General information:

Tutorial with Ian Schwarz:
Mo 12-13 h (c.t.) in room 128, building C 5.2
→ no sign-up on CLIX is necessary to attend the tutorial, I will sign you up manually in the first session so you can access course material!
→ attendance is no longer mandatory for Alte Studiengänge and ERASMUS…
→ … but recommended for everyone as preparation for the final exam!

Script, Bibliography etc.:
Please find course material on CLIX (if registered) or in the IB!

Website:
Please check the English Linguistics homepage (http://www.uni-saarland.de/fak4/norrick/) regularly for important information, events etc.!
Course material will also be uploaded ASAP.

For questions concerning organization, please contact me at s9iaschw@stud.uni-saarland.de !!
Final Exam:
The final exam will take place during the last session on February 7, 2012 (multiple-choice questions).

Attendance requirements (lecture):
→ don't miss more than 2 lectures!

Sign-up for the final exam:
No longer on HISPOS – will be announced as soon as it's determined (also check the Dept. website)

The lecture starts at 4 p.m. sharp this semester, please make sure you get here early enough!

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1 Introduction

1.1 General info: bibliography, outline, lecture script
  website: www.uni-saarland.de/fak4/norrick/

1.2 Why semantics?
  1.2.1 Semantics in Linguistics:
    • phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, lexicology
    • semantics as link between syntax and pragmatics, between form and use
1.2.2 Goals of linguistic description:
System: sound, form, meaning
Behavior: production, understanding, interaction
Product: text, discourse
Semantics is so vast, we could concentrate just on system, but behavior is the current focus in many linguistic theories, and product is the usual target of linguistic and literary study

1.2.3 Semantics and adjacent disciplines:
semasiology, semiotics, philology, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychology

1.3 Semantics and meaning
semantics as study of meaning in discourse or in linguistic systems

1.3.1 Semantics in general usage
in phrases like "it's all semantics" or "it's just a matter of semantics"

1.3.2 Meaning in general:
meaning of life, meaning of social institutions, meaning of interpersonal relations, meaning in art, esp. meaning in literature/poetry

1.3.3 Meaning of actions
Language is embedded in action and interaction
Much of what we do when we talk contributes to what we mean
paralinguistic features of talk:
• tempo, volume, intonation, voice quality
• facial expressions: smile, frown, pout, knitted brow
• gaze: at listener, at object/person referred to, at mid-distance
• body language: posture, distance, gestures to accompany or replace speech:
  hand chops, bowl gesture pointing for reference nodding, shaking head waves, shoulder shrug, hand signs

We'll discuss meaning and action only incidentally
1.3.4 Meaning of names

- Proper names have meanings of various kinds
- Place names and personal names reveal national and linguistic origins
- First names may mark gender as well
- Onomastics, the study of names, and etymology fall outside semantics, as usually understood

1.4 Conventions

- Underline for words/lexical entries: kick, by and large
- Single quotes for meanings: by and large 'in general', petit(e) 'little'
- Italic for technical terms: analogy leads to meaning change
- Asterisk marks incorrect/implausible forms: *house handle

2 History

2.1 Semantics in philology

Reisig (1825) Semasiologie as study of meaning to find principles governing development of meaning along with syntax and etymology in Latin Philology

Paul (1880) Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte gave prominence to matters of meaning (Historical)

Darmesteter (1887) La vie des mots étudiée dans leurs significations for general public

Stern (1931) Meaning and the change of meaning still using term semasiology

2.2 Semantics as a discipline in particular synchronic à la Saussure, so independent of philology and etymology

Bréal (1883) first used the term semantics i.e. sémantique

«L'étude où nous invitons le lecteur à nous suivre est d'espéce si nouvelle qu'elle n'a même pas encore reçu de nom. En effet, c'est sur le corps et sur la forme des mots que la plupart des linguistes ont exercé leur sagacité: les lois qui président à la transformation des sens, au choix d'expressions nouvelles, à la naissance et à la mort des locutions, ont été laissées dans l'ombre ou n'ont été indiquées qu'en passant. Comme cette étude, aussi bien que la phonétique et la morphologie, mérite d'avoir son nom, nous l'appellerons la sémantique c'est-à-dire la science des significations.»
“The study where we invite the reader to follow us is of such a new kind that it has not even yet been given a name. Indeed, it is on the body and the form of words that most linguists have exercised their acumen: the laws governing changes in meaning, the choice of new expressions, the birth and death of idioms, have been left in the dark or have only been casually indicated. Since this study, no less than phonetics and morphology, deserves to have a name, we shall call it semantics, i.e. the science of meaning.”


English translation of Bréal’s (1897) book published in 1900 as Semantics: Studies in the science of meaning popularized the term and the new discipline

Bréal’s laws were psychologically motivated, e.g. by the principle of least effort and the tendency to generalize but motivated also by goals of communication like desire for clarity

Anti-Saussure: intentionality is at work in language change, e.g.

- **Differentiation**: synonyms diverge: esteem respect veneration
- **Extinction of useless/problematic forms**: gang replaced by went, sie her replaced by they them
- **Analogy**: simpler, more general pattern extends –s plural
- **Pejorative tendency**: OE sæling → silly cf. OIT les ’wit’ → ’trickery’
- **Metaphor**: synesthesia: extension from one sense to another warm greeting bitter reproach loud/muted colors
Trier (1931) Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes:
first synchronic semantics based on Saussure’s work: theory of semantic fields. Concerned with meaning change, but also meaning as structural phenomenon, i.e. determined by adjacent items

Porzig (1934) „Wesenhafte Bedeutungsbeziehungen“
finally a purely synchronic approach to meaning, opposed to Trier’s paradigmatic word fields, concerned instead with syntagmatic relations like

\[
\begin{align*}
dog & \rightarrow bark \\
drink & \rightarrow liquid \\
blond & \rightarrow hair
\end{align*}
\]

Firth (1935) “The technique of semantics”
various types of meaning at all levels of organization in language,

e.g. collocation (like Porzig’s syntagmatic meaning relations) and grammar, where the sentence forms declarative/imperative and the moods active/passive realize types of meaning.

context of situation (from Malinowski) to describe meaning in the usual sense of the interface of language with context

context taken to include the speaker and hearer(s), their social relationship, their goals in the interaction, and their attitudes toward the ongoing activity as well as the physical setting and cultural definition of the situation

2.3 Semantics between syntax and pragmatics
Morris (1938) “Foundation of a theory of signs” (following Peirce, 1946) Signs, language and behavior

Sign affects recipient behavior toward goal in a way similar to object

- **Pragmatics** concerns relation of sign to interpreters; the origins, uses and effects of signs
- **Semantics** concerns relation of sign to objects; the significance of signs
- **Syntax** concerns formal relations between signs; combinations of signs (without regard for significance or behavior)
Carnap (1942, 1947)  
pure semantics based on truth conditions  

*truth-functional semantics:* meaning based on conditions under which sentence would make a true statement, e.g.  

*a dog chased a cat* = ‘for some member of the class of dogs it is the case that it chased some member of the class of cats’  

such statements are *synthetically* (via confirmation) true or false, but others may be *analytically* (by inspection) true or false, e.g.  

*some circle is square* = analytically false by definition of *circle* and *square*  

---  

All linguistics starts with pragmatics, but then progresses to abstract semantics or syntax  

Semantics can be descriptive (of real language) or pure  

Quine (1951) “Two dogmas of empiricism”: rejects reductionism of defining truth via confirmation and formal distinction of analytic vs. synthetic truth  

prefers pragmatics, i.e. empirical observation as test  

Bar-Hillel (1954) “Indexical expressions”: argues significance of pragmatics for semantics based on natural language sentences with indexical (deictic) expressions and other problems of reference, e.g. *I, you; here, now*  

---  

2.4 Semantics in linguistic theories  

2.4.1 Structuralism  
Saussure (1916)  
meaning as value in system  

*Syntagmatic and Associative (Paradigmatic)*  

| The girl | gave | her brother | a book | handed | passed | tossed | threw |
Overarching System as independent of individual speakers with inertia of its own:

- **Mutability**: system changes without conscious human input
- **Immutability**: conscious human effort can not change system

### 2.4.2 Behaviorism

Bloomfield (1926, 1935):
- behaviorism vs. mentalism
- human and animal behavior; thought as speech,
  - *Stimulus and response, substitute stimulus and response*
  
  \[ S \rightarrow r \quad s \rightarrow R \]
  
  Jack and Jill story

Meaning and expert knowledge: salt = NaCl
effectively removes semantics from mainstream linguistics

### 2.4.3 Generative Grammar

Chomsky (1957, 1965) etc.:
- deep structures are universal, in no need of interpretation
- transformations don’t affect meaning

Katz and Fodor (1963), Katz and Postal (1964):
  - Syntactically oriented semantics

**Principle of Compositionality:**
The meaning of a sentence is equal to (computable from) the meanings of its component lexical items and their structural relations. This makes semantics dependent only on syntax, and lexicon, considered part of syntax, but independent of context
2.4.4 Toward discourse semantics

In spite of Saussure’s anti-contextual structuralism, Bloomfield’s anti-mentalism and Chomsky’s focus on syntax, certain topics in linguistics are bound to meaning in ways that have always required inclusion of context and culture.

**Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis**

Sapir (1921, 1929, 1949), Whorf (1950, 1966) proposed a fundamental relationship between language, meaning, culture, and personality.

The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis states that our language determines our perception; this remains open issue even today.

Presupposition entered linguistic semantics from philosophy: Frege (1892); Russell (1905) made denotation part of truth-functional meaning:

The present king of France is bald.

**means:** there’s a king of France and he’s bald.

Strawson (1950) recognized that assumptions about existence must constitute presumptions:

**The present king of France is bald**

presupposes → there’s a present king of France

This made even truth-functional meaning dependent on beliefs shared between speakers and hearers in contexts.

**Indexicality**

Indexicality (deixis) is another discourse-bound type of meaning:

Indexical aspects of meaning require hearer inferences about speaker beliefs and intended referents, beyond truth-functional semantics proper (Bar-Hillel 1954);

over 90% of declarative sentences are indexical in requiring reference to speaker, addressee, time and place with:

- pronouns like I and you,
- adverbs like now and yesterday, here and there, right and left,
- demonstratives like this and that.

Presupposition and Indexical meaning, both bound to context, represent historical footholds for discourse analysis within semantic theory.
**Performativity**

**Austin (1962)** *Performative analysis:*
Austin showed that we use language to “do things with words,” not just to make true or false statements

*Performative* utterances are not true or false; instead they have some *illocutionary* act potential, e.g. to promise, to apologize

**Speech act theory**
Searle (1969, 1975)
Further developed *Speech act theory* and provided functional classification of *illocutionary* act types: *locutionary, illocutionary* and *perlocutionary* meaning

---

**Intention, inference, implicature**

**Grice (1967, 1975)**
Saw meaning grounded in speaker intentions
Context influences the meanings even of logical connectors like *and:*

*Sue got up and went to work → in that order*

Hearers understand what speakers say, but then go on to *infer* more than speakers say literally

Grice’s *implicature* suggested inferential models of meaning

**The British School,** esp. Firth (1957), then Halliday (1967, 1977, 1978) recognized *interpersonal* and *textual* alongside *ideational* meaning

---

**Halliday (1967)** described *anaphora* (co-reference between nouns and pronouns) in connected discourse based on cohesion and text-semantic categories

Compare co-reference in:

- **Suzy loaned Al $5 yesterday, but he won’t even give her $2 today:**

- **Suzy loaned Judy $5 yesterday, but she won’t even give her $2 today:**

Interpretation of anaphora requires knowledge of textual meaning and assumptions about context and culture
3. Meaning
3.1 Communication

3.1.1 Models of communication

Old model of communication with Speaker (A) planning, encoding, speaking, and Hearer (B) hearing, decoding and unpacking S’s meaning (from Saussure 1911)

Speaker A sends a message to B; it travels through B’s ear into B’s head, then B sends another message back to A.

→ conduit model of communication (Reddy 1969)

A newer very influential version of the conduit model was proposed by Shannon and Weaver (1949):
X encodes a message into a signal sent by a transmitter through a channel subject to noise and the receiver decodes the message from the signal for Y.

Noise makes redundancy necessary. Information is inversely proportional to probability of occurrence (assuming all signals are single univocal units with equal probability of occurrence and receiver is ready).

This message model suggests that speaker X is responsible for packaging information and receiver Y is responsible for unpacking information with no mechanism for feedback and so no interaction between X and Y.

3.1.2 Language as a system of communication

By contrast with message model (or conduit model), in real language:

- messages are not univocal/holistic, but composite
- messages are not equally probable; improbable signal will often be simply meaningless
- meaning results from partial predictability
- communicants generally have access to feedback mechanisms

Language not just about propositional information:

- it conveys interactional information
- it contains expressive and social content
- it encodes, accompanies and evokes action

3.1.3 Language as a semiotic/signaling system

Human language versus animal communication and signaling systems

Animals typically have a fixed repertoire of motivated signs associated with specific contexts and with fixed meanings.
Hockett’s design features of human language

- **Arbitrariness**: language signs are arbitrary (as in Saussure) as opposed to iconic or motivated
- **Duality of patterning**: two independent structural levels: phonology, syntax; higher-level segments (words) are composed of lower-level (phonemes) segments
- **Productivity**: Language is open-ended, creative, generative
- **Discreteness**: elements are clearly bounded rather than graded. Even in doubtful and vague cases, only one particular word can be meant, not something midway between, e.g., _true_ and _tree_
- **Displacement**: no causal connection between utterance and context (versus Behaviorist view of utterance as a response to a particular contextual stimulus)
- **Specialization**: no causal connection between utterance and contextual effects (versus Behaviorist view of utterance as a stimulus to a particular response)
- **Interchangeability**: competent speakers are also competent hearers
- **Complete feedback**: language users monitor their own language production based in part on audience response
- **Cultural transmission**: culture determines the particular language acquired as opposed to genetics
- **Learnability**: any language is learnable by any member of the human species
- **Reflexivity**: language can focus metalingually on itself we can talk about how we talk and what we mean
- **Prevarication**: language can function to deceive or misinform

3.2 Models of meaning
3.2.1 Saussure’s dyadic model

*Arbitraire du signe*

- **signified** (signifié)
- **signifier** (signifiant)
Saussure claims the linguistic sign is arbitrary, but he notes many examples of *iconicity* himself, e.g.

- **Onomatopoeia:** bow-wow, cuckoo, chickadee
- **Phonesthemes:** sl in slip, slide, slick, slime, sled
- **Motivated compounds:** houseboat, shirtsleeve, skyblue
- **Word order:** More important member named first in binomials: dollars and cents, gin and tonic, bacon and eggs

3.2.2 The semiotic triangle

> *vox significat mediantibus conceptibus*

("a word signifies [a thing] via a mediating concept")

Ogden & Richards (1923): the sign stands for the referent and symbolizes the concept

Stern (1931): the sign expresses the content and names or denotes the referent

Ullmann (1962): referent lies outside linguist's province; concept establishes connection to referent
3.2.3 Reference and denotation

“words refer” vs “words denote”

in *a dog chased a cat* the word *dog* might refer to a member of the class of dogs, linking this statement directly to a particular dog.

Alternatively, the word *dog* might just denote a member of the class of dogs, leaving it up to the hearer to find the particular dog in question.

“sentences refer” vs “speakers refer using sentences”

maybe the whole sentence *a dog chased a cat* could refer to an entire scenario involving a dog and a cat alternatively.

the sentence would denote and predicate, leaving it up to the speaker to identify the particular dog and cat in question.

Searle makes reference one kind of speech act among others in Speech Act Theory.

A speaker does not simply refer (or promise or apologize), but establishes reference to someone or something for a particular hearer in a context by meeting certain conditions.

3.3 Deixis (Indexicality)

3.3.1 Person, space, time

I, you, she;
here, there, left, right;
now, today, yesterday.

3.3.2 Discourse deixis

as discussed above,
in the example below,
in the next section.
3.4 The meanings of “meaning”

Ogden & Richards; Malinowski, Firth

*arbitrary meaning vs. iconic/motivated meaning*

3.5 Meaning properties

- **Meaningfulness:** grammatical structure & compatible lexical items
- **Meaninglessness:** either not grammatical or lexical items not compatible
- **Tautology:** grammatical structure with redundant lexical items:
  - round circle
  - *the bachelor* is unmarried
- **Anomaly:** grammatical structure but no combination of compatible lexical items:
  - square circle
  - *colorless green ideas sleep furiously*
  - but cf. metaphor: my computer hates me
  - *time flies*

- **Ambiguity:** grammatical structure with two (or more) meanings

  - **Structural:**
    - the old men and women left
  - **or due to polysemy:**
    - Joe prefers light clothing
  - **or homonymy:**
    - Suzy ran down to the bank

- **Zeugma:** a single word requires separate meanings with relation to separate words in a construction:
  - Suzy wore a hat and a friendly smile
  - Joe’s book is sadder than his sister

- **Depletion:** words co-occur with so many other different words that they develop diffuse meanings, e.g. *get, do get big, get silly, get going, get lunch, get through, get on with etc.*
3.6 Compositionality

**Principle of Compositionality:**
The meaning of a construction consists of (or is calculable from) the meanings of the component words and their structural relations.

This definition presupposes that words have recognizable meanings outside of constructions and that structural relations contribute calculable kinds of meaning.

3.6.1 Syncategorematicity (co-determination of meaning)


rejects any functional dichotomy of form and meaning: relation between unit and slot-occurrence most basic:

tagmeme

*Structural meaning overcomes morphemic meaning,*

awfully tasty damned nice terribly good

Slot occurrence locally conditions semantic variation, e.g.

drive a car vs drive a horse

Word meanings often co-determine each other in constructions

Co-determination of meaning – or syncategorematicity – particularly clear in some constructions, e.g.

white: white bread, white wine, white people, white coffee  
red: red brick, red wine, red hair, red face

But a degree of syncategorematicity is often present, e.g.

healthy: healthy people, healthy food, healthy exercise

Syncategorematicity fades into depletion with frequent words, e.g.

good: good food, good intentions, good skier, good person
3.6.2 Structural relations and meanings

Structural relations have never been assigned meanings adequately. How do we calculate subject-of and object-of?

Compare subject functions in:
- Judy punched Bob
- Judy kissed Bob (cf. Judy and Bob kissed)
- Judy recognized Bob
- Judy resembled Bob

Compare direct object functions in:
- Judy saw the house
- Judy built the house
- Judy painted the house
- Judy entered the house
- The house disappointed Judy

3.6.3 Non-compositional constructions

The Principle of Compositionality ignores non-compositional constructions.

Idiomaticity is by definition non-compositionality:
- kick the bucket, shoot the breeze, up the creek
- by the skin of his teeth and caboodle, wild goose chase

Certain lexical items introduce non-compositionality:
- The alleged murderer drives a van
- An occasional visitor passed by
- Judy smoked a quick cigarette

In the final analysis, the Principle of Compositionality is an idealization or generalization which often fails in real language constructions.

4. Lexical relations

Assuming with Saussure that the meaning of a word is determined by its structural relations with other words, the best way to approach meaning is through investigation of the structural relations in the vocabulary of a language.

4.1 Semantic fields

Trier: paradigmatic; animal – quadruped – horse – roan
Porzig: syntagmatic; horse – gallop, horse – ride, horse – whinny
4.2 Sense relations

- **Synonymy**: two words, same meaning, never complete; tendency toward divergence
  - *small* – *little*, but cf. *small change* and *little sister*

  Note: Synonymy is only a meaning property of words; semantically interchangeable phrases or sentences are said to be paraphrases

- **Polysemy**: one word, many meanings but the meanings related (historically)
  - *eye* 'organ of sight', 'center of hurricane', 'hole in needle'

- **Homophony**: different words, same pronunciation
  - *bear* 'furry creature' *bare* 'naked'

  cf. *Homography*: different words, same spelling
  - *bow* 'knotted ribbon' *bow* 'front of ship'

  and *Homonomy*: same pronunciation and spelling, but different history
  - *bank* 'financial institution' *bank* 'raised land along a river'

- **Hyponymy**: superordinate (hyponym) to subordinate
  - superordinate: *vehicle*
  - subordinates: *car, truck, bus*

  hence: *co-hyponyms*: *car, truck, bus*

  Problematic superordinate relationships:
  - *aunt* – *uncle* > none
  - *sweet* – *sour* – *bitter* > tastes, but no Adj
  - *chair* – *couch* – *bench* > ? sitting furniture (cf. G. *Sitzgelegenheit, Sitzmöbel*)

Multiple appearance in hierarchy

hence: general problem of lexical gaps, esp. in cross-language comparison

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EN</th>
<th>know</th>
<th>play</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>kennen</td>
<td>wissen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>conoscere</td>
<td>sapere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
```
cf. dialect differences:

- cutlery / silver(ware) / flatware

  - knife
  - fork
  - spoon

• Inclusion: one word meaning includes another word meaning

  - aunt ← ‘female’
  - whinny ← ‘horse’

  hence entailment:  

  - aunt → ‘female’
  - whinny → ‘horse’

• Meronymy: part to whole

  - hand ← arm
  - door ← house

  - transitive:  
    - cuff ← sleeve ← jacket ← jacket cuff
  - intransitive:  
    - handle ← door ← house
    - but no *house handle
  - inalienable: Suzy has two arms
  - alienable: Suzy has two books
    - cf. bird ← flock
    - cow ← herd

‘member of’ vs. ‘part of’
‘consist of’ vs. ‘have parts’
Antonymy:

(1) Graded (scalar) adjectives

cold .. .. .. .. .. hot
tall .. .. .. .. .. short
may be intermediate terms: cold .. cool .. tepid .. warm .. hot
and even extremes: freezing .. .. .. .. scorching

note: Markedness
Suzy’s two feet tall not *Suzy’s two feet short
How tall is she? not *How short is she?
and tendency to metaphorical use:
Suzy was cool to Al at the party
He gave her the cold shoulder

(2) Complementaries:

dead – alive
may turn into graded terms in context: more dead than alive
especially in metaphorical contexts:
the deadiest party this year
Judy’s just more alive than other people

(3) Converses:
teach – learn
husband – wife
X teach Y to Z \( \rightarrow \) Z learn Y from X
X sell Y to Z \( \rightarrow \) Z buy Y from X
X bigger than Y \( \rightarrow \) Y smaller than X
X behind Y \( \rightarrow \) Y in front of X

(4) Incompatibles:
	not green blue yellow . . .

Equipollent: left – right
girl – boy

Privative: alive – dead (= ‘not alive’)

Antipodal: north – south
up – down

Orthogonal: north – east
winter – spring

Even if we could define all the relevant lexical relations for the entire vocabulary of a language, word meanings are only a small part of linguistic meaning.
5 Componential analysis

If we find lexical relations too messy, given gaps and overlap in vocabulary, we can begin deductively by defining an underlying (universal?) system of semantic features and relations realized in the vocabularies of natural languages.

5.1 Feature Theory in Phonology

One model for such a system came from Prague School Phonology as developed by Trubetzkoy (1939):

/p/ = [+stop] [+bilabial] [-voice]

Components (or Features) represent observable acoustic or auditory Phenomena; they play a distinctive role in the phonemic system. Features involve only binary distinctions, often with one marked value, e.g. [-voice] is unmarked value for stop consonants.

5.2 Feature Theory in Anthropology

Feature representations of family relations in anthropology (Lounsbury 1956; Goodenough 1956) provided another model:

father = [+male] [+colineal] [+ascending generation]

mother = [-female] [+ablineal] [+ascending generation]

sister = [+female] [+colineal] [+same generation]

nephew = [+male] [+ablineal] [+descending generation]

father = [+male] [+colineal] [+ascending generation]

mother = [-female] [+ablineal] [+ascending generation]

sister = [+female] [+colineal] [+same generation]

nephew = [+male] [+ablineal] [+descending generation]

cf. Spanish:

tia = [+female] [+ablineal] [+ascending generation]

tio = [+male] [+ablineal] [+ascending generation]

abuela – abuelo ‘grandmother’ – ‘grandfather’ etc.

Norwegian:

fætt ‘father-father = grandfather’

fætter ‘father-mother = grandmother’

fætter ‘father-brother = paternal uncle’ etc.

5.3 Features in Semantic Theory

Some sets of words allow neat representation in terms of features:

man = [+human] [+adult] [+male]

woman = [+human] [+adult] [+female]

girl = [+human] [-adult] [+female]

boy = [+human] [-adult] [+male]

stool = [+sitting] [+legs] [-back] [+arms] [-single person]

chair = [+sitting] [+legs] [+back] [+arms] [+single person]

sofa = [+sitting] [+/-legs] [+back] [+arms] [single person] etc.

cow = [+bovine] [+adult] [+female]

bull = [+bovine] [+adult] [+male]

calf = [+bovine] [-adult]

put = [+bovine] [+adult] [+female]

cat = [+bovine] [+]adult]
ewe = [+ovine] [+adult] [-female]
ram = [+ovine] [+adult] [-male]
lamb = [+ovine] [-adult]

But should
calf = [+/-female] [+/-male] or simply unspecified?
And what about:
steer = [+bovine] [+adult] [-male] [-female]?
Can we reduce gender to [+male] and [-male]?
Why not: [+female] and [-female]?

Note: [+female] is marked case for humans, but cow and duck are both superordinate and [-female] hyponym, while dog and fox are both superordinate and [+male] hyponym.

In fact, there may be a range of values as in:

[-color] = [+clear]
but [+color] = [+red], [+blue], [+green] etc

Also: disjunctive features as in:

uncle = [+male] [+sibling of mother]
OR [+male] [+sibling of father]
sister-in-law = [+female] [+sibling of spouse]
OR [+female] [+spouse of sibling]
OR [+female] [+spouse of sibling of spouse]

What do semantic features represent?
Are they just shorthand expressions of semantic field relationships?

Psychologically real concepts vs. meta-language notation

Some like [female] vs [male] have grammatical consequences; others like [+bovine] distinguish only a few lexical items; many like [+avocado] identify a single lexical item

Compare semantic features with phonological features
Are semantic features atomic concepts?

consider the complexity of: [+female], [+spouse], [+bovine]
and the scalar character of: [+adult], [+red]

Are (at least some) semantic features universal?
Is there an innate human disposition toward certain distinctions?
Is this evidence against Saussurian arbitrariness?
5.4 Markerese in TG: Katz and Fodor, Katz and Postal

5.4.1 Features for Syntax

- **categorization:** 
  \[ [+N], [+V], [+Adj] \]
  even at sentence level:
  Clause \([+finite] [+subject]\]
  Clause \([+finite] [-subject]\)
  etc

- **polysemy** from cross-classification:

  - \textbf{cool} = \([+Adj] \) or \([+V] [+transitive]\) or \([+V] [+transitive]\)
  
  - \textbf{cool} = \([+Adj] [+temperature] [+low]\)
    \([+V] [+cause to be] [+temperature] [+low]\)
    \([+V] [+transitive] [+prepare food]\)
    \([+N] [+human] [+profession] [+prepare food]\)

- **Sub-Categorization:**

  - \([+N]\) as \([+\text{proper}]\) or \([+\text{common}]\), \([+\text{count}]\) or \([+\text{count}]\)

  - \textbf{beer} = \([+N] [+\text{count}] [+\text{liquid}] [+\text{beverage}] [+\text{malted}]\)
    \([+N] [+\text{count}] [+\text{liquid}] [+\text{drinking}] [+\text{beverage}] \ldots\n
  - \textbf{drip} = \([+V] [+\text{transitive}] [+\text{fall in drops}]\)
    \([+V] [+\text{transitive}] [+\text{cause to fall in drops}]\)
    \([+V] [+\text{transitive}] = [+V] [+ \_ \_ \_ [NP \_ \_ ]]\)
    \([+V] [+\text{transitive}] = [+V] [+ \_ \_ \_ [NP \_ \_ ]\]

  This prevents, e.g. “The girl smashed,” “The door elapsed the cat
  since \textbf{smash} is \([+ \_ \_ \_ [NP \_ \_ ]]\) and \textbf{elapse} is \([+ \_ \_ \_ [NP \_ \_ ]\]
  but still, e.g. “The hypothesis dripped,” “The beer dripped mythology

5.4.2 Selection and Projection Rules

**Selection**

\textbf{drip} = \([+V] [+\text{tr}] \& [+\text{tr}] [+\text{NP} \_ \_], \text{where NP is [+liquid]}\)
\([+V] [+\text{tr}] \& [+\_ \_ \_ \_ [NP]], \text{where NP is [+liquid]}\)

“the intransitive verb \textbf{drip} selects a subject noun phrase containing the inherent feature \([+\text{liquid}]\), and the transitive verb \textbf{drip} selects a direct object noun phrase containing the inherent feature \([+\text{liquid}]\)”

**Note 1:** Redundancy Rules specify that abstract nouns like \textit{hypothesis} and \textit{mythology} are \([-\text{concrete}] [+\text{object}]\) and thus redundantly \([-\text{liquid}]\)

**Note 2:** Alternatively, view selection restrictions as presuppositions, saying \textbf{drip} presupposes that its direct object identifies a liquid
Projection Rules

Based strictly on Principle of Compositionality, Projection Rules amalgamate semantic paths for lexical items with compatible selection restrictions.

Judy kicked the colorful ball

Starting with ball [+round] [+object] vs. ball [+social activity] [+dance] and colorful [+colored]; selects [+object] vs. colorful [+exciting]; selects [+activity]

we get only: [+colored] [+round] [+object] and: [+exciting] [+social activity] [+dance]

but not: [+exciting] [+round] [+object] and not: [+colored] [+social activity] [+dance]

Amalgamating with kick [+strike] [+with foot], which selects [+object]

gives: [+strike] [+colored] [+round] [+object] [+with foot]
not: [+strike] [+exciting] [+activity] [+dance] [+with foot]

Note: verbs select nouns, and adjectives select nouns, while nouns bear the inherent features

5.4.3 Feature Extension and Metaphor

Katz and Postal (1964) say selectional features must transfer to indefinites like something and stuff, which have no inherent semantic features.

Since the verb drip selects a subject noun phrase containing the inherent feature [+liquid], it transfers this feature to the subject the stuff in sentences like:

The stuff dripped on the new carpet

This accounts for the interpretation of the stuff as 'liquid'

Note: If selection restrictions were presuppositions, then it would be natural to say here that the verb drip presupposes that the subject the stuff identifies a liquid.
Weinreich says selectional features should transfer any time to account for sentences like:

The shooting victim dripped on the new carpet

A so-called “semantic calculator” assembles interpretations for new feature complexes (but we require “extra-linguistic knowledge” to understand why shooting victims drip)

This same transfer then accounts for metaphorical interpretations, e.g.

The tough coach barked his orders at the team
coach picks up the selectional feature [+canine] from the verb bark

Levin and van Dijk extended feature analysis to describe the reverse process, where bark picks up the feature [+human] from coach, thus generalizing its meaning

This yields two interpretations for sentences like:

The fishing boats danced in the harbor
Money talks
→ the “cartoon” interpretation and the metaphorical one

6 Metaphor
6.1 Traditional accounts
Aristotle (Rhetoric and Poetics): Metaphor is necessary when the language lacks a word, and it is ornamental when it fits the context
Metaphor is a simile without the details (i.e. explicit comparatives: like or as)
Achilles entered the battle like a lion
A lion, Achilles entered the battle
Inanimate as animate:
the ruthless spear
compares the spear to a ruthless warrior
Proportional metaphor based on analogy:

\[
\begin{align*}
B & \quad \text{is to} \quad A & \quad \text{as} \quad D & \quad \text{is to} \quad C \\
\text{Evening} & \quad \text{is to} \quad \text{day} & \quad \text{as} \quad \text{old age} & \quad \text{is to} \quad \text{life} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Thus: The evening of life for old age

A \quad \text{for} \quad D \quad \text{to} \quad B

And: the day’s old age for evening

Quintilianus (Institutio oratoria):

“In totum autem metaphora brevior est similitudo”
("on the whole, metaphor is a shorter simile")

again: similes contain like or as, while metaphors do not

Synechdoche:

part for whole: roof for ‘house’

species for genus: ten thousand things for ‘many’

one for many: the foot soldier for ‘infantry’

Metonymy:

inventor for invention, e.g. Homer for ‘text by Homer’ as in

They read Homer daily

possessor for possession: Neptune for ‘ocean’ as in

Neptune raged about the tiny ships

container for contents: the goblet for ‘gobletful of liquid’ as in

Helena drank the foaming goblet

material for object:

his steel for ‘his sword’ as in Achilles drew his steel across the stone

Linguists further distinguish:

original vs dead metaphor: face of a clock

moribund metaphor: cut into line cf.

knife through the line

word metaphor: the ship plowed the waves

vs phrase metaphor: she’s still up in the air

about her decision

or whole sentence: chickens come home to roost

extended metaphor in poetry and everyday talk, including multi-party conversation
From John Donne’s “A Valediction: Forbidding Mourning”

Our two souls therefore, which are one,
Though I must go, endure not yet
A breach, but an expansion,
Like gold to airy thinness beat.

If they be two, they are two so
As stiff twin compasses are two;
Thy soul, the fix’d foot, makes no show
To move, but doth, if th’ other do.

And though it in the centre sit,
Yet when the other far doth roam,
It leans, and hearkens after it,
And grows erect, as that comes home.

Such wilt thou be to me, who must
Like th’ other foot, obliquely run;
Thy firmness makes my circle just,
And makes me end, where I begun.

From The Whitehouse Transcripts

P: I think we better assume it. I think Colson-
D: He is playing hard ball. He wouldn’t play hard ball unless he were pretty confident that he could cause an awful lot of grief.
H: Right.
P: He is playing hard ball with regard to Ehrlichman for example, and that sort of thing. He knows what he’s got.

6.2 Newer Approaches

6.2.1 Metaphor as ungrammatical structure

If metaphors break syntactic rules, we can:
- simply discard them
- interpret them as semi-sentences, finding grammatical replacements
- invent special poetic grammar rules

But many metaphors violate only (semantic) selection restrictions rather than grammatical rules as such:

Her rabid toothbrush tore at her bunting gums
6.2.2 Metaphor as anomaly

I have measured out my life with coffee spoons
And frightful a nightfall folded rueful a day

If metaphors violate selection restrictions, we can:
• simply discard them
• interpret them as semi-sentences, finding semantically consistent replacements
• invent special semantic rules like the feature extensions outlined above

But many metaphors violate neither selection restrictions nor grammatical rules; they are simply false or senseless

My daughter's a regular fish at the swimming pool

6.2.3 Metaphor as figurative speech act

And silent was the flock in woolly fold
At the beach, my daughter's a regular fish

Metaphoric proverbs may be both true and consistent in some context, but not the one cited, e.g. The early bird catches the worm

If metaphors violate pragmatic expectations of relevance or truthfulness, figure out how we make sense of them:
• consider the writer or speaker weird
• interpret them as violations produced to get the recipient to work out the underlying intention
• invent special pragmatic constructs and algorithms based on shared assumptions about cooperation and relevance (as do Grice, Sperber and Wilson, and others)

Even this pragmatic approach still seeks to replace the metaphor with something different and literal, but some metaphors resist simple paraphrase

Telecommunications are further shrinking the globe

especially metaphors in science like:

Cyclotrons split atoms
Black holes absorb matter

Paraphrases tend to produce fewer interesting implications
6.2.4 Interactional theories of metaphor

Interactional theories see metaphors as a linguistic means of organizing perceptions and gaining new insights.

*Billboards are warts on the landscape.*

This metaphor says more than any paraphrase, because *wart* focuses perceptions of *billboards*.

Notice that reversing the metaphor confuses rather than focuses:

*Warts are billboards on the body.*

Similes are just as metaphoric as metaphors, so they can't be used to explain metaphors (as traditional theories do):

*Billiards are like warts on the landscape.*

6.2.5 Cognitive Linguistic theories of metaphor

Cognitive Linguistic theories see metaphor as basic to human cognition and language behavior (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987). Metaphors are necessary for our basic grasp of time, evaluation, emotions and so on.

*go back in time*
*in the distant future*
*before the fall*
*stocks dropped, then rose*
*the Euro ended above the Yen*
*feeling lowdown*
*in a black mood*
*their hot love cooled*

We perceive things via metaphor, i.e. we cognize abstracts in terms of basics, so we must speak of them as such, e.g. we speak of time in terms of money, as in the proverb,

*time is money: time is precious*
*spend time*
*waste time*
*run out of time*

Even our understanding of language and communication is based on the "conduit metaphor" (Reddy 1969):

*Linguistic expressions are containers for meaning.*

*put/capture an idea in words*
*her words convey her meaning*
*her words carry little meaning*
*get your ideas across*
*his words are hollow*
*the words bore a clear message to us*
And, again, metonymy:

Part for whole: Get your ass over here
Producer for product: She owns a Picasso
Controller for controlled: Napoleon lost at Waterloo
Place for institution: Berlin contacted Paris etc.

Cognitive linguists argue that metaphors organize our perceptions, but the picture is far from clear

Single source domain with multiple target domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>source domain</th>
<th>target domain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>heat in container</td>
<td>anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to boil over to let off steam</td>
<td>progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also: recurrence of an image with no apparent organizing principle

kick over the traces,
kick up a fuss,
alive and kicking,
I can’t kick
to kick off/kick the bucket,
kicking and screaming
7. Semantic scripts

Lexicon of a natural language cannot be an unordered list. Words are not recalled as independent units, but as elements in a Gestalt, a system of related words and concepts.

Speakers of a language have access to a vast semantic system consisting of interrelated semantic scripts. This system as a network of nodes connecting concepts, e.g.,

- **concept 'house'** connects with
  - 'has a roof'
  - 'has walls'
  - 'has windows'
  and with
  - 'is a home for people'
  - 'has a mortgage'
  - 'is real estate'

- **concept 'baker'** connects with
  - 'bakes bread'
  - 'gets up early'
  - 'sells cakes'
  - 'uses flour'
  - 'kneads dough'

- **concept 'chastity'** connects with
  - 'is a virtue'
  - 'take a vow of'
Thinking of one word in a script primes any other word in the script. The cognitive activation of the word bread facilitates activation of baker and flour as priming spreads and connects all shared concepts.

Cognitive scientists developed frames (also variously called schemas and cognitive models) to represent recognition, categorization and memory for recurrent experiences and semantic relations.

Frame theory has roots in work by Bateson (1953, 1954), Goffman (1967, 1974)

Fillmore’s proposed frame theory for linguistic semantics.

Fillmore (1976, 1985) suggested representing aspects of our knowledge of word meanings and their relations in lexical frames.

Rosch (1973, 1975) showed:

some properties are more salient than others
some members of a category are more typical
It's impossible to define many words without exemplification, e.g.: color, fruit, game

Instead of: “a fruit is the edible part of a plant” etc.
We find: “a fruit is like an apple, a peach or a banana”

Word meanings and categories generally not defined by features or propositions, but by prototypes

Testing for prototypes

1. Ask subjects to identify typical bird:

2. Ask subjects for typical statements about birds, e.g.

   A bird was singing outside my window
   A bird flew down and caught a worm

3. Then substitute different bird names into the statements and ask how well they fit:

   A robin/eagle/chicken was singing outside my window
   A robin/eagle/chicken flew down and caught a worm

4. Test for speed of verification of identity statements

   A robin/eagle/chicken/penguin/ostrich/bat is a bird
frame for birds includes some prototypical bird like a sparrow with characteristic features like wings, feathers and a beak, along with characteristic facts, e.g. birds fly, birds perch, birds sing, birds lay eggs

Items that fail to match our prototypes are hard to classify, e.g. penguins and ostriches as birds

Also Prototype Effects in grammar:

Prototype: A trout is a typical fish
Marginal: A tadpole is a kind of a fish
Non-member: Their daughter is a regular fish

Note: real members don't fit here:
*This trout is a regular fish

Prototypical verb meanings extend:

The kid runs around the house
The pavement runs around the house
The rainwater runs down the spout
The Mississippi runs from Minnesota to the Gulf

Peter climbed a ladder
The plane climbed to 30,000 feet
The ivy climbed the fence
The temperature climbed to 30°C
Judy climbed down into the well

The scripts of Schank and Abelson (1977) and the cognitive models of Lakoff (1987) represent a more highly structured version of the semantic networks above.

In addition to the connections between nodes:

The script for 'baker' identifies prototypes for the profession like 'the winner of this year's baking contest' or 'the owner of the bakery at the foot of the hill'

The script for 'chastity' identifies prototypes for the virtue like the goddess Diana or Saint Augustine, it distinguishes characteristics like 'is a virtue' from linguistic constructions in which the word chastity occurs such as take a vow of chastity
Scripts/Frames/Schemas/Cognitive models also account for inferences:

- semantic relation between 'robbery' and 'crime' accounts for inferences like:
  - Harry robbed a bank $\rightarrow$ Harry committed a crime

But connections below explicable only in frame theory:

- Harry and Judy robbed a bank $\rightarrow$ Judy drove the getaway car
- Harry and Judy robbed a bank $\rightarrow$ Harry and Judy split the money
- Harry robbed a bank $\rightarrow$ Harry is serving a prison term

Complete frame for 'bank robbery' will include:

- robbery is a crime, robbers collect and later split money from the bank, one robber drives getaway car, getting caught involves a prison term etc.

Frame theory finally presents a semantic theory adequate for discourse:

Frame theory finally gets beyond words as independent units

8 Semantics and grammar

8.1 Grammatical categories

- Grammatical gender in Nouns: masculine, feminine, (neuter) vs. semantic features [+male], [+female]
- das Mädchen, s'Julia, la sentinelle, the ship . . . she

- Grammatical number: singular, plural (dual) cf. semantic countability and non-countability (mass interpretation)
Note:

- hair – Haar, Haare; cheveux, capelli
- scissors vs. Schere
- pants/jeans – Hose (pair of pants)
- loaves of bread – Brot
- wheat vs. oats – Hafer
- herd of cows, government, family is/are

Active and Passive Mood: syntactic vs. semantic relation

Many arrows did not hit the target – The target was not hit by many arrows

Many people read few books – Few books are read by many people

8.2 Grammatical relations

Grammatical subject and (direct) object of a sentence vs. semantic actor/agent and receiver of action

Note: prototype subject is a sentient agent intentionally initiating dynamic action toward some goal

Judy decisively smashed Bill’s watch to pieces with a hammer

cf. Judy accidentally broke Bill’s watch with a hammer

The wild gorilla smashed Bill’s watch to pieces
The falling boulder smashed Bill’s watch to pieces
The wet climate ruined Bill’s watch
Moisture affected Bill’s watch
Bill’s watch stopped
Bill’s watch looks old

Compare subject and object relations in:

Judy pushed Bill & Judy saw Bill (but he didn’t see her)
Judy resembles Bill & Judy angered Bill (but she didn’t realize it)

Also indirect agency:

General Leathwell won the battle

And causative agent in:

Kevin caused the frog to die
Kevin tortured the frog to death
Kevin killed the frog

cf. Cathy felled the tree
Cathy caused the tree to fall
8.3 Semantic Case (Fillmore 1968, 1977)

“universal, presumably innate concepts”:
AGENT, PATIENT, INSTRUMENT, EXPERIENCER, SOURCE, GOAL, LOCATION

AGENT PATIENT INSTRUMENT LOCATION
Judy teased Fido with a stick in the yard

EXPERIENCER AGENT GOAL SOURCE
Judy enjoys Fred making pots of clay

cf.
Judy opened the door – Judy opened the door with a stick
A stick opened the door – The door opened

8.4.1 Sentence Type

declarative, imperative & interrogative as syntactic forms
vs. making statements, giving orders & asking questions

Compare:
dec.: I want to know where you’ve been
int.: Haven’t you heard that we won?
imp.: Understand that I must leave

Tell me what you have done

Also: performatives in declarative form:
I hereby sentence you to life imprisonment
I solemnly promise to pay you back by June

And: Speech acts idioms:

Can you pass the salt?
I would like some salt.

as standard requests (note use with please)
Do you know who won?
Guess who won?

as standard pre-announcements
A: Do you know/guess who won the game?
B: Who?
A: Judy.
B: Wow, cool.
9 Utterance Meaning

Utterance vs. sentence; meaning in interaction; meaning related to types of acts and events; spoken vs written

Uses of language

Information exchange vs phatic function: "mere exchange of words"

Ideational (logical, experiential), Interpersonal, Textual

Also: Instrumental and magic functions

Speech events, text types

For any ling. community, we can recognize certain events such as: salestalk, chat, gossip, bull session, sermon etc.

and typical written forms: personal and business letters, recipe, newspaper column, short story

9.1 Presupposition

Early linguistic treatments of presupposition saw it as a semantic property of sentences and even of particular lexical items:

Verbs murder and kill both assert that the object ends up dead,

but murder presupposes the act was intentional by subject;

assassinate presupposes beyond murder that object held political office
Pragmatic account of presupposition

defines presupposition in terms of appropriateness, assumptions and dispositions of speakers, and reasonable inferences by audiences, e.g. Stalnaker’s (1974)

A proposition B is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context just in case the speaker assumes or believes that B, assumes that his audience assumes or believes B, and assumes or believes that his audience recognizes that he is making these assumptions.

Note particularly the reflexive assumptions in this definition of presupposition: “speaker assumes that hearer assumes that speaker assumes etc.”

Types of presuppositions:

• **Existential**

  Any name or definite description refers to an identifiable individual

  Judy gave the red ball to the boy with freckles
  → There’s a girl named Judy, a red ball and a boy with freckles

  Negation test: Mary’s car is fast → Mary has a car
  Mary’s car is not fast → Mary has a car

• **Factive** (with factive predicates):

  Bill regrets/resents that Suzy won the game → Suzy won the game
  Suzy is happy/sad that she won the game → Suzy won the game

• **Non-Factive**

  Nancy imagined/pretended she was rich → Nancy was not rich

• **Lexical**

  Vera stopped smoking → Vera used to smoke
  Tony failed again → Tony failed once before

• **Structural**

  Why did Harry steal the money? → Harry stole the money

• **Counter-Factual**

  If you were my friend, you’d help → You’re not my friend
9.2 Implicature

By contrast with the old model of communication (Shannon & Weaver 1949) with Speaker encoding and Hearer decoding:

Grice (1957, 1975): meaning grounded in speaker intentions and reflexive assumptions between speaker and hearer about shared goals and principles.

Grice (1957) distinguishes natural and non-natural meaning.

natural meaning: causal connection between sign and meaning, as in:
- ‘dark clouds mean rain’,
- ‘red spots on skin mean measles’
no intention necessary on part of sender

speakers may convey meanings they're trying to hide, as when:
someone says ‘no’, but their smile suggests they mean ‘yes’
someone’s overly careful pronunciation suggests they’re nervous

non-natural meaning (meaning₂):
no causal connection between sign and meaning, instead someone uses sign intending to convey meaning.

Grice then makes intention and the recognition of intention the basis of meaning, generally

Sender S meant to by uttering U if and only if:
(i) S intended U to cause some effect z in recipient H.
(ii) S intended (i) to be achieved simply by H recognizing that intention (i).

S gets H to think or do something just by getting H to recognize that S is trying to cause that thought or action.
Attaining this state of mutual knowledge is the goal of communication

S’s intention becomes mutual knowledge, i.e. S knows that H knows that S knows that H knows (etc. ad infinitum) that S has this particular intention
Recall: presupposition shared between S and H and reference as a process between S and H
When S speaks literally, H understands what is meant by recognizing S’s intention to convey a meaning based on the literal meaning of what S says. But S can mean something more or different than S literally says.
Here Grice’s theory of meaning extends into a theory of language use and inference
According to the Cooperative Principle and the Conversational Maxims, communication works because hearers recognize that speakers produce messages with the intention that hearers recognize their intentions, and hearers derive meaning from apparent violations of the Maxims via inference
Meaning through Inferences derived from the Cooperative Principle (CP), along with its Conversational Maxims (Grice)

The Cooperative Principle:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
The maxims (Quantity, Quality, Relation, Manner) reflect common-sense rules for successful everyday communication.
They allow hearers to fill in unstated assumptions and make sense of apparent violations of the CP, e.g.
Maxim of Quantity: Say as much as you need to say but no more than necessary
Maxim of Relation: Be relevant

Thus, a speaker can use the Maxim of Quantity to invite the inference that no more can be said, as in:
Al: I hope you brought the bread and the cheese.
Sue: I brought the cheese.
→ I didn’t bring the bread
‘Sometimes the lecture is interesting.’
→ not usually, not always
these count as Generalized conversational implicature, because they work in any similar context
A speaker might also violate the Maxim of Relation to force the hearer to draw a special conclusion, as in:

Sue: Are you coming to the big party tonight?
Al: My parents are visiting.
➔ I'm not coming

This counts as a Particularized conversational implicature, because it requires this particular context.

Grice also identifies Conventional implicatures tied to specific words:
Even George came to the party.
➔ It was unexpected

Judy hit Al and he cried.
➔ Al cried after Judy hit him and because she hit him.

Grice also mentions social maxims like Politeness opposed to conversational maxims and R. Lakoff (1973) developed the notion of social maxims vs. conversational maxims as the basis of Politeness Theory—another approach to inference in everyday talk.

Grice (1957) makes intention and recognition of intention the basis of meaning, but there's considerable evidence against intention-based theories of meaning:
- Figurative meanings don't take longer to work out than so-called literal ones.
- Kids understand talk well, even when too young to guess about intentions.
- Personal experience that listeners don't always cooperate.

Grice's theory in particular:
- Fails to take power and politeness into account.
- Offers no specific procedures for working out non-literal interpretations.
- There are models of comprehension not based on intention.

Or where intention doesn't play such a central role:
- Discourse-based models, where hearer is the center of interpretive process.
- Conversation Analysis (CA) stresses interactive nature of meaning.
- CA sees meaning as product of negotiation subject to audience influence and interpretation (e.g. Sacks 1992).
In CA, meaning is determined by following turns:

Consider:

(1) **Ann:** Do you want to come along? Request for info  
**Hal:** Yes. Reply  
**Ann:** Then we'll need another car. Justification for question

(2) **Ann:** Do you want to come along? Offer  
**Hal:** Yes. Acceptance  
**Ann:** Great! Comment

(3) **Ann:** Do you want to come along? Pre-warning  
**Hal:** Yes. Reply  
**Ann:** You better be ready in five minutes. Warning  
**Hal:** Okay.

(4) **Ann:** Do you want to come along? Pre-invitation  
**Hal:** Not really. Refusal  
**Ann:** We sure wish you'd come. Invitation  
**Hal:** Okay then. Acceptance

(5) **Ann:** Do you know who's coming? Pre-announcement  
**Hal:** No, who? Reply  
**Ann:** Mary, Betty and Ron. Announcement

(6) **Ann:** Do you know who's coming? Request for info  
**Hal:** Yeah, Mary, Betty and Ron. Answer  
**Ann:** Oh. Comment

9.3 Speech acts

Meaning through interactional significance of acts performed with words

Declarations are those kinds of speech acts that change the world via their utterance.

- **Priest:** I now pronounce you husband and wife.
- **Jury Foreman:** We find the defendant guilty.

Representatives are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker believes to be the case or not.

- **Priest:** I now pronounce you husband and wife.
- **Jury Foreman:** We find the defendant guilty.
Expressives are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker feels. They express psychological states and can be statements of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or sorrow.

a. I'm really sorry!
   b. Congratulations!

Directives are speech acts speakers use to get someone else to do something.

a. Give me a cup of coffee.
   b. Could you lend me a pen, please?

Commissives are speech acts which commit speakers to a certain course of action. In using a commissive, the speaker undertakes to make the world fit the words.

a. I'll be back in a minute.
   b. We won't ever do that again.

Speech act theory is not a theory of everyday talk or communication. It does not include notions like power and solidarity. It has no principled means for describing sequentiality.

9.4 Reference

Reference as a speech act, in Speech Act Theory according to Searle:

Speakers use words (and gestures) to refer, i.e. to identify the objects under discussion for audience.

Like presupposition and implicature, reference requires reflexive assumptions by speaker and hearer that they are talking about the same person or thing. Reference turns out to be more of an interaction between speaker and hearer than a single act on the part of the speaker.
9.4.1 Reference and co-reference

Once reference is established, speakers go on to refer back to persons and objects

- Exophoric reference: to objects in the context
- Endophoric reference: to objects identified elsewhere in text

Two identification devices can be “co-referential”

She just can’t take care of herself.

→ here she and herself are co-referential,

Reflexive pronouns (myself, yourself, herself) show coreference within the sentence.

Co-reference can cross sentence boundaries as well.

She could refer to someone in the context (exophoric) or to someone identified elsewhere in the text (endophoric), e.g.

Jill is irresponsible. She just can’t take care of herself.

Then Jill, she and herself would all be co-referential, though only she counts as a textual cohesive device.

Note: anaphoric reference to previous text, as in most cases, versus cataphoric reference to following text, as in:

I would never have believed it. Now even Judy has quit her job!

Note: major disjunction between speech roles:

Only 1st and 2nd person (I, you, we) refer to participants in context (exophoric), while 3rd person (he, she, it, they) refers (endophorically) to someone/something in text, except in reported speech, e.g.

Here’s a note from Sue. She writes, “I leave for Lyon tonight.”

Note: only it has “extended reference” to whole phrase, clause, paragraph, topic, e.g.

Judy was drinking again.

And driving drunk.

She ran into a tree, and broke both legs.

And it doesn’t surprise me a bit.

Here it can refer to the injury, the accident, the drinking and driving or the whole incident.
9.4.2 Reference as process and negotiation in conversation

Reference requires reflexive assumptions by speaker and hearer that they are talking about the same person or thing, and this naturally leads to explicit talk between interlocutors to secure uptake and ensure understanding.

Reference is not a simple speech act, but a process of negotiation between speaker and hearer.

collaborative remembering produces complete personal reference

1 Ann: she bought a chest of drawers from um what’s that gal’s name?
2 just went back to Michigan.
3 Helen um
4 Betty: oh I know who you mean, Brady, Brady.
5 Ann: yeah.
6 Helen Brady.
7 Betty: m-hm.

Establishing reference in storytelling

1 ALICE: ... there was three cars ... and the semi.
2 ... (H) And then, the
3 ... this uh, this
guy ... pulled up and,
4 MARY: (DRINKS)
5 ALICE: ... he was going to uh,
6 ... (H) Peggy,
7 ALICE: ... (YAWN) you remember Peggy White?
8 MARY: ... (TSK) Yeah.
9 ALICE: Her husband,
10 Gary Big hare?
11 MARY: Mhm?
12 ALICE: ... Hmm and her pulled up,
13 and they were in the van?
14 And they stopped to ask Ron what happened?
15 And here another car came and rear-ended em.
Identifying locations and other details

1 ALICE: Where'd you go.
2 ... to get em.
3 MARY: ... You know where Sarah and Arvela live?
4 ALICE: ... Mhm.
5 MARY: ... Just around the corner.
6 ... Remember that first ... cattle guard you go over?
7 ALICE: ... Uhunh.
8 MARY: I didn't even go over that.
9 ALICE: ... You mean,
10 ... kinda like ... by the –
11 ... by the [tunnel]?
12 MARY: [Right below the] tunnel.
13 ALICE: ... Oh-
14 MARY: ... And I just walked up –
15 ... We just walked up around uh,
16 that area,

There are other ways of negotiating reference in interaction:

1. Self-corrected noun phrases

Sally: She was giving me
all the people that were gone this year
I mean this quarter y'know

The referential process is not complete in a single speech act;
it's a process the speaker corrects the initial noun phrase
"this year" to "this quarter," marking the change with "I mean"

Note: y'know as understanding check

2. Expanded noun phrases

Although the first noun phrase may be correct, the speaker
may still change course:

Sally: Take the spout-the little one that looks like the end
of an oil can-
Jill: Okay.
Sally: -and put that on the opening in the other large tube.
   With the round top.
Sally begins with the spout, then judges it insufficient for Jill
to pick out the referent, so she expands on it with an extra
noun phrase.

The referential process may involve the addressee from the start.
Other-corrected noun phrases

Bill: How long you going to be here?
Ann: Uh- not too long. Uh just till uh Monday.
Bill: Till-a you mean like a week from tomorrow.
Ann: Yeah.

Speakers may bring addressees into the referential process by the very design of their utterance

Dummy noun phrases

The referential process may include dummy noun phrases like:

- what's-his-name
- thingamabob

"If he puts it into the diplomatic bag, as um-what's-his-name, Micky Cohn, did, then it's not so bad"

Dummy noun phrases don't necessarily enable the addressee to identify referent uniquely; they occur as part of an extended process.

9.5 Negotiated meaning

Meaning always implicitly negotiated between speaker and hearer

Reflective assumptions and interaction in reference and presupposition

Hearer inference for implicature and metaphor
Audience as co-author in literary theory
Meaning may be explicitly negotiated in face-to-face interaction

In the early years, children receive comments and corrections on their talk, e.g.

Nick: I got Fritzy a little jacket--that's broken.
Father: Torn or ripped.
Nick: Torn.
Speakers often produce corrections on their own talk, sometimes due to hearer reactions.

Bob: but it was in the middle of this Dubrovnik Garden. which is a very overgrown kind of a garden. I mean it's not overgrown.
Al: Yeah?
Bob: but things start off, with plenty of space between them. on the ground.
Al: Yes?
Bob: but when they get up to the sort of foliage level.
Al: (laughs)
Bob: they're all sort of interlinked.

but, ah, so signals something has gone wrong

Kay: they don't really get a lot of snow. Like--they got more than we did so far but, ah, so.
Bea: This is an exceptional year I hear.
Kay: Well they usually get--about as much as--we do.

can't dance leads to seeming contradiction

Ken: I can't dance, and- hell every time, every time there's a dance I'm always at it, an' I'm always dancin',
Ron: An' yer al--yer dancing?
Ken: Sure. I can't dance worth shit, I just move around hehh's all you gotta do.

In all these examples from face-to-face talk, speakers and hearers interact to negotiate the meanings of their words and phrasing.
9.6 Coherence Meaning through relations between utterances in discourse

**Thematic structure**
Clauses typically fall into two parts; the first identifies what the clause is about (theme), the second says something new about the theme (rheme).

**Example:**
- My sister borrowed this hammer from the plumber.
- The plumber lent this hammer to my sister.

**Theme is usually subject:**
- The duke gave my aunt that teapot.

**Note the effect of passives:**
- My aunt was given that teapot by the duke.
- That teapot the duke gave my aunt.

**Information structure**
Tone groups in speech typically fall into **Given** (recoverable) information and **New** information (not recoverable).

**Tone group may match clause, but need not; it corresponds to a single unit of information; not determined by foregoing discourse, but by what speaker wants to say and current assessment of hearer’s informational requirements.**

Discourse must start somewhere, so discourse unit may consist entirely of new information.

**Example:**
- Okay. This guy walks into this bar.

**Given information tends to be recoverable from context or foregoing text, hence it may receive no expression at all.**

**Example:**
- From context: (looking at spilled food):
  - What a mess!
  - This letter here is addressed to Sue.

**From foregoing text:**
- She should be along any minute now.
- Sue: Judy finally has a job offer.
- Bill: Great.

**So an information unit consists of an obligatory New element plus an optional Given.**
We were out driving.
And we saw this really old Ford truck.
It was like a Model A or something.
With these wooden side panels.
And it was like for sale, y’know.

Meaning through Lexical Cohesion

• Through Retention (verbatim repetition)
  
  Alice saw a mushroom. The mushroom was enormous.

• Through a Synonym:
  
  Alice saw a mountain. The peak shimmered in the distance.

• Through a Superordinate:
  
  Alice saw a willow. The tree was wet with dew.

• Through a General Noun:
  
  Alice saw a deer. The creature grazed on the meadow.

General nouns:

people person man woman child creature;
thing object stuff affair matter place idea
9.7 Conversation

Meaning through face-to-face interaction

Coherence in conversation

Conversation as a speech event or discourse type with its own characteristic cohesive devices and coherent structure

Understanding checks: y'know, right?, huh?, tags

Attention signals: m'hm, uh-huh, wow, really?

Discourse markers: so, anyway, okay?

Turn Structure

Turn, move;

Adjacency pair: greeting-greeting, question-answer

Pre-sequence: “Are you busy Saturday night?”

Sue: Hi.
Jill: Hi.
Sue: so, how have you been.
Jill: not so well really.
Sue: oh I’m sorry to hear that.
Jill: how about you?
Sue: not too bad. I guess.
Jill: yes, one muddles through.
Sue: by the way, I’m looking for Al.
Jill: I just saw him at Lou’s.
Sue: really? who else was there?
Jill: Fred.
Sue: wow. are you busy right now?
Jill: not really.
Sue: would you do me a favor?
Jill: sure.
Sue: would you call Al for me?
Jill: sure. no problem.
Sue: great. thanks.
Jill: no problem.

Interactional meaning in conversation

Turn economics vs. symphonies and tapestries

Metalingual talk, Repair, Correction, Clarification

Self-repair: I saw Judy last Tuesday- sorry, Monday.

Other-initiated repair:

A: I saw Judy last Tuesday.
B: Uh, Tuesday?
A: Oh, yeah, I saw her Monday at the party.

Other-repair:

A: I saw Judy last Monday.
B: You mean Tuesday.
A: Yeah, I saw her at Nancy’s.
What is the "interactional meaning" of:

- turn-taking,
- overlap, simultaneous speech,
- misunderstanding, correction, clarification,
- joint production, co-telling, duetting?

Talk among friends

10. Addie: anyway yeah
12. they're in Dubuque ... Christmas shopping
13. and [Amanda-]
14. Brienne: [making] an evening of it?
15. Addie: making an evening of it
16. they just [decided about-]
17. Brienne: [I see]
18. Addie: =six o'clock
20. Addie: that's so late to be [home]
21. Brienne: [oh] they'll be gone a while
22. [laughs]]
23. Addie: [yeah]
24. 'so so you're gonna be HOME then?=
25. Brienne: ([laughs])
26. Addie: =or will you be just gonna hangin around with Brianne?'
27. I'm like 'yeah, probably'
28. 'well GOOD'
29. ha [ha ha]

30. Brienne: [ua::h]
31. Addie: we're going shopping,
32. 'and you can take care of Amanda
33. when she gets back-
34. Brienne: so-
35. Addie: so I was like 'well, sure'
36. 'like I mean we might-
37. we might- we might have gotten a movie
38. 'well just wait till she gets BACK and then she-' [([laughs])]
39. Brienne: [mmm]
40. Addie: ([laughs]) but I was like 'well, I don't know'
41. 'cause I know we don't have a car or anything'
42. Brienne: yeah
43. Addie: 'I suppose we might just be hanging around'
44. Brienne: hanging
45. Addie: and she was like 'GOOD
46. well then we can go SHopp[ing]
47. Brienne: [([laughs])]
48. Addie: ([laughs]) and I said 'sure'
Patricia: she said she doesn't like to go over on Flavey Road. Flavey Road is where that
Ralph: truck went over the
Ralph: m-car
Patricia: car killing three people from Grant Lake.
Mary: what do you mean the truck went over?
Ralph: [guy from Atlanta] drove all the way over from Atlanta
Patricia: [guy] went over Flavey Road without a s-stop.
he had- he didn't have any sleep.
Ralph: amazing.
Amy: so-o?
Ralph: then he r- then he ran into a car,
Patricia: got off.
Ralph: I think he burst into flames, didn't he?
Patricia: mhm, ca- the truck ran right over.
Ralph: ran right over him.
Patricia: right up and over
and killed three young people.
Mary: up and over what?
Ralph: [a CAR]
Pat: [a CAR]
Ralph: [at an exit ramp.] Pat: [with three young] coup-three young people in it

MELISSA: I can't write them exactly the way they are, because they stink.
JAN: Then you need to go downstairs and finish it.
MELISSA: [I'm fine.]
FRANK: Melissa.
MELISSA: [it's nine o'clock].
FRANK: [It's nine o'clock ... in the evening].
JAN: [You also have algebra] to do.
MELISSA: I can skip algebra.
FRANK: do you [can?]
JAN: [No].
MELISSA: [You (HO)] -- [Alright (read)].
JAN: I'll do my algebra then.
FRANK: No, you go- take that downstairs.
JAN: [Ho- ho- honey]. You need to -- be able to concentrate and get it done.
[and don't argue].
There are many different kinds of meanings in a language system. And there are many "ways of meaning" in interaction. So there can be no single theory of meaning. Instead we require different approaches to different modes of meaning. Some meaning is lexical, attached to words. Much of this meaning comes out in the study of relations between lexical items in the vocabularies of natural languages. Some sets of words can be sensibly decomposed into features. Feature approaches to lexical meaning can reveal fundamental relations with the vocabulary of a single language and across various languages.

Some meaning comes from the constructions words occur in. Syntactic choices have meanings of their own. Speech acts have specific meanings in speech events. Word meanings interact with and co-determine one another in constructions. These meanings are further constrained and developed in the discourse context and in the surrounding context-of-situation. Speakers and hearers negotiate meaning in concrete contexts. Reference, presupposition and inference require shared knowledge and beliefs about the context, topic and goals of discourse and interaction. Interpersonal meanings develop in spoken interaction. They reflect identity and build on social relations.

Paralinguistic features of talk, facial expressions, gaze, gestures, body language all contribute to meaning in face-to-face interaction as well. Linguistic semantics needs to address all these matters and more to achieve a complete description of meaning in natural language.
Thanks for attending, enjoy your semester break!