Running head: FAKING GOOD & FAKING BAD

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Abstract

A question that continues to worry practitioners and researchers is how much recruiters can trust self-reported measures of personality. Several models of faking assume that applicants differ in their motivation to fake, but field evidence regarding these differences is still rare. For the current field study, we exploited a unique setting: The examination for compulsory military service in Switzerland. We were able to show that differences in the military service motivation of Swiss conscripts ($N$ = 918) were associated with faking good or faking bad, respectively. In particular, military service motivation was related to self-admitted faking, mean personality scores, and increased correlations between personality dimensions, which supports faking models that stress the importance of motivational differences.

Keywords: faking; motivation to fake; self-presentation; personality tests; personnel selection; military

Faking good and faking bad among military conscripts

Worldwide, a considerable number of organizations use personality tests for testing and selecting applicants (e.g., Di Milia, 2004; Diekmann & König, in press; König, Klehe, Berchtold, & Kleinmann, 2010; Zibarras & Woods, 2010), and meta-analytic research supports the use of personality measures (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007; Shaffer & Postlethwaite, 2012). At the same time, many practitioners worry that applicants fake when they complete a personality test (cf. Christiansen, Rozek, & Burns, 2010) and that faking undermines the predictive validity of personality testing. Although not all researchers share this negative view of faking (e.g., Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007), many remain skeptical, and faking continues to attract considerable research attention (e.g., Galić & Jerneić, 2013; Donovan, Dwight, & Schneider, 2013; Fan et al., 2012; König, Merz, & Trauffer, 2012; Sliter & Christiansen, 2012; Van Hooft & Born, 2012; Walmsley & Sackett, 2013).

Several models have been proposed to explain faking (e.g., Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Marcus, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999), and a central variable in all of them is the motivation to fake: According to these models, the magnitude of faking depends on applicants' motivation. The motivation to fake has rarely been examined, however, especially in field studies. Thus, the present study aims, first, to extend the available knowledge about the role of the motivation to fake for candidates' self-presentation in a large field study; second, to explore whether motivational differences are indeed related to the extent of faking; and third, to determine whether these differences are also related to the internal construct validity of personality tests.

## Theoretical Background

Many practitioners fear that applicants might try to present themselves in a particular way rather than answering honestly when they are asked to complete a personality test as part of a selection process (cf. Christiansen et al., 2010). In many situations, applicants will try to present themselves in a favorable way because they want to get the job for which they are applying. This should lead to higher scores of positively scored personality dimensions such as conscientiousness and emotional stability. Thus, even though applicants' motivation to obtain a job is not tantamount to their motivation to fake, it seems likely that both co-vary substantially.

Although faking research is dominated by a focus on faking good, it has also been suggested (Goffin & Boyd, 2009) that some applicants may fake bad on purpose (or "malinger", e.g., Hall & Hall, 2011). Disregard by researchers of possible attempts by test takers to fake bad may lead to an incomplete picture of faking predictors. Goffin and Boyd use the example of testing for military placement, where some recruits may fake bad to avoid hazardous work. Another situation in which faking bad might occur is when the unemployment benefit system requires unemployed people to apply for a certain number of jobs even when some of these individuals may actually prefer to receive the unemployment benefits rather than taking a job.

If applicants differ in the extent and the direction of faking, the internal construct validity of personality measures will also be affected due to inflated correlations: Those who try to present themselves more favorably will (on average) increase their scores, whereas those who try to present themselves more unfavorably will (on average) lower their scores. As this kind of response distortion affects all personality scales that are potentially relevant for the job in the same direction, personality scores among fakers will likely be more similar (i.e., more highly correlated) than among nonfakers, and the strength of this effect should depend on the degree to

which applicants are motivated to distort their responses. In other words, differences in the extent of faking will lead to inflated correlations between test scores of job-related personality dimensions. In line with this, such inflated correlations have been found among applicants who were motivated to fake good (e.g., Cellar, Miller, Doverspike, & Klawsky, 1996; Klehe et al., 2012; Schmit & Ryan, 1993).

To explain faking, several models about the faking of personality tests have been proposed (e.g., Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Marcus, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999). These models all share the assumption that applicants' faking is influenced by an ability component and a motivational component. Few would now dispute that applicants *can* fake (for reviews, see, e.g., Goffin & Boyd, 2009, and Tett et al., 2006). In particular, many laboratory studies have shown that study participants consistently increase their scores on positively framed personality dimensions in comparison to an honest condition when they are instructed to fake good or to imagine being an applicant (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). For example, conscientiousness and extraversion scores go up by nearly one standard deviation in studies of this kind that use a within-participants design (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Thus, it appears that it is generally fairly easy for test takers to raise their scores (i.e., to choose a response option that is closer to the positive endpoint of the scale).

Given that faking does not seem to be that difficult for applicants, this stresses the importance of the motivational component of faking: A considerable proportion of faking variance might be due to differences in candidates' motivation to fake (Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Marcus, 2009; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell et al., 1999). Several recent laboratory studies (Jansen, König, Kleinmann, & Melchers, 2012; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006) measured this motivational component and showed that

individual differences in the motivation to fake are related to the extent of faking. Similarly, in a study in which real applicants completed a personality test for research purposes, O'Neill, Goffin, and Gellatly (2010) found a positive correlation between impression management (measured as a general trait) and the motivation to fake.

Evidence from operational field settings in which personality was measured for selection purposes is lacking in terms of the motivational component, but there is at least some indirect evidence from studies that compare applicants with job incumbents. If job applicants are more motivated to fake than job incumbents (because only applicants have the goal of getting the job), then applicants should obtain higher mean scores on positively scored personality scales than job incumbents. In line with this, a meta-analysis by Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, and Smith (2006) found that mean differences were in support of this argument. Furthermore, Griffith, Chmielowski, and Yoshita (2007) were able to compare conscientiousness scores obtained under real application conditions with scores obtained later under an honest instructional set. They found that a significant number of applicants had elevated their scores under application conditions, thus also stressing the importance of the motivational component (see Griffin & Wilson, 2012, for a similar finding among students).

To date, there is no published field research that has directly assessed the motivational component, which theories predict to be important when applicants complete a personality test. Thus, no studies have related this motivational component to actual personality test results from actual selection settings. Perhaps researchers have feared that some applicants may not answer questions regarding their motivation truthfully. At least those applicants who report being particularly high (or low) in their motivation to get a job or to start a career in an organization may however show evidence of faking, which could be in the form of deviations in personality

dimension means or in personality dimension intercorrelations. If the sample is sufficiently large (as in our study), it should be possible to glean this from the data.

Furthermore, faking bad has not yet been directly explored in a selection context. Our sample allowed us to explore this, because we were able to obtain data from conscripts of the Swiss Armed Forces. In Switzerland, military service is compulsory for all young men, and not all of the conscripts look forward to joining the armed forces, meaning that some are motivated to look bad and unfit for a military career (i.e., they have a low military service motivation and should therefore also have a high motivation to fake bad). Nevertheless, there are others who are interested in joining the armed forces and in potentially having a military career (i.e., they have a high military service motivation and should therefore have a high motivation to fake good). Thus, some conscripts can be expected to fake bad and others to fake good, depending on their military service motivation.

To capture the phenomenon of faking, we used three indicators of candidates' faking: personality dimension means, personality dimension intercorrelations, and self-admitted faking. We related these indicators to a measure of military service motivation. The use of an indicator of self-admitted faking was based on the same logic as for the assessment of military service motivation: Although not all participants can be expected to answer honestly on a questionnaire that assesses admitted faking, some might do so, and given our large sample size ($N = 918$), there should be enough honest responses on the faking questionnaire to find relationships with military service motivation. Furthermore, we want to stress that if we find meaningful relationships with self-admitted faking, then this can be seen as strong support for our hypotheses because these correlations are possibly attenuated due to faking on this scale, which suggests that the results of

current study would represent a conservative estimate of the assumed relationships. To summarize, this field study tested three hypotheses and explored an additional research question:

Hypothesis 1: Military service motivation is related to self-admitted faking.

Hypothesis 2: Military service motivation is related to personality dimension scores.

Hypothesis 3: Military service motivation is related to increased correlations between personality dimensions.

Research Question 1: How similar are the effects of faking bad and faking good?

## Method

### *Context*

Switzerland, a relatively small country located in the center of Europe, is surrounded by member countries of the European Union without being a member itself. It has a population of 8 million people, who predominantly speak German. Switzerland has endeavored to be a neutral country for several centuries, and one way of achieving this has been to rely on strong armed forces and on compulsory conscription for males, with women serving voluntarily. Currently, conscription means that all men between the ages of 18 and 21 receive a binding invitation to one of the six Swiss Armed Forces recruitment centers. The data for this study were collected at one of these recruitment centers.

At the Swiss Armed Forces recruitment centers, the conscripts' physical, mental and psychological characteristics are assessed over two days. The Swiss Armed Forces use physical tests (e.g., a trunk strength test), medical exams (e.g., a hearing test and a psychiatric screening test), a personality test (described below), a cognitive ability test (also described below), and security vetting.

The Swiss Armed Forces use this information from the recruitment centers for two purposes. The first purpose is to check whether the men are fit for military service (i.e., whether their characteristics meet the requirements of the Swiss Armed Forces). If men are found to be fit for military service, they attend basic military training for 18 to 21 weeks. After 7 weeks, soldiers who show the appropriate potential are offered the possibility of a cadre function, which means becoming a noncommissioned officer or reserve officer (see Melchers & Annen, 2010, for additional information concerning the military system and the pathways that might lead to a position as reserve or career officer in the Swiss Armed Forces). In the following years, conscripted men attend two- to three-week training camps until they have accrued between 260 and 1,300 days of service, with the number of days depending on the rank. Since 1996, fit conscripts have been able to claim the right to refuse to perform military service if they can put forward reasons of conscience (i.e., moral objections to serving in the military and thus possibly having to kill somebody in war). These conscientious objectors are assigned to an alternative civilian service that takes 50% longer than military service.

Roughly a third of the conscripted men are found to be unfit, and these men are exempted from military (and civilian) service. Nevertheless, of those who are unfit for military service, a third is considered as sufficiently fit to fulfill a civil protection service. In addition, conscripts who are deemed unfit for military service have to pay an additional 3% annual income tax until the age of 30 and have a reduced likelihood of being employed in the Swiss Police. Apart from this, however, such conscripts do not need to fear many additional negative consequences.

The second purpose of the recruitment center testing session is to make placement decisions for military service. For example, personality test scores above a certain threshold are

required if recruits wish to obtain positions with a larger degree of responsibility in the Swiss Armed Forces or if they are interested in a career within the Swiss Armed Forces.

The Swiss Armed Forces do not inform conscripts how they arrive at their decisions – either concerning decisions about fitness or about placement. Although conscripts are likely aware that certain medical problems (e.g., severe chronic diseases such as a valvular heart defect) are reasons for being considered unfit, they are unaware of the level of importance of the personality test.

### *Sample*

Participants were 1,108 German-speaking conscripts (all male, aged between 18 and 21) who were obliged to attend the pre-military examination at one of the Swiss Armed Forces recruitment centers. Thus, the specific setting had the advantage that the participants were representative of the male population. The final sample consisted of 918 conscripts who completed the computerized mental ability and personality tests. The remaining participants were excluded because they either did not complete one of two supplementary paper-and-pencil questionnaires (see below) or because their questionnaire data could not be linked to the database of the recruitment centers' computerized testing system.

### *Measures*

***Personality.*** Personality was assessed with the Swiss Armed Forces personality test (Boss & Brenner, 2006; Gürber & Skupnjak, 2006; Stoll, 2006), which was integrated in the computerized testing system of the Swiss Armed Forces recruitment centers. Like all of the other tests in this battery, the personality test was designed especially for this use and based on extensive validation research by the Swiss Armed Forces. It comprises items assessing the following dimensions: achievement striving (15 items, $\alpha = .92$, all $\alpha$s according to the manual),

stress tolerance (15 items, α = .88), extraversion (10 items, α = .87), conscientiousness (10 items, α = .82), courtesy (10 items, α = .84), and cooperation in teams (10 items, α = .90). Each item is answered on a six-point Likert-type scale (from 1 = *completely disagree* to 6 = *completely agree*). The instructions for the personality test did not include any warning statement with regard to faking.

***Cognitive ability***. In order to test whether faking is only related to personality test scores, we also considered the Swiss Armed Forces cognitive ability test (Huber, Wüthrich, Stoll, & Boss, 2006), which was also implemented in the computerized testing system. This test is comprised of two subtests, assessing figurative and verbal intelligence with 60 items in total (α = .88).

***Military service motivation.*** This variable was assessed with the items "How high is your motivation to serve in the armed forces?" and "How high is your motivation to 'proceed', i.e. to take a cadre position in the Swiss Armed Forces?". Both items were answered on a six-point Likert-type scale (1 = *very low*; 6 = *very high*), with an α of .77 (determined on the basis of the present sample). Military service motivation was assessed with a paper-and-pencil questionnaire at the very beginning of the first recruitment day. At this time, conscripts were told that the data would be used to evaluate the quality of the cadre selection process and that this required the conscripts to write down their names on the questionnaire.

***Self-admitted faking.*** At the very end of the final recruitment day (i.e., after all decisions had already been made and communicated to the conscripts), conscripts received another paper-and-pencil questionnaire when they checked out at the registration desk and were to leave the recruitment center. This questionnaire assessed self-admitted faking with the question "How did you answer the psychological questions about yourself and your behavior on the computer?"

They were required to answer this question on a nine-point response scale in which the lowest category (1) had the anchor “You presented yourself worse on purpose”, the middle category (5) had the anchor “You answered truthfully”, and the highest category (9) had the anchor “You presented yourself better on purpose”. They were informed that this short questionnaire would also be used to evaluate the selection process and that this meant that the conscripts had to write down their names on it.

## Results

Table 1 shows descriptive information and correlations for all study variables. It can be seen that military service motivation showed a significant correlation with self-admitted faking, $r = .23$, $p < .01$, meaning that those who had a higher motivation were also more likely to deliberately present themselves better than they were, confirming H1.

Next, as can also be seen in Table 1, all personality scales showed substantial positive correlations with military service motivation, which even exceeded .50 in half of the cases. This confirms H2. Furthermore, we found significant correlations close to .20 between personality scores and self-admitted faking, but only very weak correlations between cognitive ability and both military service motivation and self-admitted faking.

Table 2 shows means and standard deviations for conscripts who stated that they answered the tests honestly ($n = 714$) or tried to deliberately present themselves better ($n = 115$) or worse ($n = 83$) than they were. For this table, all conscripts who answered the question concerning self-admitted faking with a score larger or smaller than 5 (= *truthfully*) were combined into a fake bad and a fake good group, respectively. For the personality scales, the difference between the “honest” responders and the fake bad group was always significant, with effect sizes in the intermediate to large range according to conventional standards (Cohen, 1992).

In contrast, the differences between "honest" responders and the fake good group were small and only reached significance once (for achievement striving). This finding gives an answer to Research Question 1: faking bad effects on personality means were more pronounced than faking good effects. In addition, the three groups did not differ with regard to cognitive ability.

The final set of analyses concerned the increase of the correlations between personality dimensions that should be evident for conditions in which candidates fake their personality scores in either direction. To test this, we calculated correlations between the different personality scales for each value of the motivation scale. As can be seen in Table 3, these correlations were rather high for conscripts who had either very high or very low military service motivation and reached mean levels above .50 for these conditions. In contrast, these correlations were lower for conscripts in the middle range of the scale, meaning for those who were neither strongly motivated to serve nor who explicitly wished to avoid service in the Swiss Armed Forces. To evaluate the effect of military service motivation on scale intercorrelations, we tested whether the mean correlations between the personality scales followed a systematic quadratic trend. This trend turned out to be significant, $F(1, 120) = 12.11$, $p < .01$, meaning that the mean intercorrelations showed a clear increase on both sides of the mid-point of the motivation scale. This finding supports H3.

## Discussion

This study explored faking good as well as faking bad in a unique field setting (i.e., among Swiss Armed Forces conscripts). In line with predictions from several faking models, the present results indicate that motivational differences between test takers do matter. More precisely, differences in military service motivation were related to three different indicators of faking: the extent to which applicants admitted faking after the conscription decision had been

made, the level of means of personality scales, and the extent to which personality scales were correlated. Furthermore, our results offer first empirical support for the argument that applicants in operational field settings might also fake bad under certain circumstances (Goffin & Boyd, 2009).

The finding that motivational differences matter so much for faking supports a basic argument of several faking models. In particular, in their respective models, Ellingson and McFarland (2011), Goffin and Boyd (2009), McFarland and Ryan (2000) and Snell et al. (1999) all argued that a motivational component is an important predictor of the extent of faking. Despite the importance of these models for the faking literature, no field study with real applicants has so far shown that such motivational differences do indeed matter. The present study fills this gap in the literature and thereby empirically supports an important theoretical prediction.

Moreover, the importance of motivational differences was shown with three different indicators for faking. While one indicator (mean differences in personality scores) is widely used, this was the first field study to date to ask real applicants afterwards how much they had faked (our second indicator). Furthermore, our third indicator (the average intercorrelation of personality scales) builds on previous research (e.g., Cellar et al., 1996; Klehe et al., 2012; Schmit & Ryan, 1993) demonstrating that faking increases the correlations between personality dimensions. Our study goes beyond this research, however, by suggesting that – at least at the group level – higher correlations can be used as an additional indicator of faking.

Effect sizes for faking bad were higher than for faking good. This finding could be due to at least four reasons. First, faking bad might be easier than faking good because the average scores of conscripts for all personality variables were always closer to the positive endpoint of

the scales than to the negative endpoint (see Table 1). Second, many theories assume that an avoidance motivation is stronger than an approach motivation (e.g., Steel & König, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Thus, conscripts who wish to evade military service and especially a position as an officer, which would have the consequence that they have to serve for a larger number of days, may be particularly motivated to fake. Third, test takers who are motivated to serve in the armed forces might be prepared to respond relatively honestly because of the use of the personality data for placement decisions. Thus, responding honestly might seem as a suitable strategy for them to prevent placement decisions that do not suit their interests. And finally, it is also possible that those who are not interested in joining the armed forces found it easier to admit to faking than those who were interested. The latter might have feared that admitting to faking might have a negative impact on their military career, whereas the former did not have much to lose when admitting to faking given that the conscription decision had already been made.

Unlike previous studies, the amount of faking was relatively uniform across the six personality dimensions. Previous meta-analyses (Birkeland et al., 2006; Hooper & Sackett, 2008; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) indicated that conscientiousness and emotional stability are the Big Five traits that are most heavily affected by faking, and these findings have been explained with the argument that applicants may particularly fake items that they consider relevant for the targeted job (e.g., Birkeland et al., 2006; Jansen et al., 2012). For instance, applicants likely consider a conscientiousness item about setting high standards as relevant for most jobs and thus particularly fake this item. In line with this, the effects of faking bad descriptively seemed somewhat larger on scales related to conscientiousness and emotional stability than on the other scales, but in absolute terms the effects seemed less pronounced than in previous meta-analyses (Birkeland et al., 2006; Hooper & Sackett, 2008; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).

Our setting also allowed for the assessment of cognitive ability, but cognitive ability scores did not differ between honest responders and fakers. Furthermore, cognitive ability did not correlate with the military service motivation (and with self-admitted faking only to a very small extent, at $r$ = -.09). For those who admitted to fake good this is not surprising because "faking good" on a cognitive ability tests is a concept that does not make much sense: If test takers are able to produce higher ability scores, then those scores can be interpreted as accurate measures of their cognitive ability. Those who admitted to fake bad, however, did not have lower scores, either, than those who said that they answered honestly. This is surprising because producing lower scores should not be too difficult for recruits (i.e., a recruit could randomly chose answers or could deliberately select incorrect answers). A possible reason for this finding could be that the Swiss Armed Forces also have information concerning scholastic achievement of the recruits, meaning that participants might have feared raising suspicions if their ability scores did not correspond to their scholastic achievement.[1] Another explanation suggested by a reviewer is that there is a difference between saying "I'm not capable" versus "I don't fit," and the latter may be more acceptable and less threatening to recruits' self-pride.

As in all studies, this study is not free of limitations. First and foremost, we do not know how honest study participants were when we asked them to admit to faking. Over three quarters of the participants stated that they answered truthfully, but participants answered non-anonymously, leaving it open how trustworthy the answers actually were. Presumably, more honesty would have increased the variance in the data, which would have meant more power. This, however, renders our study a conservative test of our hypotheses. Future research could try to obtain base rates of faking good and of faking bad by using certain techniques that guarantee a high degree of anonymity. For example, researchers could use the randomized response

technique, which has proven to be useful in previous selection research (Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; König, Hafsteinsson, Jansen, & Stadelmann, 2011). Unfortunately, the use of these techniques is restricted because they can only be used to obtain base rates on a group level and not to achieve individual-level data. In other words, it would be impossible to correlate data on admitted faking (obtained with the randomized response technique) with, for example, personality scores.

A second limitation of this study is that we exploited a special situation: compulsory military service. Currently, joining the armed forces is a voluntary decision in most Western countries. Thus, the question of whether our results generalize to military testing in other countries or to other testing situations remains unanswered. Furthermore, as explained above, the results concerning the ability test might be specific to the present context. Thus, they might not generalize to other contexts in which an ability test has to be completed to determine whether a person is entitled to unemployment or health benefits, for example. At the same time, however, the compulsory military service situation in Switzerland enabled us to show faking bad and faking good within a representative sample, providing new evidence of the extent to which faking can affect test scores. In particular, our study supports the generalizability of several central predictions from faking models to faking bad.

A third limitation is that we only focused on a main effect of the motivation to fake, although this motivation likely interacts with other variables. For example, Jansen et al. (2012) experimentally manipulated the relevance of personality dimensions and found that highly motivated participants, in particular, engaged in more faking on those personality facets that they considered relevant and less on those considered irrelevant, and such an interactive effect can also affect the correlation between personality dimensions. In our study, however, such

interactive effects were probably less important because the Swiss Armed Forces personality test (Boss & Brenner, 2006; Gürber & Skupnjak, 2006; Stoll, 2006) that we studied was explicitly designed to measure traits that the Swiss Armed Forces consider as relevant (e.g., there were no Openness to experience items). This interpretation also fits with the fact that we found faking effects on all dimensions (see Table 2).

Our study also has important implications for practitioners because this study suggests that faking is indeed a phenomenon that can be found not only in the laboratory (e.g., Komar, Komar, Robie, & Taggar, 2010; Van Hooft & Born, 2012) but also in the field, despite the opposing views voiced by some authors (e.g., Hogan et al., 2007). Furthermore, practitioners should be aware of the important role of motivational differences for faking (including the possibility of a motivation to fake bad) and should therefore not rely solely on fakable selection procedures.

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Footnote

[1] We thank Martin Gubler for pointing this out to us.

Table 1

*Means, Standard Deviations, Potential Range, and Correlations of Study Variables*

| Variable | *M* (*SD*) | Possible range | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Conscientiousness | 4.46 (0.83) | 1-6 | *(.82)* | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Achievement striving | 4.68 (0.77) | 1-6 | .78** | *(.92)* | | | | | | | |
| 3. Extraversion | 4.25 (0.98) | 1-6 | .46** | .63** | *(.87)* | | | | | | |
| 4. Courtesy | 4.93 (0.75) | 1-6 | .50** | .55** | .37** | *(.84)* | | | | | |
| 5. Cooperation in teams | 4.49 (0.91) | 1-6 | .44** | .54** | .63** | .41** | *(.90)* | | | | |
| 6. Stress tolerance | 4.65 (0.75) | 1-6 | .76** | .88** | .65** | .57** | .56** | *(.88)* | | | |
| 7. Cognitive ability | 35.55 (8.26) | 0-60 | -.04 | -.03 | -.12** | .06 | -.08* | .05 | *(.88)* | | |
| 8. Military service motivation | 3.21 (1.41) | 1-6 | .51** | .57** | .45** | .29** | .41** | .51** | -.04 | *(.77)* | |
| 9. Self-admitted faking | 5.05 (0.78) | 1-9 | .20** | .22** | .18** | .16** | .18** | .22** | -.09** | .23** | (-) |

*Note*. $N = 918$ except for self-admitted faking ($n = 912$ due to missing data). Cronbach's α (according to the manuals with the exception of the military service motivation) are shown in the diagonal where applicable.

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 2

*Means, Standard Deviations, and Effect Sizes for Honest Responders vs. Fakers*

| | Fake bad (FB) *n* = 83 | Honest (H) *n* = 714 | Fake good (FG) *n* = 115 | Effect sizes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variable | *M* (*SD*) | *M* (*SD*) | *M* (*SD*) | FB vs H | FG vs H |
| Conscientiousness | 3.85 (0.99) | 4.51 (0.80) | 4.59 (0.68) | -0.81** | 0.10 |
| Achievement striving | 4.11 (0.83) | 4.71 (0.76) | 4.90 (0.59) | -0.78** | 0.26* |
| Extraversion | 3.68 (1.15) | 4.30 (0.95) | 4.43 (0.83) | -0.64** | 0.14 |
| Courtesy | 4.43 (0.87) | 4.97 (0.72) | 5.04 (0.64) | -0.73** | 0.10 |
| Cooperation in teams | 3.96 (1.04) | 4.53 (0.88) | 4.70 (0.80) | -0.63** | 0.20 |
| Stress tolerance | 4.09 (0.82) | 4.69 (0.74) | 4.86 (0.51) | -0.80** | 0.24 |
| Cognitive ability | 36.06 (9.05) | 35.66 (8.08) | 34.47 (8.49) | 0.05 | -0.15 |

*Note*. Effect sizes are given in Cohen's *d*s, and significance levels (* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$) indicate significant differences in Scheffé post-hoc tests.

Table 3
*Correlations between Personality Scales for Groups that Differ in their Military Service Motivation*[a]

| Variable | CS | AS | EX | CY | CT | ST |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Military service motivation = 1 (*n* = 96): Mean scale intercorrelation = .56 (*SD* = .15) | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness (CS) | - | | | | | |
| Achievement striving (AS) | .74 | - | | | | |
| Extraversion (EX) | .33 | .57 | - | | | |
| Courtesy (CY) | .51 | .58 | .33 | - | | |
| Cooperation in teams (CT) | .40 | .52 | .71 | .43 | - | |
| Stress tolerance (ST) | .67 | .86 | .65 | .48 | .58 | - |
| Military service motivation = 2 (*n* = 164): Mean scale intercorrelation = .52 (*SD* = .18) | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness (CS) | - | | | | | |
| Achievement striving (AS) | .74 | - | | | | |
| Extraversion (EX) | .39 | .60 | - | | | |
| Courtesy (CY) | .41 | .47 | .23 | - | | |
| Cooperation in teams (CT) | .36 | .50 | .62 | .28 | - | |
| Stress tolerance (ST) | .74 | .88 | .55 | .54 | .46 | - |
| Military service motivation = 3 (n = 218): Mean scale intercorrelation = .41 (*SD* = .18) | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness (CS) | - | | | | | |
| Achievement striving (AS) | .70 | - | | | | |
| Extraversion (EX) | .22 | .40 | - | | | |
| Courtesy (CY) | .33 | .37 | .22 | - | | |
| Cooperation in teams (CT) | .15 | .28 | .54 | .29 | - | |
| Stress tolerance (ST) | .62 | .78 | .51 | .42 | .41 | - |
| Military service motivation = 4 (*n* = 201): Mean scale intercorrelation = .42 (*SD* = .20) | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness (CS) | - | | | | | |
| Achievement striving (AS) | .67 | - | | | | |
| Extraversion (EX) | .23 | .46 | - | | | |
| Courtesy (CY) | .41 | .50 | .22 | - | | |
| Cooperation in teams (CT) | .18 | .26 | .31 | .22 | - | |
| Stress tolerance (ST) | .65 | .85 | .47 | .56 | .27 | - |
| Military service motivation = 5 (*n* = 160): Mean scale intercorrelation = .50 (*SD* = .12) | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness (CS) | - | | | | | |
| Achievement striving (AS) | .61 | - | | | | |
| Extraversion (EX) | .35 | .47 | - | | | |
| Courtesy (CY) | .45 | .46 | .39 | - | | |
| Cooperation in teams (CT) | .36 | .44 | .51 | .42 | - | |
| Stress tolerance (ST) | .65 | .80 | .58 | .52 | .46 | - |
| Military service motivation = 6 (*n* = 79): Mean scale intercorrelation = .52 (*SD* = .13) | | | | | | |
| Conscientiousness (CS) | - | | | | | |
| Achievement striving (AS) | .64 | - | | | | |
| Extraversion (EX) | .39 | .63 | - | | | |
| Courtesy (CY) | .41 | .48 | .46 | - | | |
| Cooperation in teams (CT) | .37 | .52 | .50 | .39 | - | |
| Stress tolerance (ST) | .70 | .81 | .57 | .54 | .39 | - |

*Note*. [a] rounded to integers.