Strategic manoeuvring with hyperbole in political debate

A. Francisca SNOECK HENKEMANS

University of Amsterdam, Spuistraat 134, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

a.f.snoeckhenkemans@uva.nl

1. Introduction

Hyperbole is a rhetorical trope by means of which statements are made that are obviously exaggerated and thus untrue or unwarranted.[1] Both in classical rhetoric and in modern pragma-linguistic approaches specific functions have been ascribed to hyperbole. In this paper, the stylistic device of hyperbole will be discussed by making use of the extended version of the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory, in which rhetorical insights are integrated in a dialectical framework (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, 9; van Eemeren 2010, 22). According to this theory, arguers may be taken to be pursuing both dialectical and rhetorical goals in argumentative discourse. Although there is no reason to assume that the rhetorical norm of persuasion is necessarily in contradiction with the critical ideal of reasonableness, there is a potential tension between attempting to achieve at the same time a dialectical as well as a rhetorical aim (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, 135). In order to diminish this tension, arguers are assumed to make use of 'strategic manoeuvring'. Strategic manoeuvring consists of three aspects:[2]

> Strategic manoeuvring can take place in making an expedient choice from the options constituting the 'topical potential' associated with a particular discussion stage, in selecting a responsive adaptation to 'audience demand,' and in exploiting the appropriate 'presentational devices.' Both parties may be expected to select the material they can handle well, or that suits them best, develop the perspective most agreeable to their audience, and present their contributions in the most effective way (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, 139).

Strategic manoeuvring can 'derail' and become fallacious if a party allows its dialectical aims to be overruled by its rhetorical aims, and violates one or more rules for critical discussion.

---

[1] In classical rhetoric, hyperbole can also be a figure of thought, when it is a means of gradual amplification (Lausberg 1998, 410).

[2] These aspects are to a large extent comparable with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969) notions of 'choice', 'communion' and 'presence'.

In the last couple of years I have explored the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring with various presentational means such as metonymy, rhetorical questions and *praeteritio*.[3] In this paper, I will discuss some of the functions that hyperbole can have in strategic manoeuvring. I will illustrate these functions by looking at some examples of the way hyperbole is used in European political debates.

I shall first give a characterization of hyperbole and of the functions that have been ascribed to this figure of speech in the rhetorical and pragmatic literature. Next, I shall give a more detailed specification of the ways in which hyperbole may contribute to arguers' dialectical and rhetorical aims in political debates.

2. Characteristics and functions of hyperbole

Quintilian (VIII.6.67) describes hyperbole as a "tasteful exaggeration of the truth" that can go in two directions: one can exaggerate by presenting things as bigger or as smaller than they are. In this paper I will concentrate on the first type of hyperbole, the exaggerated enlargement or overstatement.

Overstatement can take various forms. The lexico-grammatical repertoire for hyperbole includes numerical expressions, expressions of spatial extent, intensifying and extreme adjectives and adverbs, comparatives and superlatives (Spitzbardt 1963). According to McCarthy and Carter hyperbolic utterances often describe entities and events in the most extreme way possible (2004, p. 157). They contain lexical items such as *completely*, *every time*, and *everyone*.[4] Claridge (2011, pp. 40-49) gives an overview of realizations of hyperbole.. Claridge (2011, 40-49) gives an overview of realizations of hyperbole. A first distinction that can be made is that between *basic* and *composite* hyperbole. According to Claridge, basic hyperbolic expressions do not leave the domain of the corresponding intended expression. In (1), for example the hyperbolic expression 'freezing' belongs to the same domain (that of temperature) as the intended expression 'very cold'. Example (2), however, is a case of metaphorical hyperbole, and involves domain-switching, in this case from being afraid to changing one's qualitative substance (Claridge 2011, 40-41):

---

[3] See Snoeck Henkemans 2008, 2009a and 2009b.
[4] McCarthy and Carter (2004, p. 157) perceive an overlap between what Pomerantz (1986) has termed 'extreme case formulations' and hyperbole, although they do recognize that extreme formulations are not necessarily heard as counterfactual and are often rather conventional.

(1) It was so cold in the restaurant I was **freezing**.

(2) When I saw him walking down the street I was **petrified**.

Claridge further distinguishes between the type of syntactic constituent that can be hyperbolic: hyperbolic expressions can be words (as in example 1 and 2), phrases or clauses. Within the categories of phrasal and clausal hyperboles, there are two regularly occurring patterns: comparison, as in example (3), and repetition, as in example (4) (Claridge 2011, 48).

(3) I avoid beaches **like the plague**.

(4) He put **loads and loads** of cream on his cake.

Although hyperbole exaggerates how things are in reality, and thus involves saying something which is strictly speaking untrue, or unwarranted, it is not considered as a form of lying.[5] Leech (1969) calls hyperbole, litotes and irony 'honest deceptions,' because they all give a wrong representation of a situation and at the same time some indication of the true state of affairs.[6] According to Clark, hyperbole can be seen as a violation of the maxim of quality which gives rise to conversational implicatures (1996, 143). That the literal utterance violates the maxim of quality is a property that hyperbole shares with a figure of speech such as *irony*. There is, however an important difference between the reconstruction of the intended meaning in cases of irony and hyperbole, according to McCarthy and Carter (2004, 158). In recovering the intended meaning of an ironic statement, the listener should change the literal assertion into a different *kind* of assertion (usually the opposite of what was literally said). In the case of hyperbole, however, the difference between what is said and what is implicated is

> not one of kind, but of degree; the corrective response is to up- or downscale the assertion to accord with reality (the listener who hears *I almost starved to death when I stayed at my aunt's house!* 'corrects' it to something like *My aunt was very mean with food/did not feed me nearly enough so I was hungry* (McCarthy and

---

[5] Not just factual assertions may be hyperbolic: Claridge (2011, 19, 17n) gives examples of evaluative statements (such as: "I love that passport") that can be exaggerated too. In that case, the hyperbole is not counterfactual, but the utterance is less credible, does not seem completely sincere.

[6] Claridge (2011, 18) nuances this characterization , however, by noting that the 'conflict' between what is said and what is meant in the case of hyperbole can be large or small, and that small-scale exaggerations are harder to detect and can be employed as lies more easily.

Carter 2004, 158).

Since it is a prerequisite for the recognition of hyperbole that the listener notes that there is a distinction between what is literally said and what is actually the case, the role of context is crucial in the interpretation of hyperbolic utterances (Claridge 2011, 12). What is an exaggeration in the one case, does not have to be one in the other.

The question is to what exactly a speaker can be held accountable in the case of hyperbole. Fogelin (1988, 13) believes that an hyperbolic statement is uttered 'with the intention of having it corrected away from the extreme, but still to something *strong*'.[7] According to Claridge (2011, 20), by using hyperbole, speakers communicate their emotional orientation towards a state of affairs. This is possible, because hyperbolic expressions do not just have a quantitative meaning, but also a qualitative or emotional value:

> While hyperbole is one means of intensification in the sense of gradability, [….] it is also intensification in the emotional sense, i.e. emphasis or what Labov (1984) calls 'intensity'. Emphasis as such is not dependent on a degree scale, but generally heightens the force of the proposition and marks the intensity of speaker involvement and commitment. This means that while the speaker is certainly not bound to the literal meaning of his utterance, s/he is committed to the deeper emotional and interactional, thus social, truth of the statement. (Claridge 2011, 12)

The extent of contrast between the hyperbolic utterance and how things are in reality correlates, according to her, 'with the strength of the emotion to be expressed' (Claridge 2011, 20).

In both classical and modern rhetoric, hyperbole is seen as a device that can be used both to highlight or emphasize certain aspects and to convey and arouse specific emotions (Ueding 1998; Roberts and Kreuz 1994). Claridge adds that one of the advantages of hyperbole is that it can *at the same time* emphasize something and convey emotions:

> Figurative expressions like hyperbole […] allow the conveyance of emotion besides and on top of an 'objective-content' message, thus economically telescoping several messages (cf. *it was dead easy* versus *it was very easy – and I was surprised, relieved* etc. *about it*). (2011, 79)

---

[7] According to Norrick, by using hyperbole the speaker communicates 'that his utterance *seems to him* to literally represent the objective state of affairs, given his emotional involvement' (Norrick 1982, 172).

Although emotions are important in the case of hyperbole, and the trope is therefore often associated with pathos in particular,[8] Claridge argues that this trope can have an influence on all of the three Aristotelian aspects of persuasion, logos, pathos and ethos:

> With respect to *logos*, it can be useful to maximize or hyperbolically inflate some aspects of proofs while downplaying others […] With respect to *pathos*, hyperbole can make things appear more important, more frightening or more desirable, thus arousing specific attitudes and feelings. […] Finally, with respect to *ethos*, a constantly exaggerating speaker may appear untrustworthy […] while one who always minimizes may not be convincing, or boring; the degree of hyperbole may need to be carefully calibrated. (Claridge 2011, 217)

A case in point for Claridge's claim that it is important to strike the right balance with hyperbole, is to be found in example (5). As becomes clear from the example, on occasions which call for grand statements, even being a bit nuanced can raise suspicion and will be perceived as significant. In the example, Jonathan Chait comments on Barack Obama's election night speech of November 7, 2012. In the speech, Obama claims that although there are differences of opinion between Americans, Americans still share common hopes and dreams:

(5)   We Just Had a Class War. And one side won.

        When President Obama took the stage at McCormick Place in Chicago well after midnight, we were all too wiped out with joy or depression or Nate Silver auto-refresh fatigue to pay careful attention to the speech the newly reelected president delivered. The phrase that lingered in most of our sleepy ears was the reprise of his career-launching invocation of the United States as being more than red and blue states. So soaring, so unifying. But those words were merely the trappings of magnanimity draped over an argument that was, at its core, harsher than the one he had regularly delivered during the campaign. The telling phrase came when Obama turned away from the thank-yous and patriotic hymnals into the guts of his remarks. "Despite all our differences," he transitioned, "most of us share certain hopes for America's future." The key term here is "most," as opposed to "all"—"most" meaning less than 100 percent and possibly as little as 51 percent. He attributed to most Americans a desire for great schools, a desire to limit debt and inequality: "a generous America, a compassionate America."
        (Jonathan Chait, *New York news and features*, November 11, 2012)

In classical rhetoric, hyperbole and other forms of amplification were already seen as techniques that can be used to exaggerate certain facts or value judgments and thereby

---

[8] Hyperbole has been classified as a figure of affect in rhetoric (Lausberg 1960, 299)

strengthen the arguer's defence or attack.[9] Fahnestock and Tonnard describe the function ascribed to such techniques throughout the history of rhetoric as that of making a line of argument 'more psychologically salient to the audience and more conceptually important in the overall case' (2011, 105).

Claridge (2011) mentions another aspect of hyperbole that may be used for persuasive purposes: many hyperbolic expressions are characterized by a certain vagueness. When expressions such as 'age' or 'load' or 'million' are used hyperbolically, they do not refer to an exact amount. This vagueness may, according to her, be to the advantage of the speaker:

> Such vagueness may favour the use of a word for hyperbolic purposes, as the extension can be seen as gradual, not too blatant and also easily retractable (Claridge 2011, 209).

In a corpus study analysis of the rhetorical functions of hyperbole in ordinary conversations, Cano Mora found that many hyperbolic utterances were used on the one hand to praise someone or to approve of something and on the other to complain, attack and criticize someone or something (2006, 205).[10] A similar observation is made by Claridge, who found that particularly in a political context hyperbole is used for such purposes as 'emphasising the seriousness of the situation, the urgency of action, criticising the political opponent and praising one's own party or policies' (2011, 265).

3. Strategic function of hyperbole

The literature on hyperbole has shown that hyperbole can function as an emphasizing device and can therefore be used to make information that is to the arguer's advantage seem more salient to the audience. Hyperbole also has an evaluative meaning, and can thus be a means to convey and arouse emotions. The combination of the emphasizing and evaluative effect of hyperbole explains why this device seems to be particularly suitable for acts of criticism or praise.

The question I would now like to address is what role *hyperbole*, in view of these

---

[9] Such a role is given to hyperbole and amplification in Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria,* in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium,* and in Cicero's *De Oratore*.

[10] Cano Mora found that emphasis was by far the most important function of hyperbole, followed by positive and negative evaluation. Other more or less prominent functions were expression of surprise, simplification, interest intensification, contrast of differences and humour (2006, 199).

characteristics, can play in political debates in arguers' strategic manoeuvrings in the different stages of an argumentative discussion. In all stages of argumentative discourse, the dialectical aim of maintaining reasonableness and the rhetorical aim of achieving effectiveness go together (van Eemeren 2010, 40). For each stage of a discussion, therefore, both dialectical and rhetorical objectives can be distinguished (van Eemeren 2010, 44-45). This means that a specification should be given of how hyperbole can contribute to these aims in every discussion stage.

In the *confrontation* stage, where the dialectical aim is to externalize the difference of opinion, the rhetorical objective of the participants will be to define the difference of opinion in the way that is the most beneficial from their own perspective (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, 138). In a situation where there is also a third party, as in parliamentary debate, arguers will for instance present the position of their (political) opponent in a way that may convince the audience that it is completely indefensible.[11]

Examples of this use of hyperbole for confrontational manoeuvring can be found in the debate on the Dutch government's statement of policy on taking office, delivered to the House of Representatives of the States General by the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, on 13 November 2012. In the two weeks preceding the debate, a lot of protest from different groups in society had risen in reaction to the effects on consumer purchasing power of one of the new government's proposed measures for cutting the costs of health care. In reaction to Mark Rutte's defense of the government policies, Geert Wilders, leader of one of the opposition parties (PVV), interrupts Rutte in the following way:

> (6) [Two weeks ago] I asked the prime minister whether he was prepared to offer his apologies. He would not do so then. In the meantime, **a 100.000 apologies would not be enough anymore**. The prime-minister has made **a complete mess** of it. He has **plunged the Netherlands into a chaos**. If he wants to **destroy his own party** that is up to him, but that he is **doing the same to the Netherlands**, **is intolerable**. He has **broken almost all his election promises**. He is going to **wreck the Netherlands** with his budget cuts [Translation fsh].

With this reaction, Wilders attacks Rutte's standpoint that the policies his government

---

[11] Van Eemeren analyses a parliamentary debate as a communicative activity type that can be characterized by each party's mission to reach his primary audience of listeners and watchers via a critical exchange with the secondary audience consisting of their actual interlocutors (2010, 154).

proposes, and in particular the budget cuts, are acceptable.[12] In his attack, Wilders criticizes the proposed policies in an exaggerated way by claiming that they are inconsistent with nearly all the election promises made by Rutte's party and by claiming that the budget cuts will 'wreck the Netherlands,' thereby blowing up the consequences the proposed policies will have. In this way, such a negative picture of the government's position is presented, that it seems almost superfluous to provide arguments for the negative judgment of the government's plans.

At the same time, this example also shows how hyperbole can contribute to achieving goals in the *opening* stage. The dialectical aim of the opening stage is to achieve clarity concerning the starting points that will be the point of departure for the discussion. The rhetorical aim of each of the parties is to establish those starting points that serve their own interest best. In the example, Wilders presents it as a common starting-point that everyone in the Netherlands is against the proposed policies. He does so, in the first place, by presenting it as taken for granted that apologies are due, and even claiming that no apologies to the people of the Netherlands can now be enough anymore. Secondly, with the phrases 'plunged the Netherlands into a chaos' and 'If he wants to destroy his own party', Wilders is referring to the protests that have risen against the proposed measures. He makes it seem as if the complete electorate, even all members of the prime minister's own party, are against the proposed measures. By using hyperbolic formulations, he also gives the impression that he is sharing the audience's discontent and anger. As Claridge points out, aligning with exaggerated voter sentiment can be seen as a natural use of hyperbole in a democracy, since the politician can in this way demonstrate a high level of agreement with the electorate (2011, 225).

In the *argumentation* stage, the dialectical aim is to advance and criticize argumentation. The rhetorical aim of this stage is 'to make the strongest case and to launch the most effective attack' (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2002, 139). Hyperbole can be used in the argumentation stage to make an attack on the other party's argumentation seem more forceful. In example (7), the British Prime Minister David Cameron reacts to the accusation of the Leader of the Opposition, Edward Miliband, that the government's policies show that Cameron is out of touch with the situation of lower and middle class families, while his policies are favouring the rich. Cameron denies the charge, by claiming

---

[12] In the speech that preceded this interruption, Rutte referred to the protests that had risen, but maintained: 'We must economise. There is no getting round that necessity. Our social security system – along with health care – is the area in which it is most difficult to keep provision affordable for future generations without taking drastic measures' (http://www.government.nl/government/policy-statement).

that he has cut taxes for the poor, and that under his government the rich pay more taxes than in the past under the opposition. Miliband then attacks Cameron by claiming that nobody believes him anymore and that everyone knows that he only represents the rich:

> (7)   *The Prime Minister:* What is out of touch is denying the fact that we had a deficit left by the right hon. Gentleman's Government that we had to deal with. That is what we have had to do, but we have been able to do it at the same time as cutting taxes for the poorest in our country, increasing child tax credits, and freezing the council tax to help those families. When it comes to the top rate of tax, let me tell him this: the richest in our country will pay more in tax under every year of this Government than any year of his Government. Those are the facts; he may not like them but he cannot deny them.
> *Edward Miliband:* The problem is that **nobody believes him anymore**. […] Before he was elected, the Prime Minister said: "Unless you can represent everyone in our country you cannot be a one nation party." That was then; this is now. **Everyone now knows** he cannot be a one nation Prime Minister.
> (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmhansrd/cm121219/debtext/121219-0001.htm#12121957001143)

By reacting in this way, Miliband implicitly argues that the "facts" that the Prime Minister is referring to cannot really be seen as undeniable facts, since "nobody believes him anymore". In his attack, Miliband does not really address Cameron's arguments for the opposite standpoint: he does not show that Cameron did not cut taxes for poor families or that it is not true that the rich will pay more taxes under his Government. Instead, Miliband makes it seem as if there is general agreement on the fact that David Cameron is not doing anything for the poor, but is only favouring the rich. To make his attack seem stronger – if only in the eyes of a third party, the voters Miliband represents – Miliband makes use of the hyperbolic expressions "nobody" and "everyone".

The dialectical aim of the *concluding* stage is to establish the result of the discussion: can the protagonist maintain his standpoint or can the antagonist maintain his position of doubt? The rhetorical objective of each party is to "claim victory", or to get the other party to admit defeat. In the following fragment of a Dutch parliamentary debate about the profit figures of the health insurance companies in the Netherlands that was held on April 17, 2013, Anne Mulder from the Dutch liberal party VVD, puts pressure on Mrs. Leyten from the Socialist Party (SP) to give up her standpoint and admit that the health insurance companies are doing their job and that the health system is working. He does this by exaggerating the way in which the Socialist Party participates in the debate in

parliament: According to Mulder, things are always wrong in the eyes of the Socialist Party:

> (8) **Anne Mulder** (VVD):
> My fraction is surprised that the Socialist Party has asked for this debate. On January 22 we all were also present in Question time. Then Mrs. Leijten said: It's a shame the health insurance companies are not doing their job! Now these health insurance companies *are* doing their job […] and it is still not right! **It is never right. Things are always wrong in the eyes of the Socialist Party. It would be good if for once the Socialist Party would acknowledge** that this health system is working. […] **The Socialist Party is never satisfied and always bitter. Sometimes I think: the Socialist Party always says no, no, no and they are always unhappy. Socialist Party members only say yes once in their life and are happy only once, and that is on their wedding day** (translation *fsh*)

The hyperbole in this fragment serves to heighten the pressure on the Socialist Party to give up its position by exaggerating and thereby ridiculing its negative attitude and by giving the message an emotional tone of exasperation. This might make it more difficult for the opponent to maintain the standpoint.

4. Conclusion

As I hope to have made clear by presenting a number of examples of the use of hyperbole in political debates, this stylistic device can be used for different rhetorical purposes in the different stages of an argumentative discussion. Generally speaking, it can be used to emphasize the information that contributes most to achieving the arguer's aims in the stage concerned. Unlike other emphasizing devices, hyperbole can at the same time convey positive or negative emotions that may make the dialectical move it occurs in rhetorically even more effective.

In the confrontation stage, the position of the opponent may be exaggerated in such a way that it becomes easier to attack. Especially in cases where there is a third party functioning as the arguer's primary audience, criticizing the opponent's position by exaggerating the negative aspects of it may be of advantage to the arguer. Hyperbole can also be used in the opening stage to emphasize the level of agreement with the audience, thereby making it seem that there is a common starting point for the discussion. In the argumentation stage the arguments can be made to look stronger by means of exaggeration. And finally, in the concluding stage, the arguer may use exaggeration as a

way of putting pressure on the other party to admit defeat.

References

Cano Mora, L. 2006. *'How to Make a Mountain out of a Molehill'. A Corpus-Based Pragmatic and Conversational Analysis Study of Hyperbole in Interaction*. Valencia: University of Valencia Press.

Cicero. 1976. *De Inventione; De Optimo Genere Oratorum, Topica*. Translated by H.M. Hubbell. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

[Cicero].1981. De Ratione Dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium). Translated by H. Caplan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Claridge, C. 2011. *Hyperbole in English. A Corpus-Based Study of Exaggeration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clark, H. 2010. *Using Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eemeren, F.H. van. 2010. *Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Eemeren, F.H. van, and R. Grootendorst. 1992. *Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies; A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Eemeren, F.H. van and P. Houtlosser. 2002. "Strategic Maneuvering: Maintaining a Delicate Balance." In *Dialectic and Rhetoric: The Warp and Woof of Argumentation Analysis*, edited by F.H. van Eemeren and P. Houtlosser, 119-130. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Fahnestock, J. and Y. Tonnard. 2011. "Amplification in Strategic Maneuvering." In *Keeping in Touch with Pragma-Dialectics*, edited by E. Feteris, B. Garssen and F. Snoeck Henkemans, 103-116. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Fogelin, R.J. 1988. *Figuratively Speaking*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lausberg, H. 1998. *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*. Leiden/Boston/Köln: Brill.

Labov, W. 1984. "Intensity." In *Meaning, Form, and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications*. Georgetown University Round Table on Language and Linguistics, edited by D. Schiffrin, 43– 70. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

Leech, G. 1969. *A Linguistic Guide to English Poetry.* Harlow: Longman.

McCarthy, M. and Carter, R. (2004). "'There's Millions of Them': Hyperbole in Everyday

Conversation." *Journal of Pragmatics* 36: 149-84.

Norrick, N.R. 1982. "On the Semantic of Overstatement." In *Sprache Beschreiben und Erklären*. Linguistisches Kolloquium 16, 1981, Kiel, edited by K. Detering, 168-179. Tübingen: Niemeyer.

Perelman, Ch., and Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. 1969. *The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation*. Translated by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Quintillian. 1920. *Institutio Oratoria* (Vols 1-4). Translated by H.E. Butler. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Roberts, R.M. and Kreuz, R. J. 1994."Why Do People Use Figurative Language?" *American Psychological Society* 5: 159-163.

Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. 2008 . "Manoeuvring Strategically with Metonymy in the Confrontation and Argumentation Stages of a Discussion." In *Understanding Argumentation: Work in Progress*, edited by F. H. van Eemeren, D. C. Williams and I. Z. Zagar, 69-77. Amsterdam: Sic Sat-Rozenberg.

Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. 2009a. "Manoeuvring Strategically with Rhetorical Questions." In *Pondering on Problems of Argumentation: Twenty Essays on Theoretical Issues*, edited by F. H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen, 15-23. Dordrecht: Springer.

Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. 2009b. "The Contribution of *Praeteritio* to Arguers' Confrontational Strategic Manoeuvres." In *Examining Argumentation in Context; Fifteen Studies on Strategic Maneuvering,* edited by F.H. van Eemeren, 241-255. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Spitzbardt, H. (1963). Overstatement and understatement in British and American English. *Philologica Pragensia, 6, 277-286.*

Ueding, G., ed. 1998. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.