and brings already in a precarious position those who argue that Rome was merely a form of oligarchy.

Another, however, very serious aspect of Greek influence in Roman intellectual life in general and especially in rhetoric expressed by Greek philosophical schools, which Romans who could afford them attended with zeal, without necessarily being aristocrats, from the penultimate and mainly from the last pre-Christian century onwards. For my observations on this issue I will base once again in Cicero.

The Stoics

For Cicero, oratory based on Stoic rhetorical theory is inappropriate to convince a popular audience, partly because it is profound and artful, and partly because of the lack of the style that is suitable for such an audience, i.e. with digressions, loose and varied (**literary source n. 21)**. On the contrast, the style of the Stoics suits better dialectic than rhetoric and hence is more useful in the accuracy of the arguments than in the analysis. It is also short and dense to such a degree that the popular audience is not able to attend it.

[17] Long (1990[2]) 335.
[18] Albrecht (2000[3]) 552.

This, however, did not deter a Stoic, L. Aelius Stilon (*Lucius Aelius Stilo*), from writting speeches for others, as he himself had not the ambitions of an orator.[19] Furthermore, a typical example of a Stoic orator was *Quintus Aelius Tubero,* praetor of 123 BC, with the characteristics of an implacable opponent of G. Gracchus –an important political element- in conjunction with those of the orator with rough, uncultivated and wild verbal, consistent with his very lifestyle. [20]

The Stoics of Rome then were not good orators, with the sole exception of Cato the Younger, who excelled both in *sententia senatoria* and in *contiones*, and therefore Brutus in the homonymous ciceronian treatise characterizes his eloquence supreme.[21] Especially before the Senate the Stoic characteristics of Cato's rhetoric are particularly evident.

The Academics and the Peripatetics

Cicero notes on the Academy and the Peripatetic school that these two philosophical schools -especially the latter-[22] are more appropriate than others for the education of the orator, if he were to rely solely on a particular school, but nothing more than that. Besides the style these schools cultivated was too free and loose, elements that exceed the tolerable limits for trials and for a popular audience (**literary source 22**). Regarding in general the relationship between these two schools of philosophy with the education of the orator, Cicero believes that no one should expect that he will be an orator by studying in a single of them, but he also stresses that it is impossible for anyone to become an orator without them. The model orator here is Demosthenes, who appears to have academic philosophical education, but he was above all an orator thanks to the style of his orations, which was more suitable for rhetoric than for philosophy.

The Epicureans

Epicurean philosophy was regarded generally as unfit for rhetoric by Cicero. As a characteristic example of an Epicurean orator Cicero presents *Titus Albucius,*

[19] Cic. *Brut.* 206.
[20] Cic. *Brut.* 117.
[21] Cic. *Brut.* 118.
[22] Cic. *Brut.* 119.

who lived at around the late 2nd century BC. He studied so deeply Greek and particularly the Epicurean culture that he could be considered a true Greek.[23] His orations, however, is of little value, because Epicurean philosophy, as is also evidenced by the Greek case, did not favor one's participation in politics and much less eloquence (**literary source n. 23**).

4. Deliberative Oratory in Rome

Ἀγὼν λόγων *in the Senate*

In the Senate used to take place a full *ἀγὼν λόγων*, i.e. a confrontation of antithetical orations.[24] These orations were peculiar because of the special nature of this civic institution of the *res publica*. It is therefore not surprising that there were orators capable only in this kind of rhetoric and not necessarily in another. The main feature of this rhetoric, as can be reasonably understood, is brevity. The existence of many speakers, time pressure and the high, in many cases, educated senators necessarily limited the speaker strictly within his theme. From this perspective oratory deployed in the Senate recalls the kind of oratory we find in the royal council of Xerxes, as presented by Herodotus, rather than that before the Athenian *Demos*. Such an example of senatorial oratory we find in Sallust.[25] It pertains to the discussion took place in the Senate on the fate of the arrested conspirators in the case of Catiline (*Lucius Sergius Catilina*). The speakers were more than two, but Sallust quotes only the orations of Caesar (*Gaius Iulius Caesar*) and Cato the Younger (*Marcus Porcius Cato Uticensis*), as the most representative of two opposing proposals. In both these orations we find the same individual rhetorical questions seen, however, from a different angle.

These two orations have the characteristics of a contradiction (*ἀντιλογία*), as we know it from Thucydides: the second oration achieves a complete reversal, step by

[23] Cic. *Brut.* 131.
[24] For a comprehensive discussion see Ramsey (2007) 122-35; cf. Millar (1984) 15-6; Dyck (2008) 12-3. For the meaning of the phrase *ἀγὼν λόγων* cf. Romilly (1988) 180 and 215-7.
[25] Sal. *Cat.* 51-2.

step, of the positions taken by the orator in the first one.[26] Their differences with the contradictions included in Thucydides' history are determined by the different target audience. Thus the structure of the above orations is adapted to the time pressure and to the necessity of the orators' limitation within their theme. For these reasons there is virtually no *exordium* and *peroratio*, in the classic sense of the terms, in both these orations. Rather, we have short introductions and recommendations respectively. Almost all of the content of the two orations is dedicated to argumentation, and the main effort of the orators is to focus on rebuttal. The rhetorical issues used by both speakers, as already mentioned, are common and revolve around philosophy, history and especially the *mos maiorum* as opposed to the "demoralization" which presumably occures in the speakers' era. Politically these three elements are of great importance. Especially the last point seems to had a decisive impact on the minds of the senators and shaped their final decision according to Cato's proposal. To the extent that Cato managed to harmonize his speech with this element, he also managed to secure a positive vote of the Senate for his proposal.[27] To the success of his speech also contributed the fact that his own oration, contrary to the oration of Caesar, utilizes the element of *πάθος* (the rousing of emotions), but not to an extended degree. Avoiding accentuation of passion is certainly due to the type of the audience, which was based mainly on logic to decide. But it seems that without the touch of passion too things are difficult for the orator in *sententia senatoria*.

Ἀγὼν λόγων *in the* contio

In the *contio* too, in which all Roman citizens and whoever else was in the *forum*[28] could be involved, often a true confrontation of antithetical orations was conducted, especially in cases of law proposals (*rogationes*) by someone -usually by the tribune of the plebs- who had the power to convene (*potestas contionandi*) this kind of assembly.[29] In the beginning of this procedure the proposer (*auctor*) read the law and then delivered a speech to support it, or vice versa. As the chairman of the

[26] For the characteristics of this kind of rhetorical confrontation in Thucydides' history see Romilly (1988) 179-238.
[27] Sal. *Cat.* 53.
[28] Taylor (1966) 62; Thompson (1978) 23-7. Women also could attend a *contio* or even deliver a speech there –in very special occasions though; see Culhman (2004) 156; App. *BC* 4.32-3.
[29] Pina Polo (1995) 205-6.

assembly, the proposer had the exclusive right to designate who else would speak in the *contio* and in what order. Usually, however, he called persons who supported and others who opposed the law, so that the people be informed comprehensively about it. But if the specific magistrate omitted to present in a reasonable degree the opposite view, anyone else with *potestas contionandi* could convene additional *contiones*, to propound his position to the audience. Of course the supporters of the *rogatio* could act similarly.[30] After the end of the procedure in the *contio* followed the vote in the *comitia centuriata* or in the *comitia tributa*,[31] which this time involved, of course, only the citizens.

Apart, however, from the opportunity raised for the orators to have a real confrontation, which the *contiones* provided mainly in legislative initiatives, that kind of assembly was generally suitable for political struggles waged before the people by the Roman politicians on all current issues. From this perspective the *contio* was a real rhetorical school, especially for younger orators, as Cicero informs us (**literary source n. 24**).

Cicero's contional rhetoric and oratory

My basic hypothesis in my dissertation is that democratic political speeches before the crowd, such as Cicero's *contiones* were, refer to a largely democratic polity basis, but its final image, as revealed by the specific speeches, directly or indirectly, must be formed after a thorough research. This research also highlihts, hopefully, the causes that Cicero regarded as critical to the decline of the paternal republic, with particular emphasis on populism as an independent factor, wich shocks and ultimately overthrows a democratic constitution and transforms it into totalitarian.

The detailed discussion of the subject in my dissertation leads to some conclusions that confirm, as I believe, my initial hypothesis. Thus Roman rhetorical theory, developed by Cicero in full form, emanating from the kind of oratory the *res publica* as a peculiar political system requires, and being enriched by the achievements of corresponding Greek, concerns eminently oratory before the crowd. This finding brings us already to the democratic basis of government, in which that kind of oratory took place. But, because of the coexistence of primarily deliberative

[30] Pina Polo (1995) 207-8.
[31] For these two assemblies of *populus Romanus* see Taylor (1966) 6-7 and 59-106; Brennan (2004) 62; North (2006) 261-3.

oratory before the Senate, Roman rhetorical theory introduces a transverse incision in already existing Greek theory, reciprocating somehow the enrichment it received from the latter. The constant dialectic of oratory, however, with a humanist and practical political philosophy, at the level we see it in Cicero, is the most important element that constitutes the renewal of classical rhetoric, as we knew it from the Greeks.

This renewal, nevertheless, was made possible partly thanks to the type of polity the *res publica* was and partly because of the dominant political position of Rome, which was, after Athens -certainly in a much larger scale- the second major power in the Mediterranean, in which free oratory was honored.

Subsequently, the historical valuation of Roman deliberative oratory by Cicero himself takes place on the basis of two trends, whose collision course is identified clearly from the era of Gracchi onwards.[32] The first trend is prone to demagogy, which is pendant from a once true but often hypocritical interest in the problems of the people, but finally leads to a tendency toward self-concentration of powers, in violation of what we might retrospectively call "the Constitution of the *res publica*".

The second trend, on the other hand, which essentially existed since the time of Tarquinius's overthow, is the pro-contitutional one, which aims to maintain the status of the *res publica*, i.e. the distinct roles of the people, the Senate and the magistrates in it, and its manifest democratic base, as the offices, which were open to all citizens, and the laws of the state, i.e. almost the whole of the political power, emanated from the universal right to vote.

The fullest expression of the second trend in deliberative oratory of Rome is Cicero's *contiones*. The key elements of this kind of oratory, which according to Cicero is the true *eloquentia popularis*, is the strong theoretical background on which it is built, the deep philosophical education of the orator and, most importantly, his faith in the constitutional form of the *res publica*. Fairly, therefore, the oratory that promotes this idea does not allow itself the divisive phraseology and the incitement of a whole political body collectively against an other one, e.g. the people against the Senate or vice versa. However, this oratory is directed against individual persons or groups that threaten the constitutional order. Thus by his *contiones* Cicero doesn't try to tie the people to the chariot of the Senate, but he addresses one of the three factors, whose role is crucial for the proper operation and adjustment of the paternal polity to

[32] It seems that this is exactly the key point in the treatise *Brutus*.

the current political developments. And *contiones* addressed the real master of the political life of the *res publica*, the *populus Romanus*, who was the bearer of its democratic and liberal character, made up by the idea of *libertas*, the strength of individual rights, the social mobility and democratic oratory.

On the other hand, Cicero's *contiones* clearly show that the demagogues, denouncing systematically the Senate, championing ostensibly the popular interests, who called themselves *populares* and regarded as hypocrites politicians like Cicero, and of undemocratic attitudes others like Cato the Younger, were actually abolished the position not only of the Senate but also of the people in the *res publica*, decomposed and eventually turned it essentially into a militarism.

Much more than this, however, Cicero's both contional oratory and rhetoric present the Roman *res publica* as the stopover of the development of democracy between ancient Athenian and modern parliamentary democracies. The role of the Senate was the key element which worked as a safety valve between the demagoges and the people, the lack of wich in the Athenian *δημοκρατίαν* made Isocrates to complain, as we saw above. The contribution of this political system to history has, therefore, colossal proportions: it gave a model constitution, which united on a democratic basis the best elements of other polities and provided the conditions for the greatest inner peace within freedom, so that there was a reasonable expectation, that by the necessary strengthening and deepening of institutions and individual rights, there would be also a parallel reinforcement of true democratic consciousness and per capita cultivation of the citizens, and freedom could not be converted into arbitrariness, endangering the structure of the constitution by the independent corrosive factor of populism.

The rapid spread of the modern parliamentary democracy -elsewhere in greater and elsewhere with less success- noted in our time, shows that this type of government is the most effective political vehicle of man to meet the challenges of the future, as it accords better than any other alternative to free citizens who feel jointly responsible for shaping that future. From this perspective Cicero, if he saw the current developments, would surely feel significantly vindicated for his political struggle, which made him a true martyr of democracy.

5. Conclusion

Finally it seems that political oratory and rhetoric are meaningful only in acting and dynamic democracies, that through these means have to maintain their citizens vigilant, in order to achieve the expansion of their basic principles and institutions, together with their safety from both external and internal hazards. Among the latter demagogy is faced by Cicero as the most dangerous. From this point of view today the real European integration could and should be promoted through the above principles of rhetoric, in order to isolate, from the continental body the existent risk that modern demagogy marks, which is heavily responsible for creating the current primarily political and secondarily economic crisis. Consequently it seems evident that the most powerful weapon of modern Europe towards this very risk would and hopefully will be the establishment of a single European Constitution, especially if we are to believe Isocrates (**literary source n. 25**).

Saarbrücken, October 10th, 2013

Literary sources

1) *ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία,*
τοσαύτην ἔχουσα δύναμιν ὅσην περ ἐν σώματι φρόνησις.
αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ βουλευομένη περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ τὰ μὲν
ἀγαθὰ διαφυλάττουσα, τὰς δὲ συμφορὰς διαφεύγουσα.
ταύτῃ καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας
ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι, καὶ πράττειν οὕτως ἑκάστους
οἵαν περ ἂν ταύτην ἔχωσιν.

Isoc. VII. 14

[For the soul of a state is nothing else than its polity, having as much power over it as does the mind over the body; for it is this which deliberates upon all questions, seeking to preserve what is good and to ward off what is disastrous; and it is this which of necessity assimilates to its own nature the laws, the public orators and the private citizens; and all the members of the state must fare well or ill according to the kind of polity under which they live.]

Trans. George Norlin, Ph.D., LL.D. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1980.

2) *τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην, ὥσπερ εἶπον, κυρίαν ἐποίησαν τῆς εὐταξίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἣ τοὺς μὲν οἰομένους ἐνταῦθα βελτίστους ἄνδρας γίγνεσθαι, παρ᾽ οἷς οἱ νόμοι μετὰ πλείστης ἀκριβείας κείμενοι τυγχάνουσιν, ἀγνοεῖν ἐνόμιζεν: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν κωλύειν ὁμοίους ἅπαντας εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἕνεκά γε τοῦ ῥᾴδιον εἶναι τὰ γράμματα λαβεῖν παρ᾽ ἀλλήλων.*

Isoc. VII. 39

[Such, then, as I have described, was the nature of the Council which our forefathers charged with the supervision of moral discipline—a council which considered that those who believed that the best citizens are produced in a state where the laws are prescribed with the greatest exactness were blind to the truth; for in that case there

would be no reason why all of the Hellenes should not be on the same level, at any rate in so far as it is easy to borrow written codes from each other.]

3) *μεγίστην δ᾽ αἰτίαν ἡγητέον ἐν ἅπαντι πράγματι καὶ πρὸς ἐπιτυχίαν καὶ τοὐναντίον τὴν τῆς πολιτείας σύστασιν.*

Plb. 6.2.9

[As the most important reason for success and failure one should consider the composition of the constitution.]

4) … *μύθων τε ῥητῆρ᾽ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων.*

Hom. *Il.* I 443

[you have to be both an effective orator and fighter]

5) *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πρὸς μὲν Ἀλέξανδρον ὑπεκρίναντο τάδε. ‘καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτό γε ἐπιστάμεθα ὅτι πολλαπλησίη ἐστὶ τῷ Μήδῳ δύναμις ἢ περ ἡμῖν, ὥστε οὐδὲν δέει τοῦτό γε ὀνειδίζειν. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἐλευθερίης γλιχόμενοι ἀμυνεύμεθα οὕτω ὅκως ἂν καὶ δυνώμεθα….’*

Hdt. 8.143.1

[But to Alexander the Athenians replied as follows: “We know of ourselves that the power of the Mede is many times greater than ours. There is no need to taunt us with that. Nevertheless in our zeal for freedom we will defend ourselves to the best of our ability….”]

English translation by A. D. Godley. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. 1920.

- cf. idem 7.135.3.

6) *...καὶ ἄλλους οὐκέτι ὕστερον ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, φοβούμενοι μὴ σφίσιν οἱ ἐξιόντες χείρους γίγνωνται, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ Παυσανίᾳ ἐνεῖδον, ἀπαλλαξείοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομίζοντες ἱκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε παρόντι ἐπιτηδείους.*

Thuc. 1.95.7

[…and the Lacedaemonians did not send out any to succeed them. They feared for those who went out a deterioration similar to that observable in Pausanias; besides, they desired to be rid of the Median war, and were satisfied of the competency of the Athenians for the position, and of their friendship at the time towards themselves.]

Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. London, J. M. Dent; New York, E. P. Dutton. 1910.

7) *ἐπλεύσαμεν ἐς Σικελίαν πρῶτον μέν, εἰ δυναίμεθα, Σικελιώτας καταστρεψόμενοι, μετὰ δ᾽ ἐκείνους αὖθις καὶ Ἰταλιώτας, ἔπειτα καὶ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἀρχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν ἀποπειράσοντες. εἰ δὲ προχωρήσειε ταῦτα ἢ πάντα ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω, ἤδη τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐμέλλομεν ἐπιχειρήσειν, κομίσαντες ξύμπασαν μὲν τὴν ἐκεῖθεν προσγενομένην δύναμιν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, πολλοὺς δὲ βαρβάρους μισθωσάμενοι καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ ἄλλους τῶν ἐκεῖ ὁμολογουμένως νῦν βαρβάρων μαχιμωτάτους, τριήρεις τε πρὸς ταῖς ἡμετέραις πολλὰς ναυπηγησάμενοι, ἐχούσης τῆς Ἰταλίας ξύλα ἄφθονα, αἷς τὴν Πελοπόννησον πέριξ πολιορκοῦντες καὶ τῷ πεζῷ ἅμα ἐκ γῆς ἐφορμαῖς τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν βίᾳ λαβόντες, τὰς δ᾽ ἐντειχισάμενοι, ῥᾳδίως ἠλπίζομεν καταπολεμήσειν καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοῦ ξύμπαντος Ἑλληνικοῦ ἄρξειν.*

Thuc. 6.90.2-3

[We sailed to Sicily first to conquer, if possible, the Siceliots, and after them the Italiots also, and finally to assail the empire and city of Carthage. [3] In the event of all or most of these schemes succeeding, we were then to attack Peloponnese, bringing with us the entire force of the Hellenes lately acquired in those parts, and taking a number of barbarians into our pay, such as the Iberians and others in those

countries, confessedly the most warlike known, and building numerous galleys in addition to those which we had already, timber being plentiful in Italy; and with this fleet blockading Peloponnese from the sea and assailing it with our armies by land, taking some of the cities by storm, drawing works of circumvallation round others, we hoped without difficulty to effect its reduction, and after this to rule the whole of the Hellenic name.]

8) *παρὰ δ᾽ ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἥκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν.*

Plat. *Prot.* 318e-319a

[whereas, if he applies to me, he will learn precisely and solely that for which he has come. That learning consists of good judgement in his own affairs, showing how best to order his own home; and in the affairs of his city, showing how he may have most influence on public affairs both in speech and in action.]

Translated by W.R.M. Lamb. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967.

9) *τοιόνδε τοι ταρβοῦντες ἐνδίκως σέβας* 700
ἔρυμά τε χώρας καὶ πόλεως σωτήριον
ἔχοιτ᾽ ἄν, οἷον οὔτις ἀνθρώπων ἔχει,
οὔτ᾽ ἐν Σκύθησιν οὔτε Πέλοπος ἐν τόποις.
κερδῶν ἄθικτον τοῦτο βουλευτήριον,
αἰδοῖον, ὀξύθυμον, εὐδόντων ὕπερ 705
ἐγρηγορὸς φρούρημα γῆς καθίσταμαι.

A. *Εὐμ.* 700-6

[Stand in just awe of such majesty, and you will have a defense for your land and salvation of your city, such as no man has, either among the Scythians or in Pelops'

realm. I establish this tribunal, untouched by greed, worthy of reverence, quick to anger, awake on behalf of those who sleep, a guardian of the land.]

English translation by Herbert Weir Smyth, Ph. D. in two volumes. 2. Eumenides. Herbert Weir Smyth, Ph. D. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press. 1926.

10) *οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι μᾶλλον αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρῶτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ᾽ ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι.*

Thuc. 2.65.10

[With his {Pericles'} successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.]

11) ***Σωκράτης***
ἔλεγές τοι νυνδὴ ὅτι καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται ὁ ῥήτωρ.

Γοργίας
καὶ γὰρ ἔλεγον, ἔν γε ὄχλῳ.

Σωκράτης
οὐκοῦν τὸ ἐν ὄχλῳ τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς εἰδόσι τοῦ ἰατροῦ πιθανώτερος ἔσται.

Γοργίας
ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

Plat. *Gorg.* 459a 1-6.

[Socrates
You were saying just now, you know, that even in the matter of health the orator will be more convincing than the doctor.

Gorgias
Yes, indeed, I was—meaning, to the crowd.

Socrates
And "to the crowd" means "to the ignorant?" For surely, to those who know, he will not be more convincing than the doctor.

Gorgias
You are right.]

12)*οἱ γὰρ κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον τὴν πόλιν διοικοῦντες κατεστήσαντο πολιτείαν οὐκ ὀνόματι μὲν τῷ κοινοτάτῳ καὶ πραοτάτῳ προσαγορευομένην, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων οὐ τοιαύτην τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι φαινομένην, οὐδ᾽ ἣ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπαίδευε τοὺς πολίτας ὥσθ᾽ ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀκολασίαν δημοκρατίαν, τὴν δὲ παρανομίαν ἐλευθερίαν, τὴν δὲ παρρησίαν ἰσονομίαν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐξουσίαν τοῦ πάντα ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἀλλὰ μισοῦσα καὶ κολάζουσα τοὺς τοιούτους βελτίους καὶ σωφρονεστέρους ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ἐποίησεν.*

Ἰσοκ. VII. 20

[For those who directed the state in the time of Solon and Cleisthenes did not establish a polity which in name merely was hailed as the most impartial and the mildest of governments, while in practice showing itself the opposite to those who lived under it, nor one which trained the citizens in such fashion that they looked upon insolence as democracy, lawlessness as liberty, impudence of speech as equality, and licence to do what they pleased as happiness, but rather a polity which detested and punished such men and by so doing made all the citizens better and wiser.]

13) *τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστον τιμῶσαν καὶ κολάζουσαν προηροῦντο, καὶ διὰ ταύτης ᾤκουν τὴν πόλιν, οὐκ ἐξ ἁπάντων τὰς ἀρχὰς κληροῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τοὺς ἱκανωτάτους ἐφ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν ἔργων προκρίνοντες. τοιούτους γὰρ ἤλπιζον ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἵοί περ ἂν ὦσιν οἱ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστατοῦντες.*

Ἰσοκ. VII. 22

[and preferring rather that which rewards and punishes every man according to his deserts, they governed the city on this principle, not filling the offices by lot from all the citizens, but selecting the best and the ablest for each function of the state; for they believed that the rest of the people would reflect the character of those who were placed in charge of their affairs.]

14) *πέπεισμαι γὰρ ἐξ ὧν παρὼν καὶ ἀκούων σύνοιδα, τὰ πλείω τῶν πραγμάτων ἡμᾶς ἐκπεφευγέναι τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὰ δέοντα ποιεῖν ἢ τῷ μὴ συνιέναι. ἀξιῶ δ᾽ ὑμᾶς, ἂν μετὰ παρρησίας ποιῶμαι τοὺς λόγους, ὑπομένειν, τοῦτο θεωροῦντας, εἰ τἀληθῆ λέγω, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, ἵνα τὰ λοιπὰ βελτίω γένηται: ὁρᾶτε γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν δημηγορεῖν ἐνίους εἰς πᾶν προελήλυθε μοχθηρίας τὰ παρόντα.*

Dem. III. 3

[For what I have seen and heard convinces me that most of your chances have escaped us rather from a disinclination to do our duty than from a failure to understand it. I must ask you to bear with me if I speak frankly, considering only whether I am speaking the truth, and speaking with the object that things may go better in the future; for you see how the popularity-hunting of some of our orators has led us into this desperate predicament.]

Demosthenes with an English translation by J. H. Vince, M.A. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1930.

15)*ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν βουλὴ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀπεστερήθη τῆς ἐπιμελείας. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συνέβαινεν ἀνίεσθαι μᾶλλον τὴν πολιτείαν διὰ τοὺς προθύμως δημαγωγοῦντας.*

Ἀριστ. *Ἀθ.* 26

[In this way the Council of the Areopagites was deprived of the superintendence of affairs. After this there came about an increased relaxation of the constitution, due to the eagerness of those who were the leaders of the People.]

Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1952.

16)*alterum, quod remoto foro, contione, iudiciis, senatu statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis esse perfectum*.

Cic. *De Orat.* 1.35

[secondly your pronouncement that, even if we take no account of the forum, of popular assemblies, of the court of justice, or of the Senate-house, the orator is still complete over the whole range of speech and culture.]

Translated by E. W. Sutton, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusets, William Heinemann Ltd. 1959.

17) *In quam cum intueor,maxime mihi occurrunt, Attice, et quasi lucent Athenae tuae, qua in urbe primum se orator extulit primumque etiam monumentis et litteris oratio est coepta mandari.*

Cic. *Brut.* 26

[And when I think of Greece it is especially your Athens which comes to my mind, Atticus, and shines out like a beacon. It was there that the orator first made his appearance, and there first that oratory began to be consigned to written records.]

Translated by G. L. Hendrickson, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusets, William Heinemann Ltd. 1962.

18) *...illi {Graeci} nati in litteris ardentesque his studiis, otio vero diffluentes, non modo nihil acquisierint sed ne relictum quidem et traditum et suum conservaverint*.

Cic. *de Orat.* 3.131

[whereas the Greeks, though born in a world of literature and enthusiasts for these studies, are yet demoralized by sloth and have not only made no further acquisitions but have not even preserved their own heritage that came down to them.]

19)*videmus item paucis annis post*
reges exactos,cum plebes prope ripam Anionis ad tertium
miliarium consedisseteumque montem, qui Sacer
appellatus est, occupavisset, M. Valerium dictatorem dicendo
sedavisse discordias eique ob eam rem honores amplissimos
habitos et eum primum ob eam ipsam causam Maximum
esse appellatum. Ne L. Valerium quidem Potitum arbitror
non aliquid potuisse dicendo, qui post decemviralem invidiam
plebem in patres incitatam legibus et contionibus suis mitigaverit.

Cic. *Brut.* 54

[We see again a few years after the expansion of the kings, when the plebeians had withdrawn to the third milestone near the Anio, and occupied the eminence which thereafter was called the Sacred Mount, that Marcus Valerius the dictator appeased their discord by his eloquence. For this success we learn that the most distinguished honours were conferred upon him, and that for the same reason he was the first to be called Maximus. Nor do I think that Lucius Valerius Potitus was without capacity as an orator, since by his laws and public harangues he succeeded in assuaging the passions of the common people against the patricians after the odium aroused by the rule of the decemvirs.]

20) *Nam posteaquam, imperio omnium gentium constituto, diuturnitas pacis otium confirmavit, nemo fere laudis cupidus adulescens non sibi ad dicendum studio omni enitendum putavit*.

Cic. *de Orat.* 1.14

[For as soon as our world-empire had been established, and an enduring peace had assured us leisure, there was hardly a youth, athirst for fame, who did not deem it his duty to strive with might and main after eloquence.]

21) *...in Stoicis; quorum peracutum et artis plenum orationis genus scis tamen esse exile nec satis populari adsensioni accommodatum.*

Cic. *Brut*. 114

[…of the Stoics. Their style of oratory is acute and systematic, as you know, but meagre and not well suited to winning the assent of apopular audience.]

22) *...liberior et latior quam patitur consuetudo iudiciorum et fori.*

Cic. *Brut.* 120

[…too free and discursive for the usage of court and forum.]

23) *…minime aptum ad dicendum genus.*

Cic. *Brut.* 131

[…a creed ill-suited to public speaking.]

24) *Tum P. Sulpici in tribunatu cotidie contionantis totum genus dicendi penitus cognovimus.*

Cic. *Brut.* 306

[Publius Sulpicius was tribune at that time and addressed the people almost daily, so that I came to know his style thoroughly.]

25) *ἢν δὲ μεταβάλωμεν τὴν πολιτείαν, δῆλον ὅτι κατὰ*
τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, οἷά περ ἦν τοῖς προγόνοις τὰ πράγματα,
τοιαῦτ᾽ ἔσται καὶ περὶ ἡμᾶς: ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν
πολιτευμάτων καὶ τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἀεὶ καὶ παραπλησίας ἀποβαίνειν.

Ἰσοκ. VII. 78

[but if we effect a change of polity, it is evident by the same reasoning that such conditions of life as our ancestors enjoyed will come about for us also; for from the same political institutions there must always spring like or similar ways of life.]

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